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The Advancement of Learning

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(13) For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them is
of laws to repress them. For as it hath been well observed, that
the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are
military; and while virtue is in state, are liberal; and while
virtue is in declination, are voluptuary: so I doubt that this age
of the world is somewhat upon the descent of the wheel. With arts
voluptuary I couple practices joculary; for the deceiving of the
senses is one of the pleasures of the senses. As for games of
recreation, I hold them to belong to civil life and education. And
thus much of that particular human philosophy which concerns the
body, which is but the tabernacle of the mind.

XI. (1) For human knowledge which concerns the mind, it hath two
parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul
or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions
thereof. Unto the first of these, the considerations of the
original of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far
it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof,
and many other points, do appertain: which have been not more
laboriously inquired than variously reported; so as the travail
therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way.
But although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really
and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath been, yet I hold
that in the end it must be hounded by religion, or else it will be
subject to deceit and delusion. For as the substance of the soul in
the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth
by the benediction of a producat, but was immediately inspired from
God, so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by
accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the
subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the
nature and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that
gave the substance. Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul
there be two appendices; which, as they have been handled, have
rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth: divination and
fascination.

(2) Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial
and natural: whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a
prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural
is, when the mind hath a presention by an internal power, without
the inducement of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts: either when
the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is
rational; or when it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the
effect, which is experimental: whereof the latter for the most part
is superstitious, such as were the heathen observations upon the
inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of
bees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For
artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed
amongst particular knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions,
as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician
hath his predictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and
issues of diseases. The politique hath his predictions; O urbem
venalem, et cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit! which stayed not
long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in Caesar: so as
these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred over. But
the divination which springeth from the internal nature of the soul
is that which we now speak of; which hath been made to be of two
sorts, primitive and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the
supposition that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into
itself, and not diffused into the organs of the body, hath some
extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore appeareth most in
sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in waking
apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and
observances which make the mind most to consist in itself. By
influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror
or glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and
spirits: unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce. For
the retiring of the mind within itself is the state which is most
susceptible of divine influxions; save that it is accompanied in
this case with a fervency and elevation (which the ancients noted by
fury), and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.

(3) Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive upon
other bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that we spake in
the proper place. Wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the
disciples of pretended natural magic, have been so intemperate, as
they have exalted the power of the imagination to be much one with
the power of miracle-working faith. Others, that draw nearer to
probability, calling to their view the secret passages of things,
and specially of the contagion that passeth from body to body, do
conceive it should likewise be agreeable to nature that there should
be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without
the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown (now
almost made civil) of the mastering spirit, and the force of
confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to
raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified
have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it.
And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a
great part of ceremonial magic. For it may be pretended that
ceremonies, characters, and charms do work, not by any tacit or
sacramental contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen
the imagination of him that useth it; as images are said by the
Roman Church to fix the cogitations and raise the devotions of them
that pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted
that imagination hath power, and that ceremonies fortify
imagination, and that they be used sincerely and intentionally for
that purpose; yet I should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that
first edict which God gave unto man, In sudore vultus comedes panem
tuum. For they propound those noble effects, which God hath set
forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained
by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiences in these
knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience,
that it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much
vanity.

XII. (1) The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of
man is of two kinds--the one respecting his understanding and
reason, and the other his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the
former produceth position or decree, the latter action or execution.
It is true that the imagination is an agent or nuncius in both
provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth
over to imagination before reason have judged, and reason sendeth
over to imagination before the decree can be acted. For imagination
ever precedeth voluntary motion. Saving that this Janus of
imagination hath differing faces: for the face towards reason hath
the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the print of
good; which nevertheless are faces,


"Quales decet esse sororum."


Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is
invested with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in
itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by
Aristotle, "That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which
the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason hath over the
imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free
citizen," who may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that,
in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our
reason, which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the
mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again,
in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other
impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true
appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from
the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science that
doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to
alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a
pleasure or play of imagination than a work or duty thereof. And if
it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the
imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and consider
of the imagination. No more than we shall speak now of such
knowledges as reason produceth (for that extendeth to all
philosophy), but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the
faculty of reason: so as poesy had his true place. As for the
power of the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the
same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, whereunto most
fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative
reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer
it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content ourselves with
the former division, that human philosophy, which respecteth the
faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral.

(2) The part of human philosophy which is rational is of all
knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but
a net of subtlety and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that
knowledge is pabulum animi; so in the nature of men's appetite to
this food most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in
the desert, that would fain have returned ad ollas carnium, and were
weary of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less
nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges
that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality,
policy, about the which men's affections, praises, fortunes do turn
and are conversant. But this same lumen siccum doth parch and
offend most men's watery and soft natures. But to speak truly of
things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are the keys of all
other arts, for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, "That the
hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of
forms;" so these be truly said to be the art of arts. Neither do
they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the
habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but
also to draw a stronger bow.

(3) The arts intellectual are four in number, divided according to
the ends whereunto they are referred--for man's labour is to invent
that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is
invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that
which is retained. So as the arts must be four--art of inquiry or
invention; art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory;
and art of elocution or tradition.

XIII. (1) Invention is of two kinds much differing--the one of arts
and sciences, and the other of speech and arguments. The former of
these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a
deficience as if, in the making of an inventory touching the state
of a defunct, it should be set down that there is no ready money.
For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is
that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West
Indies had never been discovered if the use of the mariner's needle
had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and
the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences
be no further discovered, if the art itself of invention and
discovery hath been passed over.

(2) That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth
plainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to invent
sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a
cuique in sua arte credendum. And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely,
speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, "That
medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons
and causes were discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and
by light from them the medicines and cures discovered." And Plato
in his "Theaetetus" noteth well, "That particulars are infinite, and
the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; and that the
pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the
inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular
knowledge are taken from tradition and experience." And therefore
we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of
things refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to
beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men.


"Dictamnum genetrix Cretaea carpit ab Ida,
Puberibus caulem foliis et flore camantem
Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres haesere sagittae."


So that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being to
consecrate inventors) that the Egyptians had so few human idols in
their temples, but almost all brute:


"Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis,
Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c."


And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe
the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that
Prometheus first stroke the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than
that when he first stroke the flints he expected the spark; and
therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with
the European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave
the first occasion. So as it should seem, that hitherto men are
rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for
music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot-lid
that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance or anything
else than to logic for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither
is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other:


"Ut varias usus meditande extunderet artes
Paulatim."


For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that
which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which is a
perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed
by an absolute necessity of conservation of being. For so Cicero
saith very truly, Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem saepe
vincit. And therefore if it be said of men,


"Labor omnia vincit
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas,"


it is likewise said of beasts, Quis psittaco docuit suum ?a??e? Who
taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree,
where she spied water, that the water might rise so as she might
come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea or
air, and to find the way from a field in a flower a great way off to
her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she
burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then
the word extundere, which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the
word paulatim, which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are
where we were, even amongst the Egyptians' gods; there being little
left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty or art, for
matter of invention.

(3) Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which
seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of sciences may
be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by
derivation from the principles; their form of induction, I say, is
utterly vicious and incompetent; wherein their error is the fouler,
because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they
contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For he that
shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent
dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, Aerei
mellis caelestia dona, distilling and contriving it out of
particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and
garden, shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth manage
and act an induction much better than they describe it. For to
conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance
contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can
assure (in many subjects) upon those particulars which appear of a
side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear
not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which
were brought before him, and failed of David which was in the field.
And this form (to say truth), is so gross, as it had not been
possible for wits so subtle as have managed these things to have
offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and
dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars;
which their manner was to use but as lictores and viatores, for
sergeants and whifflers, ad summovendam turbam, to make way and make
room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service.
Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to
see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and
human truth; for, as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as
a child, so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions
(whereof we speak), as if it were a second infancy or childhood.

(4) Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced,
yet, nevertheless, certain it is that middle propositions cannot be
deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism--that is, by
touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is
true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like,
yea, and divinity (because it pleaseth God to apply Himself to the
capacity of the simplest), that form may have use; and in natural
philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, Quae
assensum parit operis effaeta est; but the subtlety of nature and
operations will not be enchained in those bonds. For arguments
consist of propositions, and propositions of words, and words are
but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things; which
notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of
particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of
consequences of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can
ever correct that error, being (as the physicians speak) in the
first digestion. And, therefore, it was not without cause, that so
many excellent philosophers became sceptics and academics, and
denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion
that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances and
probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be
but a form of irony, Scientiam dissimulando simulavit; for he used
to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge; like
the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but
would not acknowledge so much. And in the later academy, which
Cicero embraced, this opinion also of acatalepsia (I doubt) was not
held sincerely; for that all those which excelled in copy of speech
seem to have chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give
glory to their eloquence and variable discourses; being rather like
progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end. But assuredly many
scattered in both academies did hold it in subtlety and integrity.
But here was their chief error: they charged the deceit upon the
senses; which in my judgment (notwithstanding all their
cavillations) are very sufficient to certify and report truth,
though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of
instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too
subtle for the sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and
other like assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit
upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of
collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I
speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek
help; for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a
straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be
easily done by help of a ruler or compass.

(5) This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I
purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound, having
digested it into two parts: whereof the one I term experientia
literata, and the other interpretatio naturae; the former being but
a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long,
nor speak too great upon a promise.

(6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an
invention; for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to
recover or resummon that which we already know; and the use of this
invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is
already possessed to draw forth or call before us that which may be
pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So
as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or
suggestion, with an application; which is the cause why the schools
do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent.
Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an
enclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already
obtained the name, let it be called invention; so as it be perceived
and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is readiness
and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification
thereof.

(7) To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses,
preparation and suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a
part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any
artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully,
doth deride the sophists near his time, saying, "They did as if one
that professed the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make up
a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all
fashions and sizes." But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker
should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken,
he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine
knowledge, saith, "That the kingdom of heaven is like a good
householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store;" and we see
the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, that pleaders
should have the places, whereof they have most continual use, ready
handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for the
literal interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and
to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and
contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great
experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have
occasion to speak of (if he will take the pains), he may have it in
effect premeditate and handled in thesi. So that when he cometh to
a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names, and
times, and places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We
see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of
the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to
make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for
orations and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may
overweigh Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich
wardrobe for a pair of shears.

(8) But the nature of the collection of this provision or
preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric,
yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be
spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further handling of it to
rhetoric.

(9) The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth
assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite
our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly
collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use
(truly taken) only to furnish argument to dispute, probably with
others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude
aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve only to
apprompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a
faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato
saith, "Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a
general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it?"
And, therefore, the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and
compendious is your search. But the same places which will help us
what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if
a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we
have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and
revolve; so as I cannot report that this part of invention, which is
that which the schools call topics, is deficient.

(10) Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and special.
The general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched
by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But
leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools (which
is, to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their
command, and to reject the rest), I do receive particular topics;
that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every
particular knowledge, as things of great use, being mixtures of
logic with the matter of sciences. For in these it holdeth ars
inveniendi adolescit cum inventis; for as in going of a way, we do
not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the
better sight of that part of the way which remaineth, so every
degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which
followeth; which light, if we strengthen by drawing it forth into
questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit.

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