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The Advancement of Learning

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(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge,
concerning the culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man,
considering the arts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that
my labour is but to collect into an art or science that which hath
been pretermitted by others, as matter of common sense and
experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported with
Demosthenes, "You may not marvel (Athenians) that Demosthenes and I
do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink wine;" and like as we
read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleep -


"Sunt geminae somni portae: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,
Sed falsa ad coelum mittunt insomnia manes:"


so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure
maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor ("of wine") is the
more vaporous, and the braver gate ("of ivory") sendeth forth the
falser dreams.

(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human
philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth
of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth
to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the
good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into
health, beauty, strength, and pleasure, so the good of the mind,
inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make
the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with
decency; and strong and agile for all duties of life. These three,
as in the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever.
For it is easy to observe, that many have strength of wit and
courage, but have neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty
or decency in their doings; some again have an elegancy and fineness
of carriage which have neither soundness of honesty nor substance of
sufficiency; and some again have honest and reformed minds, that can
neither become themselves nor manage business; and sometimes two of
them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise
determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to
retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it, than in the
strength and vigour of it.

XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of
all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to
axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, "That the Romans were
like sheep, for that a man were better drive a flock of them, than
one of them; for in a flock, if you could get but some few go right,
the rest would follow:" so in that respect moral philosophy is more
difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to
itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge
requireth only an external goodness; for that as to society
sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil
times in good governments: for so we find in the Holy story, when
the kings were good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc poulus non direxerat
cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum. Again, states, as great
engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of frame: for as
in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so
governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following;
but the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted.
These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil
knowledge.

(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary
actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and
government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and
protection; and they be three wisdoms of divers natures which do
often sever--wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom
of state.

(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected,
but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself,
but an influence also into business and government. The poet saith,
Nec vultu destrue verba tuo: a man may destroy the force of his
words with his countenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero,
recommending to his brother affability and easy access; Nil interest
habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum: it is nothing won to admit
men with an open door, and to receive them with a shut and reserved
countenance. So we see Atticus, before the first interview between
Caesar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero
touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture.
And if the government of the countenance be of such effect, much
more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to
conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well expressed by
Livy, though not meant for this purpose: Ne aut arrogans videar,
aut obnoxius; quorum alterum est alienae libertatis obliti, alterum
suae: the sum of behaviour is to retain a man's own dignity,
without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if
behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may
pass into affectation, and then Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam
transferre--to act a man's life? But although it proceed not to
that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too
much. And therefore as we use to advise young students from company
keeping, by saying, Amici fures temporis: so certainly the
intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of
meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that form of
urbanity please themselves in it, and seldom aspire to higher
virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by
reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything becometh; but
where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos and compliments.
Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an over-curious
observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and
season. For as Solomon saith, Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat;
et qui respicit ad nubes, non metet: a man must make his
opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to
me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a
garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too
curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of
the mind and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be
too strait or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of
civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot
report it for deficient.

(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been
hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning
and the professors of learning. For from this root springeth
chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to
this effect, that there is no great concurrence between learning and
wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain
to civil life, for wisdom of behaviour, it is by learned men for the
most part despised, as an inferior to virtue and an enemy to
meditation; for wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well
when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few; but for the
wisdom of business, wherein man's life is most conversant, there be
no books of it, except some few scattered advertisements, that have
no proportion to the magnitude of this subject. For if books were
written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned men with mean
experience would far excel men of long experience without learning,
and outshoot them in their own bow.

(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge
should be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is
much less infinite than science of government, which we see is
laboured and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some
of the ancient Romans in the saddest and wisest times were
professors; for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in use for
senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as
Coruncanius, Curius, Laelius, and many others, to walk at certain
hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use
their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto
them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the
employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an
accusation, and every other occasion incident to man's life. So as
there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes,
arising out of a universal insight into the affairs of the world;
which is used indeed upon particular causes propounded, but is
gathered by general observation of causes of like nature. For so we
see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother, De petitione
consulatus (being the only book of business that I know written by
the ancients), although it concerned a particular action then on
foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic
axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a perpetual direction in
the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may see in those
aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed by
Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was
as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly
matters, we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions,
precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions;
whereupon we will stay a while, offering to consideration some
number of examples.

(6) Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam,
ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi. Here is commended
the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to
find: as it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he
burned Sertorius' papers unperused.

Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur, sive rideat,
non inveniet requiem. Here is described the great disadvantage
which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself;
which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to
jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no
ways quit himself well of it.

Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet eum
contumacem. Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch
in his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and
unthankfulness.

Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo? coram regibus stabit, nec erit
inter ignobiles. Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising
to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many
times love not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient,
but ready and diligent.

Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, cum adolescente secundo
qui consurgit pro eo. Here is expressed that which was noted by
Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius. Plures adorant solem
orientem quam occidentem vel meridianum.

Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne
demiseris; quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima. Here caution
is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the
unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself
of means to make them better.

Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri: venit contra eam rex
magnus, et vallavit eam, instruxitque munitones per gyrum, et
perfecta est obsidio; inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens,
et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam; et nullus deinceps recordatus
est huminis illius pauperis. Here the corruption of states is set
forth, that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of
it.

Millis responsio frangit iram. Here is noted that silence or rough
answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.

Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum. Here is lively represented how
laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred
till the last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step
findeth a briar or impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

Melior est finis orationis quam principium. Here is taxed the
vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and
inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of speech.

Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non bene facit; iste et pro
buccella panis deseret veritatem. Here is noted, that a judge were
better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge
offendeth not so lightly as a facile.

Vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri vehementi, in quo
paratur fames. Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous
extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry
horseleech.

Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens coram impio.
Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face
of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many
particular injuries passed over by connivance.

Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc non esse
peccatum, particeps est homicidii. Here is noted that, whereas men
in wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if
they might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed
aggravate their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.

Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso.
Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do
principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will
espouse us to many factions and quarrels.

Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum. Here is noted, that in
domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves
quieting of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived
of their expectation, and it turneth to wind.

Filius sapiens laetificat patrem: filius vero stultus maestitia est
matri suae. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort
of the good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of
their ill proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but
of fortune.

Qui celat delictum, quaerit amicitiam; sed qui altero sermone
repetit, separat faederatos. Here caution is given, that
reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that
which is past, than by apologies and excuses.

In omni opere bono erit abundantia; ubi autem verba sunt plurima,
ibi frequenter egestas. Here is noted, that words and discourse
aboundeth most where there is idleness and want.

Primus in sua causa justus: sed venit altera pars, et inquiret in
eum. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth
much; in sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly
removed, except some abuse or falsity in the information be
detected.

Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora
ventris. Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation,
which seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth
deep which hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.

Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi injuriam facit; et qui arguit
impium, sibi maculam generat. Here caution is given how we tender
reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to
esteem it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.

Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia. Here is
distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but
verbal and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon the occasion
presented is quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and
confused.

Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda
hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus. Here the mind of a wise man is
compared to a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures
and customs are represented; from which representation proceedeth
that application,


"Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit."


(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic
of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led
with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I
noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also
attended them with brief observations, such as to my understanding
offer no violence to the sense, though I know they may be applied to
a more divine use: but it is allowed, even in divinity, that some
interpretations, yea, and some writings, have more of the eagle than
others; but taking them as instructions for life, they might have
received large discourse, if I would have broken them and
illustrated them by deducements and examples.

(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is
generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that
as men found out any observation that they thought was good for
life, they would gather it and express it in parable or aphorism or
fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where
examples failed: now that the times abound with history, the aim is
better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing
which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of
negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and
aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories or examples.
For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particulars,
knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it hath much greater
life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example,
than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no
point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when
the example is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it
is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the
discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern
for action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake
are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile
aspect towards the discourse which they are brought in to make good.

(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as
history of times is the best ground for discourse of government,
such as Machiavel handleth, so histories of lives is the most
popular for discourse of business, because it is more conversant in
private actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this
purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon letters, such
as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero ad Atticum, and
others. For letters have a great and more particular representation
of business than either chronicles or lives. Thus have we spoken
both of the matter and form of this part of civil knowledge,
touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient.

(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as
much from that whereof we have spoken as sapere and sibi sapere, the
one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre.
For there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of
pressing a man's own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often
sever. For many are wise in their own ways that are weak for
government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature for
itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did
take much knowledge of: Nam pol sapiens (saith the comical poet)
fingit fortunam sibi; and it grew to an adage, Faber quisque
fortunae propriae; and Livy attributed it to Cato the first, In hoc
viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus
esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur.

(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and
professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was
observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great
services to the state in his government, and giving an account
thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude every
particular with this clause, "And in this fortune had no part." And
it came so to pass, that he never prospered in anything he took in
hand afterwards. For this is too high and too arrogant, savouring
of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, Dicis, Fluvius est neus et
ego feci memet ipsum; or of that which another prophet speaketh,
that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and that which
the poet expresseth,


"Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint!"


For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; and,
therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed
their successes to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue.
For so Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus. So Caesar said to
the master of the ship, Caesarem portas et fortunam ejus.

(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, Faber quisque fortunae
suae: Sapiens dominabitur astris: Invia virtuti null est via, and
the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as
stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for the
presumption or outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and
good; and are no question imprinted in the greatest minds, who are
so sensible of this opinion as they can scarce contain it within.
As we see in Augustus Caesar (who was rather diverse from his uncle
than inferior in virtue), how when he died he desired his friends
about him to give him a plaudite, as if he were conscious to himself
that he had played his part well upon the stage. This part of
knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is
practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And,
therefore, lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible
by axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down
some heads or passages of it.

(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument
to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein
every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till
he see the difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as
virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique,
as to be truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning
greatly, both in honour and in substance. In honour, because
pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is
like a lark, that can mount and sing, and please herself, and
nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk,
that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey.
In substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth,
that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise
in the globe of crystal or form; that is, that there be not anything
in being and action which should not be drawn and collected into
contemplation and doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem
of this architecture of fortune otherwise than as of an inferior
work, for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of his being, and
many times the worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for
better respects: but nevertheless fortune as an organ of virtue and
merit deserveth the consideration.

(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most
summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window
which Momus did require; who seeing in the frame of man's heart such
angles and recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into
them; that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching
persons, their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and
fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly
stand, so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they
lie most open and obnoxious, their friends, factions, dependences;
and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and
times, Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras; their principles,
rules, and observations, and the like: and this not only of persons
but of actions; what are on foot from time to time, and how they are
conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the like.
For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself,
but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous: for
men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are
one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These
informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as
the minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency
of observations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to
ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who
saith, Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda; sed vir
prudens exhauriet illud. And although the knowledge itself falleth
not under precept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions
for the obtaining of it may.

(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the
ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief
and distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds
than to words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised
words than to set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared
which is said, Fronti nulla fides, which is meant of a general
outward behaviour, and not of the private and subtle motions and
labours of the countenance and gesture; which, as Q. Cicero
elegantly saith, is Animi janua, "the gate of the mind." None more
close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, Etenim vultu
offensionem conjectaverat. So again, noting the differing character
and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the Senate, he
saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of
Germanicus, thus: Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut
penitus sentire crederetur; but of Drusus thus: Paucioribus sed
intentior, et fida oratione; and in another place, speaking of his
character of speech when he did anything that was gracious and
popular, he saith, "That in other things he was velut eluctantium
verborum;" but then again, solutius loquebatur quando subveniret.
So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such
commanded countenance (vultus jussus), that can sever from a feigned
tale some of these fashions, either a more slight and careless
fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and wandering, or
coming from a man more drily and hardly.

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