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The Advancement of Learning

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(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain
the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and
servant. So likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the
civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of
neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not as they are
parts of government and society, but as to the framing of the mind
of particular persons.

(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it
also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the
weighing of duties between person and person, case and case,
particular and public. As we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus
against his own sons, which was so much extolled, yet what was said?


"Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores."


So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we
see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose
opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their
associates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a
tyrant being a usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding
that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was
better than a civil war: and a number of the like cases there are
of comparative duty. Amongst which that of all others is the most
frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of
a small injustice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the
truth: Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, ut multa juste fieri possint.
But the reply is good: Auctorem praesentis justitiae habes,
sponsorem futurae non habes. Men must pursue things which are just
in present, and leave the future to the Divine Providence. So then
we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and
description of good.

XXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of life,
it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto,
without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair
image or statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without
life and motion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these
words: Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex
quibus gignatur. Inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse,
acquirendae autem ejus modos et vias ignorare. Non enum de virtute
tantum, qua specie sit, quaerendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam
faciat: utrumque enum volumeus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus
compotes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex
quibus et quomodo. In such full words and with such iteration doth
he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great commendation of
Cato the second, that he had applied himself to philosophy, Non ita
disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi. And although the neglect of our
times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the
reformation of their life (as Seneca excellently saith, De partibus
vitae quisque deliberat, de summa nemo), may make this part seem
superfluous; yet I must conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates,
Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens aegrotat.
They need medicine, not only to assuage the disease, but to awake
the sense. And if it be said that the cure of men's minds belongeth
to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral philosophy may be
preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as
the Psalm saith, "That the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually
towards the mistress," and yet no doubt many things are left to the
discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress' will; so
ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines
of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due
limits) many sound and profitable directions.

(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I
cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written
inquiry; the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein
both speech and action is often conversant; and such wherein the
common talk of men (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass)
is wiser than their books. It is reasonable, therefore, that we
propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and
because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient, which
seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and
presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will,
therefore, enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it may
appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical
we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not;
for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by
way of application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the
nature of the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the
physician the constitution of the patient nor the variety of
accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two
things are without our command: points of Nature, and points of
fortune. For to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the
other, our work is limited and tied. In these things, therefore, it
is left unto us to proceed by application


"Vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:"


and so likewise,


"Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo."


But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and
neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which
draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth
adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call
accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth
principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent
state or disposition, unto which we do apply; for we cannot fit a
garment except we first take measure of the body.

(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down
sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several
characters and tempers of men's natures and dispositions, specially
having regard to those differences which are most radical in being
the fountains and causes of the rest, or most frequent in
concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few
of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of
virtues, that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be
considered, that there are minds which are proportioned to great
matters, and others to small (which Aristotle handleth, or ought to
have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it not deserve as
well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to intend
many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide
themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be
but in few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of
mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are
proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a
short return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and is
to be won with length of pursuit:-


"Jam tum tenditqus fovetque."


So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is
commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved
it to be considered by Aristotle, "That there is a disposition in
conversation (supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or
concern a man's self) to soothe and please, and a disposition
contrary to contradict and cross;" and deserveth it not much better
to be considered. "That there is a disposition, not in conversation
or talk, but in matter of more serious nature (and supposing it
still in things merely indifferent), to take pleasure in the good of
another; and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the
good of another?" which is that properly which we call good nature
or ill nature, benignity or malignity; and, therefore, I cannot
sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the
several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted
both in morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry
and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions
of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men's natures,
according to the predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet,
lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of
pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man
shall find in the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians
make touching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals
handsomely and lively painted forth. A man shall meet with in every
day's conference the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, real,
humorous, certain, huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima
impressione, and the like; and yet, nevertheless, this kind of
observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For
the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no
precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both
history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where
these observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our
hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary that receipts
might be made of them for use of life.

(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which are
imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by
health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which
are inherent and not extern; and again, those which are caused by
extern fortune, as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches,
want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant
fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the
like. And, therefore, we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see
an old man beneficent, benignitas hujis ut adolescentuli est. Saint
Paul concludeth that severity of discipline was to be used to the
Cretans, increpa eos dure, upon the disposition of their country,
Cretensus semper mendaces, malae bestiae, ventres. Sallust noteth
that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories: Sed
plerumque regiae voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles,
saepeque ipsae sibi advers. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of
the fortune mendeth the disposition: solus Vespasianus mutatus in
melius. Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and sudden
fortune for the most part defeateth men qui magnam felicitatem
concoquere non possunt. So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to
keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of
fortune; Divitiae si affluant, nolite cor apponere. These
observations and the like I deny not but are touched a little by
Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some
scattered discourses; but they were never incorporate into moral
philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the knowledge
of this diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and the
knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to
the physician, except we mean to follow the indiscretion of
empirics, which minister the same medicines to all patients.

(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the
affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first
to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the
diseases; and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind,
after knowledge of the divers characters of men's natures, it
followeth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind,
which are no other than the perturbations and distempars of the
affections. For as the ancient politiques in popular estates were
wont to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds;
because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds
did not move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and
tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in working and
agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature
thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds,
did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find
strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers
volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which is the
principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are
considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be
moved by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well
for the quantity; but where their true place is he pretermitteth
them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that
can satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that should generally
handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of
colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections as
light is to particular colours. Better travails, I suppose, had the
Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which
we have at second hand. But yet it is like it was after their
manner, rather in subtlety of definitions (which in a subject of
this nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample
descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular
writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections: as
of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of
countenance, and other. But the poets and writers of histories are
the best doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth,
with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how
pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further
degree; how they disclose themselves; how they work; how they vary;
how they gather and fortify: how they are enwrapped one within
another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and
other the like particularities. Amongst the which this last is of
special use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection
against affection, and to master one by another; even as we used to
hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise
percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is
erected that excellent use of praemium and paena, whereby civil
states consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and
hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the
government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction
with another, so it is in the government within.

(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own command,
and have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and
appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled
custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation,
company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books,
studies: these as they have determinate use in moralities, from
these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receipts and
regiments compounded and described, as may serve to recover or
preserve the health and good estate of the mind, as far as
pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we will insist upon
some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too long
to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and habit to
speak of.

(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that
of those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by
custom; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand
times up it will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or
hearing we do not learn to see or hear the better. For though this
principle be true in things wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason
whereof we cannot now stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in
things wherein Nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a
strait glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will
by use bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we
speak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold
we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort have a
nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, than
those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion,
that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more
to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be
many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as
there is of ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will
recite a few.

(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first
either too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a
diffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature you breed an
opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a
further expectation than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in
the end: if too weak, of the other side, you may not look to
perform and overcome any great task.

(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two
several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other
when it is worst disposed; that by the one you may gain a great
step, by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the
mind, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant.

(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way,
which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto
we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream,
or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural
crookedness.

(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better,
and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend
be not first in the intention, but tanquam aliud agendo, because of
the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint.
Many other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and
custom, which being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature;
but, being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of
Nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit.

(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence
and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts
of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one
of the fathers in great indignation call poesy vinum daemonum,
because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions?
Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he
saith, "That young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy,
because they are not settled from the boiling heat of their
affections, nor attempered with time and experience"? And doth it
not hereof come, that those excellent books and discourses of the
ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most
effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and popular
opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats fit to be scorned
and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty of life,
because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and
settled years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it
not true also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters
of policy, till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and
morality; lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think
that there are no true differences of things, but according to
utility and fortune, as the verse describes it, Prosperum et felix
scelus virtus vocatur; and again, Ille crucem pretium sceleris
tulit, hic diadema: which the poets do speak satirically and in
indignation on virtue's behalf; but books of policy do speak it
seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, "That
if Caesar had been overthrown, he would have been more odious than
ever was Catiline;" as if there had been no difference, but in
fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most
excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is
there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of
moralities themselves (some kinds of them), lest they make men too
precise, arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, In Marco
Catone haec bona quae videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse
propria; quae nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura, sed a
magistro? Many other axioms and advices there are touching those
proprieties and effects, which studies do infuse and instil into
manners. And so, likewise, is there touching the use of all those
other points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited
in the beginning in the doctrine of morality.

(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet
more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this
ground; that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more
perfect, and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose,
therefore, of this practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of
the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of
the good hath been practised by two means, vows or constant
resolutions, and observances or exercises; which are not to be
regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in
continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been
practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that
which is past, and an inception or account de novo for the time to
come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for
all good moral philosophy (as was said) is but a handmaid to
religion.

(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of
all other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the
most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and
good estate; which is, the electing and propounding unto a man's
self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a
reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For if these two
things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends,
and again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them; it
will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once.
And this indeed is like the work of nature; whereas the other course
is like the work of the hand. For as when a carver makes an image,
he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as if he be upon the
face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still,
till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when nature
makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the
parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man
practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the
like but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look,
what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth
commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to
conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth
excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called
virtuous, but divine. His words are these: Immanitati autem
consentaneum est opponere eam, quae supra humanitatem est, heroicam
sive divinam virtutem; and a little after, Nam ut ferae neque vitium
neque virtus est, swic neque Dei: sed hic quidem status altius
quiddam virtute est, ille aluid quiddam a vitio. And therefore we
may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to
Trajan in his funeral oration, where he said, "That men needed to
make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as
good lords to them as Trajan had been;" as if he had not been only
an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be
heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine
state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men
unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently
called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and
fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is elegantly said by
Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine
love, Amor melior Sophista loevo ad humanam vitam--that love
teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or
preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules
and preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that
facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so
certainly, if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth
work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of
morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other.
Nay, further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections,
though they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and
uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt the
mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose
it: so in all other excellences, though they advance nature, yet
they are subject to excess. Only charity admitteth no excess. For
so we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the angels transgressed
and fell; Ascendam, et ero similis altissimo: by aspiring to be
like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; Eritis sicut Dii,
scientes bonum et malum: but by aspiring to a similitude of God in
goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall
transgress. For unto that imitation we are called: Diligite
inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro
persequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii Patris vestri
qui in coelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos,
et pluit super justos et injustos. So in the first platform of the
divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, Optimus
Maximus: and the sacred Scriptures thus, Miscericordia ejus super
omnia opera ejus.

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