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The Advancement of Learning

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(6) Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great,
is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we
may observe that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a
few axioms or observations upon any subject, to make a solemn and
formal art, filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it
with examples, and digesting it into a sensible method. But the
writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the
writing in method doth not approach.

(7) For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or
solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be
made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of
illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse
of connection and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut
off. So there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good
quantity of observation; and therefore no man can suffice, nor in
reason will attempt, to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and
grounded. But in methods,


"Tantum series juncturaque pollet,
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris,"


as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were
disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to
win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for they
carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part
illuminating another, and therefore satisfy. But particulars being
dispersed do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly,
aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire
further; whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure
men, as if they were at furthest.

(8) Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight,
is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by
questions and their determinations. The latter kind whereof, if it
be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of
learning as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to
besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and
the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in
of themselves: indeed a man would not leave some important piece
enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the
delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to
remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to minister
and excite disputatious and doubts.

(9) Another diversity of method is, according to the subject or
matter which is handled. For there is a great difference in
delivery of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of
knowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed. And howsoever
contention hath been moved, touching a uniformity of method in
multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the
weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that
which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain empty and barren
generalities; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all
the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and press
of the method. And, therefore, as I did allow well of particular
topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular methods
of tradition.

(10) Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and teaching of
knowledge is, according unto the light and presuppositions of that
which is delivered. For that knowledge which is new, and foreign
from opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that
that is agreeable and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he
thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith
"If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes," &c.
For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions need only
but to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular
opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves
conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate. So that it is of
necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations
to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning,
and in rude times when those conceits which are now trivial were
then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else
would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for
paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood or
judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and
tropes are, for it is a rule, that whatsoever science is not
consonant to presuppositions must pray in aid of similitudes.

(11) There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received:
as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of
concealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though I have
stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I
have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and
constitute one general inquiry (which seems to me deficient)
touching the wisdom of tradition.

(12) But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, doth
further belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a
work, but also the several beams and columns thereof; not as to
their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure. And therefore
method considereth not only the disposition of the argument or
subject, but likewise the propositions: not as to their truth or
matter, but as to their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus
merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules of
propositions--?a????? p??t??, ??ta pa?t?? &c.--than he did in
introducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the condition
of human things that, according to the ancient fables, "the most
precious things have the most pernicious keepers") it was so, that
the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. For he had
need be well conducted that should design to make axioms
convertible, if he make them not withal circular, and non-promovent,
or incurring into themselves; but yet the intention was excellent.

(13) The other considerations of method, concerning propositions,
are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the
dimensions of sciences: for every knowledge may be fitly said,
besides the profundity (which is the truth and substance of it, that
makes it solid), to have a longitude and a latitude; accounting the
latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude towards action;
that is, from the greatest generality to the most particular
precept. The one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to
intermeddle within the province of another, which is the rule they
call ?a?a?t?; the other giveth rule unto what degree of
particularity a knowledge should descend: which latter I find
passed over in silence, being in my judgment the more material. For
certainty there must be somewhat left to practice; but how much is
worthy the inquiry? We see remote and superficial generalities do
but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more
aiding to practice than an Ortelius' universal map is to direct the
way between London and York. The better sort of rules have been not
unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see
the images of things, but first they must be filed: so the rules
will help if they be laboured and polished by practice. But how
crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far forth they
may be polished aforehand, is the question, the inquiry whereof
seemeth to me deficient.

(14) There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method,
which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture: which is,
to deliver knowledges in such manner as men may speedily come to
make a show of learning, who have it not. Such was the travail of
Raymundus Lullius in making that art which bears his name; not
unlike to some books of typocosmy, which have been made since; being
nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance,
that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the
art; which collections are much like a fripper's or broker's shop,
that hath ends of everything, but nothing of worth.

XVIII. (1) Now we descend to that part which concerneth the
illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we
call rhetoric, or art of eloquence, a science excellent, and
excellently well laboured. For although in true value it is
inferior to wisdom (as it is said by God to Moses, when he disabled
himself for want of this faculty, "Aaron shall be thy speaker, and
thou shalt be to him as God"), yet with people it is the more
mighty; for so Solomon saith, Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens,
sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet, signifying that profoundness of
wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is
eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the
labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of
his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their
works of rhetoric exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of
examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero,
added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled
the progression in this art; and therefore the deficiences which I
shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as
handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art
itself.

(2) Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of
this science, as we have done of the rest, the duty and office of
rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of
the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the administration
thereof by three means--by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains
to logic; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric;
and by passion or affection, which pertains to morality. And as in
negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by importunity,
and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are
undermined by inconsequences, solicited and importuned by
impressions or observations, and transported by passions. Neither
is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers
and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish
and advance it. For the end of logic is to teach a form of argument
to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of morality is to
procure the affections to obey reason, and not to invade it; the end
of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to
oppress it; for these abuses of arts come in but ex oblique, for
caution.

(3) And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing
out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of
rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did
mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to
the pleasure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more
conversant in adorning that which is good than in colouring that
which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than
he can do or think; and it was excellently noted by Thucydides, in
Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of
estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good
speech, knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and
base. And therefore, as Plato said elegantly, "That virtue, if she
could be seen, would move great love and affection;" so seeing that
she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree
is to show her to the imagination in lively representation; for to
show her to reason only in subtlety of argument was a thing ever
derided in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics, who thought to thrust
virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no
sympathy with the will of man.

(4) Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient
to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions
and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and
proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditious of the
affections -


"Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor,"


reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions
did not practise and win the imagination from the affections' part,
and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination
against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an
appetite to good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the
affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future
and sum of time. And, therefore, the present filling the
imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that
force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote
appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason
prevaileth.

(5) We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged
with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or
morality with vice; for we know the doctrines of contraries are the
same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic
differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm--the one
close, the other at large--but much more in this, that logic
handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it
is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle
doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and
moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both; for
the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men
indifferent and the same, but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric
ought to differ according to the auditors:


"Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion."


Which application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far that
if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he
should speak to them all respectively and several ways; though this
politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the
greatest orators to want: whilst, by the observing their well-
graced forms of speech, they leese the volubility of application;
and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better
inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here or in that part
which concerneth policy.

(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as I
said, are but attendances; and first, I do not find the wisdom and
diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection
of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and
comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric (as I touched
before). For example -


"Sophisma.
Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.
Redargutio.
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces."


Malum est, malum est (inquit emptor): sed cum recesserit, tum
gloriabitur! The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three--one,
that there be but a few of many; another, that there elenches are
not annexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use
of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in
impression. For many forms are equal in signification which are
differing in impression, as the difference is great in the piercing
of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength
of the percussion be the same. For there is no man but will be a
little more raised by hearing it said, "Your enemies will be glad of
this" -


"Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae."


than by hearing it said only, "This is evil for you."

(7) Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before,
touching provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech
and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts: the
one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a
shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to that which is
frequent and most in request. The former of these I will call
antitheta, and the latter formulae.

(8) Antitheta are theses argued pro et contra, wherein men may be
more large and laborious; but (in such as are able to do it) to
avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments
to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited,
but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large
when they come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by
reference.


"Pro verbis legis.
Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quae recedit a litera:
Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.

Pro sententia legis.
Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula."


(9) Formulae are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of
speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of
preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. For as
in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well casting of
the staircases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech,
the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect.


"A conclusion in a deliberative.
So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences
future."


XIX. (1) There remain two appendices touching the tradition of
knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical. For all
knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's
proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition
of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the relative
part thereof concerneth reading of books; whereunto appertain
incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true
correction and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash
diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often
presumed that that which they understand not is false set down: as
the priest that, where he found it written of St. Paul Demissus est
per sportam, mended his book, and made it Demissus est per portam;
because sporta was a hard word, and out of his reading: and surely
their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are
of the same kind. And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the
most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors,
which resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein it is over
usual to blanch the obscure places and discourse upon the plain.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great
light to true interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the
authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves
what books to read.

And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies;
that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.

(2) For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of
tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers
considerations of great fruit.

As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to
initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so
proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to press the more
difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy; for it is one
method to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise
dancing with heavy shoes.

A third is the application of learning according unto the propriety
of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual,
but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as,
for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the
faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for
in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to
begin. And as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure
and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences
for excellency or speedy profiting: and therefore it is an inquiry
of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and
proper for what sciences.

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence
to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in
exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise
their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a
great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of
exercises. It were too long to particularise a number of other
considerations of this nature, things but of mean appearance, but of
singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or
young plants is that that is most important to their thriving, and
as it was noted that the first six kings being in truth as tutors of
the state of Rome in the infancy thereof was the principal cause of
the immense greatness of that state which followed, so the culture
and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible (though unseen)
operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can
countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also how
small and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall
into great men or great matters, do work great and important
effects: whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus of two stage
players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing
put the Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combustion. For
there arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus
Caesar, Blaesus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutineers,
which were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard
speak, which he did in this manner:- "These poor innocent wretches
appointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold the light; but
who shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that
was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of
the common cause? and he hath murdered him this last night by some
of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his
executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blaesus, what is done with his
body? The mortalest enemies do not deny burial. When I have
performed my last duties to the corpse with kisses, with tears,
command me to be slain besides him; so that these my fellows, for
our good meaning and our true hearts to the legions, may have leave
to bury us." With which speech he put the army into an infinite
fury and uproar: whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was
there any such matter; but he played it merely as if he had been
upon the stage.

(3) But to return: we are now come to a period of rational
knowledges; wherein if I have made the divisions other than those
that are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those
divisions which I do not use. For there is a double necessity
imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The one, because it
differeth in end and purpose, to sort together those things which
are next in nature, and those things which are next in use. For if
a secretary of estate should sort his papers, it is like in his
study or general cabinet he would sort together things of a nature,
as treaties, instructions, &c. But in his boxes or particular
cabinet he would sort together those that he were like to use
together, though of several natures. So in this general cabinet of
knowledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the
nature of things; whereas if myself had been to handle any
particular knowledge, I would have respected the divisions fittest
for use. The other, because the bringing in of the deficiences did
by consequence alter the partitions of the rest. For let the
knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be fifteen. Let the
knowledge with the deficiences be twenty; the parts of fifteen are
not the parts of twenty; for the parts of fifteen are three and
five; the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as these
things are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be.

XX. (1) We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the
appetite and will of man: whereof Solomon saith, Ante omnia, fili,
custodi cor tuum: nam inde procedunt actiones vitae. In the
handling of this science, those which have written seem to me to
have done as if a man, that professed to teach to write, did only
exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving
any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing
of the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and
copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, virtue,
duty, felicity; propounding them well described as the true objects
and scopes of man's will and desires. But how to attain these
excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to
become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over
altogether, or slightly and unprofitably. For it is not the
disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not
by nature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by
doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and
punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches, that can
excuse the absence of this part.

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