A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P R S T U V W X Z

My Days of Adventure

E >> Ernest Alfred Vizetelly >> My Days of Adventure




There were from 10,000 to 12,000 men in our force, which now ranked as the
fourth division of the 21st army corps. Nearly all the men of both
brigades were Breton Mobilisés, adjoined to whom, however, perhaps for the
purpose of steadying them, were three or four very small detachments of
former regiments of the line. There was also a small contingent of the
French Foreign Legion, which had been brought from Algeria. Starting from
Yvré l'Evêque towards, noon on December 4, we marched to Ardenay, where
we spent the night. The weather was fine and dry, but intensely cold.
On the 5th we camped on some hills near the town of Saint Calais, moved
only a mile or two farther on the 6th--there being a delay in the receipt
of certain orders--then, at seven o'clock on the 7th, started in the
direction of Vendôme, marching for about twelve hours with only the
briefest halts. We passed from the department of the Sarthe into that
of Loir-et-Cher, going on until we reached a little place called
Ville-aux-Cleros, where we spent the night under uncomfortable conditions,
for it snowed. Early the following day we set out again, and, leaving
Vendôme a couple of miles or so away on our right, we passed Fréteval and
camped on the outskirts of the forest of Marchenoir.

The night proved bitterly cold, the temperature being some fourteen
degrees (centigrade) below freezing-point. I slept huddled up in a van,
but the men generally were under canvas, and there was very little straw
for them to lie upon, in such wise that in the morning some of them
actually found their garments frost-bound to the ground! Throughout the
night of the 10th we heard guns booming in the distance. On the 11th, the
12th, and the 13th December we were continually marching, always going in
the direction of the guns. We went from Ecoman to Morée, to Saint
Hilaire-la-Gravelle, and thence to the Chateau de Rougemont near
Fréteval, a spot famous as the scene of a victory gained by our Richard
Coeur-de-Lion over Philip Augustus. The more or less distant artillery
fire was incessant both by day and by night; but we were only supporting
other divisions of the corps, and did not find ourselves actually engaged.
On the 15th, however, there was very sharp fighting both at Fréteval and
Morée, and on the morning of the 16th our Gatlings went forward to support
the second division of our army corps, which was being hard pressed by the
Germans.

All at once, however, orders for a general retreat arrived, Chanzy having
at last decided to fall back on Le Mans. There was considerable confusion,
but at last our men set out, taking a north-westerly direction. Fairly
good order prevailed on the road, and the wiry little Bretons at least
proved that their marching powers were unimpaired. We went on incessantly
though slowly during the night, and did not make a real halt until about
seven o'clock on the following morning, when, almost dead-beat, we reached
a little town called Droué.

Jaurès, I should mention, had received the order to retreat at about four
o'clock on the afternoon of December 16, and had speedily selected three
different routes for the withdrawal of the 21st army corps. Our division,
however, was the last to quit its positions, it being about eight o'clock
at night when we set out. Thus our march lasted nine hours. The country
was a succession of sinuous valleys and stiff slopes, and banks often
overlooked the roads, which were edged with oaks and bushes. There were
several streams, a few woods, and a good many little copses. Farms often
lay close together, and now and again attempts were made to buy food and
drink of the peasantry, who, upon hearing our approach, came at times with
lights to their thresholds. But they were a close-fisted breed, and
demanded exorbitant prices. Half a franc was the lowest charge for a piece
of bread. Considering how bad the men's boots were, the marching was very
good, but a number of men deserted under cover of the night. Generally
speaking, though there was a slight skirmish at Cloyes and an engagement
at Droué, as I shall presently relate, the retreat was not greatly
hampered by the enemy. In point of fact, as the revelations of more recent
years have shown, Moltke was more anxious about the forces of Bourbaki
than about those of Chanzy, and both Prince Frederick Charles and the
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had instructions to keep a strict watch on the
movements of Bourbaki's corps. Nevertheless, some of the Grand Duke's
troops--notably a body of cavalry--attempted to cut off our retreat. When,
however, late on the 16th, some of our men came in contact with a
detachment of the enemy near Cloyes, they momentarily checked its
progress, and, as I have indicated, we succeeded in reaching Droué without
loss.

That morning, the 17th, the weather was again very cold, a fog following
the rain and sleet of the previous days. Somewhat later, however, snow
began to fall. At Droué--a little place of about a thousand inhabitants,
with a ruined castle and an ancient church--we breakfasted as best we
could. About nine o'clock came marching orders, and an hour later, when a
large number of our men were already on their way towards Saint Agil, our
next halting-place, General Gougeard mounted and prepared to go off with
his staff, immediately in advance of our rear-guard. At that precise
moment, however, we were attacked by the Germans, whose presence near us
we had not suspected.

It was, however, certainly known to some of the inhabitants of Droué, who,
terrified by all that they had heard of the harshness shown by the Germans
towards the localities where they encountered any resistance, shrank from
informing either Gougeard or any of his officers that the enemy was at
hand. The artillery with which our rear was to be protected was at this
moment on the little square of Droué. It consisted of a mountain battery
under Sub-Lieutenant Gouesse of the artillery, and three Gatlings under
Sub-Lieutenant De la Forte of the navy, with naval lieutenant Rodellec du
Porzic in chief command. Whilst it was being brought into position,
Colonel Bernard, Gougeard's chief of staff, galloped off to stop the
retreat of the other part of our column. The enemy's force consisted of
detachments of cavalry, artillery, and Landwehr infantry. Before our
little guns could be trained on them, the Landwehr men had already seized
several outlying houses, barns, and sheds, whence they strove to pick off
our gutiners. For a moment our Mobilisés hesitated to go forward, but
Gougeard dashed amongst them, appealed to their courage, and then led them
against the enemy.

Not more than three hundred yards separated the bulk of the contending
forces, indeed there were some Germans in the houses less than two hundred
yards away. Our men at last forced these fellows to decamp, killing and
wounding several of them; whilst, thanks to Colonel Bernard's prompt
intervention, a battalion of the 19th line regiment and two companies of
the Foreign Legion, whose retreat was hastily stopped, threatened the
enemy's right flank. A squadron of the Second Lancers under a young
lieutenant also came to our help, dismounting and supporting Gougeard's
Mobilises with the carbines they carried. Realizing that we were in force,
the enemy ended by retreating, but not until there had been a good deal of
fighting in and around the outlying houses of Droué.

Such, briefly, was the first action I ever witnessed. Like others, I was
under fire for some time, being near the guns and helping to carry away
the gunners whom the Germans shot from the windows of the houses in which
they had installed themselves. We lost four or five artillerymen in that
manner, including the chief officer, M. de Rodelleo du Porzic, whom a
bullet struck in the chest. He passed away in a little café whither we
carried him. He was, I believe, the last of his family, two of his
brothers having previously been killed in action.

We lost four or five other officers in this same engagement, as well as a
Breton chaplain of the Mobilisés. Our total losses were certainly larger
than Gougeard subsequently stated in his official report, amounting in
killed and wounded, I think, to from 120 to 150 men. Though the officers
as a rule behaved extremely well--some of them, indeed, splendidly--there
were a few lamentable instances of cowardice. By Gougeard's orders, four
were placed under arrest and court-martialled at the end of the retreat.
Of these, two were acquitted, whilst a third was shot, and a fourth
sentenced to two years' imprisonment in a fortress. [From the formation of
the "Army of Brittany" until the armistice the total number of executions
was eleven. They included one officer (mentioned above) for cowardice in
presence of the enemy; five men of the Foreign Legion for murdering
peasants; one Franc-titeur for armed robbery, and four men (Line and
Mobile Guards) for desertion in presence of the enemy. The number would
have been larger had it been possible to identify and punish those who
were most guilty in the stampede of La Tuilerie during the battle of
Le Mans.]

The enemy's pursuit having been checked, we eventually quitted Droué, but
when we had gone another three miles or so and reached a village called
Fontenelle, the Germans came on again. It was then about two o'clock in
the afternoon, and for a couple of hours or so, whilst we continued our
retreat, the enemy kept up a running cannonade, repeatedly endeavouring
to harass our rear. We constantly replied to their fire, however, and
steadily kept them off, losing only a few men before the dusk fell, when
the pursuit ceased. We afterwards plodded on slowly--the roads being in a
terrible condition--until at about half-past six o'clock we reached the
village of Saint Agil, where the staff installed itself at Count de
Saint-Maixent's stately renaissance château.

The weather was better on December 18, for, though it was extremely cold,
the snow ceased falling. But we still had a formidable task before us.
The roads, as I have said, were wretched, and at Saint Agil we had to
contend with some terrible quagmires, across which we found it at first
impossible to get our guns, ammunition-vans, and baggage train. It became
necessary to lop and fell trees, and form with them a kind of bed over
which our impedimenta might travel. Hour after hour went by amidst
incessant labour. An ammunition waggon containing only half its proper
load required the efforts of a dozen horses to pull it over that morass,
whilst, as for the guns, each of the 12's required even more horses.
It was three o'clock on the afternoon of the 18th when the last gun was
got across. Three gun-carriages were broken during those efforts, but our
men managed to save the pieces. Late in the operations the Germans again
put in an appearance, but were held in respect by our Gatlings and
mountain-guns. Half an hour, however, after our departure from Saint Agil,
they entered the village.

In a very wretched condition, half-famished and footsore, we went on,
through the sudden thaw which had set in, towards Vibraye, whose forest,
full in those days of wild boars and deer, stretched away on our left.
We were now in the department of the Sarthe, and, cutting across country
in the direction of the Huisne, we at last reached the ancient little
_bourg_ of Connerré, on the high-road running (left of the river) towards
Le Mans. There I took leave of our column, and, after buying a shirt and
some socks, hastened to the railway station--a mile and a half distant--
hoping, from what was told me, that there might be some means of getting
to Le Mans by train, instead of accompanying our men along the highway.
At Connerré station I found a very good inn, where I at once partook of
the best meal that I had eaten since leaving Le Mans, sixteen days
previously. I then washed, put on my new shirt and socks, and went to
interview the station-master. After a great deal of trouble, as I had a
permit signed by Colonel Bernard, and wore an ambulance armlet, I was
allowed to travel to Le Mans in a railway van. There was no regular
service of trains, the only ones now running so far north being used for
military purposes. I got to Le Mans a few hours before our column reached
Yvré l'Evêque on the night of December 20, and at once sought a train
which would convey me to Rennes, if not as far as Saint Malo. Then came
another long, slow, dreary journey in a villainous wooden-seated
third-class carriage. It was between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning
when we reached Rennes. I still had about five-and-twenty francs in my
pocket, and knowing that it would not cost me more than a quarter of that
amount to get to Saint Malo, I resolved to indulge in a good _dejeuner_ at
the Hôtel de France.

There was nobody excepting a few waiters in the long dining-room, but the
tables were already laid there. When, however, I seated myself at one of
them, the head-waiter came up declaring that I could not be accommodated,
as the tables were reserved for _ces messieurs_. I was inquiring who
_ces messieurs_ might be, when some of them entered the room in a very
swaggering manner. All were arrayed in stylish and brand-new uniforms,
with beautiful boots, and looked in the pink of condition. They belonged,
I found, to a free corps called the "Eclaireurs d'Ille-et-Vilaine," and
their principal occupations were to mess together copiously and then
stroll about the town, ogling all the good-looking girls they met. The
corps never went to the front. Three or four weeks afterwards, when I
again passed through Rennes--this second time with my father--Messieurs
les Eclaireurs were still displaying their immaculate uniforms and highly
polished boots amidst all the misery exhibited by the remnants of one of
Chanzy's _corps d'armée_.

Though I was little more than a boy, my blood fairly boiled when I was
requested to give up my seat at table for these arrogant young fops.
I went to complain at the hotel _bureau_, but, being confronted there by
the landlady instead of by the landlord, I did not express my feelings so
strongly as I might have done. "Madame" sweetly informed me that the first
_déjeuner_ was entirely reserved for Messieurs les Eclaireurs, but that,
if I would wait till the second _déjeuner_ at noon, I should find ample
accommodation. However, I was not inclined to do any such thing. I thought
of all the poor, famished, shivering men whom I had left less than
twenty-four hours previously, and some of whom I had more than once helped
to buy bread and cheese and wine during our long and painful marches.
They, at all events, had done their duty as best they could, and I felt
highly indignant with the swaggering young bloods of Rennes, who were
content to remain in their native town displaying their uniforms and
enjoying themselves. Fortunately, such instances were very rare.

Returning to the railway station, I obtained something to eat at the
refreshment-room, where I presently heard somebody trying to make
a waiter understand an order given in broken French. Recognizing a
fellow-countryman, I intervened and procured what he desired. I found that
he was going to Saint Malo like myself, so we made the journey together.
He told me that, although he spoke very little French, he had come to
France on behalf of an English boot-making firm in order to get a contract
from some of the military authorities. Many such people were to be found
in Brittany, at Le Mans, at Tours, and elsewhere, during the latter period
of the war. An uncle of mine, Frederick Vizetelly, came over, I remember,
and interviewed Freyeinet and others on behalf of an English small-arm
firm. I forget whether he secured a contract or not; but it is a
lamentable and uncontrovertible fact that many of the weapons and many of
the boots sold by English makers to the National Defence were extremely
defective. Some of the American weapons were even worse than ours. As for
the boots, they often had mere "composition soles," which were soon worn
out. I saw, notably after the battle of Le Mans, hundreds--I believe I
might say, without, exaggeration, thousands--of men whose boots were mere
remnants. Some hobbled through the snow with only rags wrapped round their
bleeding feet. On the other hand, a few of our firms undoubtedly supplied
satisfactory boots, and it may have been so in the case of the traveller
whom I met at Rennes.

A few days after my return to Saint Malo, my cousin, Montague Vizetelly,
arrived there with a commission from the _Daily News_ to join Chanzy's
forces at Le Mans. Mr. Robinson, I was afterwards told, had put some
questions about me to my brother Adrian, and, on hearing how young I was,
had thought that I might not be equal to the occasion if a decisive battle
between Prince Frederick Charles and Chanzy should be fought. My cousin--
then four-and-twenty years of age--was accordingly sent over. From that
time nearly all my war letters were forwarded to the _Pall Mall Gazette_,
and, as it happened, one of them was the first account of the great battle
of Le Mans, from the French side, to appear in an English paper.



XI

BEFORE LE MANS

The War in various Regions of France--General Faidherbe--Battle of
Pont-Noyelles--Unreliability of French Official News--Engagement of
Nuits--Le Bourget Sortie--Battles of Bapaume and Villersexel--Chanzy's
Plan of Operations--The Affair of Saint Calais--Wretched State of some
of Chanzy's Soldiers--Le Mans and its Historical Associations--The
Surrounding Country--Chanzy's Career--Positions of his Forces--Advance
of Prince Frederick Charles--The first Fighting before Le Mans and its
Result.


Whilst Chanzy was retreating on Le Mans, and there reorganizing and
reinforcing his army, a variety of operations went on in other parts
of France. After the German occupation of Amiens, Moltke instructed
Manteuffel to advance on Rouen, which he did, afterwards despatching a
column to Dieppe; the result being that on December 9 the Germans, for
the first time, reached the sea-coast. Since December 3 Faidherbe had
taken the chief command of the Army of the North at Lille. He was
distinctly a clever general, and was at that time only fifty-two years of
age. But he had spent eleven years in Senegal, organizing and developing
that colony, and his health had been impaired by the tropical West African
climate. Nevertheless, he evinced no little energy, and never despaired,
however slender might be the forces under him, and however cramped his
position. As soon as he had reorganized the army entrusted to his charge,
he moved towards Amiens, and on December 23 and 24 a battle was fought at
Pont-Noyelles, in the vicinity of that town. In some respects Faidherbe
gained the advantage, but his success was a barren one, and his losses
were far greater than those of the Germans, amounting, indeed, to 2300 men
(apart from many deserters), whereas the enemy's were not more than a
thousand. Gambetta, however, telegraphed to the Prefects that a great
victory had been gained; and I remember that when a notice to that effect
was posted at the town-hall of Saint Servan, everybody there became
jubilant.

Most of our war-news, or, at least, the earliest intelligence of any
important engagement, came to us in the fashion I have indicated,
townsfolk constantly assembling outside the prefectures, subprefectures,
and municipal buildings in order to read the day's news. At times it was
entirely false, at others some slight success of the French arms was
magnified into a victory, and a petty engagement became a pitched battle.
The news in the French newspapers was usually very belated and often quite
unreliable, though now and again telegrams from London were published,
giving information which was as near to the truth as the many English war
correspondents on both sides could ascertain. After the war, both
Frenchmen and Germans admitted to me that of all the newspaper
intelligence of the period there was nothing approaching in accuracy
that which was imparted by our British correspondents. I am convinced,
from all I heard in Paris, in Berlin, in Vienna, and elsewhere, during
the two or three years which followed the war, that the reputation of the
British Press was greatly enhanced on the Continent by the news it gave
during the Franco-German campaign. Many a time in the course of the next
few years did I hear foreigners inquire: "What do the London papers say?"
or remark: "If an English paper says it, it must be true." I do not wish
to blow the trumpet too loudly on behalf of the profession to which I
belonged for many years, but what I have here mentioned is strictly true;
and now that my days of travel are over, I should be glad to know that
foreigners still hold the British Press in the same high esteem.

But, to return to my narrative, whilst the events I have mentioned were
taking place in Normandy and Northern France, Gambetta was vainly trying
to persuade Bourbaki to advance in the direction of Montargis. He also
wished to reinforce Garibaldi; but the enmity of many French officers
towards the Italian Liberator was so great that they would not serve with
him. General von Werder was at this time covering the siege of Belfort and
watching Langres. On December 18 there was an engagement at Nuits between
some of his forces and those led by the French commander Cremer, who
claimed the victory, but afterwards retreated towards Beaune. The French,
however, were now able to re-occupy Dijon. On the 21st another sortie was
made from Paris, this time on the north, in the direction of Le Bourget
and Ville-Evrard. Ducrot was again in command, and 200,000 men were got
together, but only 5000 were brought into action. There were a great many
desertions, and no fewer than six officers of one brigade alone were
court-martialled and punished for lack of courage. The affair appears to
have been arranged in order to quiet the more reckless elements in Paris,
who were for ever demanding "a great, a torrential sortie." In this
instance, however, there was merely "much ado about nothing." The truth
is, that ever since the Champigny affair both Trochu and Ducrot had lost
all confidence.

On January 2 and 3, the French under Faidherbe, and the Germans under
Goeben, fought a battle at Bapaume, south of Arras. The former were by far
the more numerous force, being, indeed, as three to one, and Faidherbe is
credited with having gained a victory. But, again, it was only a barren
one, for although the Germans fell back, the French found it quite as
necessary to do the same. About a week previously the 16th French Army
Corps, with which Bourbaki had done little or nothing on the Loire, had
been removed from Vierzon and Bourges to join the Army of the East, of
which Bourbaki now assumed the chief command. The transport of the troops
proved a very difficult affair, and there was great disorder and, again,
many desertions. Nevertheless, on January 9, Bourbaki fought Werder at
Villersexel, in the vicinity of Vesoul, Montbéliard, and Belfort. In this
engagement there appear to have been serious mistakes on both sides, and
though Bourbaki claimed a success, his losses were numerically double
those of the Germans.

Meantime Chanzy, at Le Mans, was urging all sorts of plans on Gambetta and
Freyeinet. In the first place he desired to recruit and strengthen his
forces, so sorely tried by their difficult retreat; and in order that he
might have time to do so, he wished Bourbaki to execute a powerful
diversion by marching in the direction of Troyes. But Gambetta and
Freyeinet had decided otherwise. Bourbaki's advance was to be towards the
Vosges, after which he was to turn westward and march on Paris with
150,000 men. Chanzy was informed of this decision on and about January 5
(1871), and on the 6th he made a last attempt to modify the Government
plan in order that Bourbaki's march might be directed on a point nearer to
Paris. In reply, he was informed that it was too late to modify the
arrangements.

With regard to his own operations, Chanzy's idea was to march towards the
capital when his forces were reorganized. His bases were to be the river
Sarthe, the town of Le Mans, and the railway-line running northward to
Alençon. Thence he proposed to advance to some point on the river Eure
between Dreux and Chartres, going afterwards towards Paris by such a route
as circumstances might allow. He had 130,000 men near Le Mans, and
proposed to take 120,000 with 350 field-pieces or machine-guns, and
calculated that he might require a week, or to be precise eight days, to
carry this force from Le Mans to Chartres, allowing for fighting on the
way. Further, to assist his movements he wished Faidherbe, as well as
Bourbaki, to assume the offensive vigorously as soon as he was ready. The
carrying out of the scheme was frustrated, however, in part by the
movements which the Government ordered Bourbaki to execute, and in part by
what may be called the sudden awakening of Prince Frederick Charles, who,
feeling more apprehensive respecting Bourbaki's movements, had hitherto,
in a measure, neglected Chanzy's doings.

Copyright (c) 2007. famouswriterz.com. All rights reserved.