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The Advancement of Learning

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(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be
trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and
nature: Fraus sibi in parvis fidem praestruit ut majore emolumento
fallat; and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought
and sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be without
manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull men to sleep,
both as to caution and as to industry; and are, as Demosthenes
calleth them, Alimenta socordiae. So again we see how false the
nature of some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus
practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful
reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus
advanced many of the friends of Antonius, Simul amicis ejus
praefecturas et tribunatus largitur: wherein, under pretence to
strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his
dependents.

(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of
flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially
with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see
Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a
step forth of his dissimulation when he said, "You are hurt because
you do not reign;" of which Tacitus saith, Audita haec raram occulti
pectoris vocem elicuere: correptamque Graeco versu admonuit, ideo
laedi quia non regnaret. And, therefore, the poet doth elegantly
call passions tortures that urge men to confess their secrets:-


"Vino torus et ira."


And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and
so settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery,
sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and
weakness, they open themselves; specially if they be put to it with
a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, Di
mentira, y sacar as verdad: "Tell a lie and find a truth."

(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports:
men's weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their
virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times
from their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar
friends, with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and
the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to
such men are more masked: Verior fama e domesticis emanat.

(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their
natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best
interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it
was both pleasantly and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by
a nuncio of the Pope, returning from a certain nation where he
served as lidger; whose opinion being asked touching the appointment
of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case they did not
send one that was too wise; because no very wise man would ever
imagine what they in that country were like to do. And certainly it
is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper
ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian proverb being
elegant, and for the most part true:-


"Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
C'e ne manco che non credi."


"There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than
men do account upon."

(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by
their natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being
at the top of human desires, they have for the most part no
particular ends whereto they aspire, by distance from which a man
might take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and
desires; which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more
inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men's
ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also of the
predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally
sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by
Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humours of pleasures, metus ejus
rimatur, he wrought upon Nero's fears, whereby he broke the other's
neck.

(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way
resteth in three things; the first, to have general acquaintance and
inwardness with those which have general acquaintance and look most
into the world; and specially according to the diversity of
business, and the diversity of persons, to have privacy and
conversation with some one friend at least which is perfect and
well-intelligenced in every several kind. The second is to keep a
good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in most things
liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech inviteth
and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to a
man's knowledge; and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and
inwardness. The last is the reducing of a man's self to this
watchful and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every
conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as
Epictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to say
to himself, Et hoc volo, et etiam institutum servare; so a politic
man in everything should say to himself, Et hoc volo, ac etiam
aliquid addiscere. I have stayed the longer upon this precept of
obtaining good information because it is a main part by itself,
which answereth to all the rest. But, above all things, caution
must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of themselves, and
that this much knowing do not draw on much meddling; for nothing is
more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many matters.
So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to
this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which may
concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more
dexterity.

(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to
take good information touching their own person, and well to
understand themselves; knowing that, as St. James saith, though men
look oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein
as the divine glass is the Word of God, so the politic glass is the
state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the which we are to
behold ourselves.

(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities
and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting
these with the most, and those other with the least; and from this
view and examination to frame the considerations following.

(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth
with the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable
and fit, then in all things to give themselves more scope and
liberty; but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of
their life to be more close retired, and reserved; as we see in
Tiberius, who was never seen at a play, and came not into the senate
in twelve of his last years; whereas Augustus Caesar lived ever in
men's eyes, which Tacitus observeth, alia Tiberio morum via.

(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions
and courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be
free; and, if engaged, to make the departure at the first
opportunity; as we see was done by Duke Valentine, that was designed
by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after
in regard of his parts and inclination; being such, nevertheless, as
a man cannot tell well whether they were worse for a prince or for a
priest.

(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are
like to have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course
wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most
eminent; as Caesar Julius did, who at first was an orator or
pleader; but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, Hortensius,
Catulus, and others for eloquence, and saw there was no man of
reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the state was forced
to rely, he forsook his course begun towards a civil and popular
greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial greatness.

(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents, to
proceed according to the composition of their own nature; as we may
see in Caesar, all whose friends and followers were men active and
effectual, but not solemn, or of reputation.

(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by
examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas
perhaps their natures and carriages are far differing. In which
error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith that he was wont
often to say, Sylla potuit, ego non potero? Wherein he was much
abused, the natures and proceedings of himself and his example being
the unlikest in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and
pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of majesty and
circumstance, and therefore the less effectual.

But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath
many other branches, whereupon we cannot insist.

(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man's self,
there followeth the well opening and revealing a man's self; wherein
we see nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the
less show. For there is a great advantage in the well setting forth
of a man's virtues, fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial
covering of a man's weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the
one, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by circumstances,
gracing the other by exposition, and the like. Wherein we see what
Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest politique of his
time, Omnium quae dixerat feceratque arte quadam ostentator, which
requireth indeed some art, lest it turn tedious and arrogant; but
yet so, as ostentation (though it be to the first degree of vanity)
seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than in policy; for as it is
said, Audacter calumniare, semper aliquid haeret; so, except it be
in a ridiculous degree of deformity, Audacter te vendita, semper
aluquid haeret. For it will stick with the more ignorant and
inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile at it
and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth countervail
the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and
government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or
at times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in
military persons); or at times when others are most envied; or with
easy and careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too
long, or being too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a
man's self, as well as gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling
or putting down others' injury or insolency; it doth greatly add to
reputation: and surely not a few solid natures, that want this
ventosity and cannot sail in the height of the winds, are not
without some prejudice and disadvantage by their moderation.

(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they
are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that
virtue be not disvalued and embased under the just price, which is
done in three manners--by offering and obtruding a man's self,
wherein men think he is rewarded when he is accepted; by doing too
much, which will not give that which is well done leave to settle,
and in the end induceth satiety; and by finding too soon the fruit
of a man's virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour;
wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him hear what is
truly said: Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris, si haec te
res parva sicuti magna delectat.

(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the
valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners--
by caution, by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do
ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for
which they are not proper; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet
spirits will thrust themselves into matters without difference, and
so publish and proclaim all their wants. Colour is when men make a
way for themselves to have a construction made of their faults or
wants, as proceeding from a better cause or intended for some other
purpose. For of the one it is well said,


"Saepe latet vitium proximitate boni,"


and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he
pretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must
affect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so the rest. For the
second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not do
his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities; and for that
purpose must use to dissemble those abilities which are notorious in
him, to give colour that his true wants are but industries and
dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last but the surest
remedy--namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man
cannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who
endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat
down the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth
this other, which is to face out a man's own defects, in seeming to
conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing; and,
to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath least
opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best: like as we
shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show their verses, and
you except to any, they will say, "That that line cost them more
labour than any of the rest;" and presently will seem to disable and
suspect rather some other line, which they know well enough to be
the best in the number. But above all, in this righting and helping
of a man's self in his own carriage, he must take heed he show not
himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much
dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some sparkles
of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage,
with a ready rescussing of a man's self from scorns, is sometimes of
necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune;
but it ever succeedeth with good felicity.

(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour
to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing
hindereth men's fortunes so much as this: Idem manebat, neque idem
decebat--men are where they were, when occasions turn: and
therefore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he
addeth that he had versatile ingenium. And thereof it cometh that
these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves and cannot
make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is
nature to be somewhat vicious and enwrapped, and not easy to turn.
In some it is a conceit that is almost a nature, which is, that men
can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their
course, when they have found good by it in former experience. For
Machiavel noted wisely how Fabius Maximus would have been
temporising still, according to his old bias, when the nature of the
war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it is want
of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not discern
when things have a period, but come in too late after the occasion;
as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows,
when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then
they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some
other it is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that
they can bring about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end,
when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with
disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of
Sibylla's books the treble price, when he might at first have had
all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this
restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and
nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind
concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity
with that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is
well expressed, Fatis accede deisque, that men do not only turn with
the occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their
credit or strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in
their actions that which is most passable: for this will preserve
men from foil, not occupy them too much about one matter, win
opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a show of a
perpetual felicity in all they undertake: which cannot but mightily
increase reputation.

(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy
with the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that
which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: Et quemadmodum receptum
est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsae
ducendae; ut quaeipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus
persequi cogantur. For if we observe we shall find two differing
kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of
occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and
pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in;
either of which is very imperfect without the other.

(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good
mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a man's self: for
although depth of secrecy, and making way (qualis est via navis in
mari, which the French calleth sourdes menees, when men set things
in work without opening themselves at all), be sometimes both
prosperous and admirable; yet many times dissimulatio errores parit,
qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant. And therefore we see the
greatest politiques have in a natural and free manner professed
their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised in them. For
so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, "that he
wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or
enemies." So Caesar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple
to profess "that he had rather be first in a village than second at
Rome." So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what
Cicero saith of him, Alter (meaning of Caesar) non recusat, sed
quodammodo postulat, ut (ut est) sic appelletur tyrannus. So we may
see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Caesar, in his
very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet
in his harangues to the people would swear, Ita parentis honores
consequi liceat (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to
help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of
Caesar's that was erected in the place: and men laughed and
wondered, and said, "Is it possible?" or, "Did you ever hear the
like?" and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so handsomely and
ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who
tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and dissembling manner
as Tacitus saith of him, Occultior non melior, wherein Sallust
concurreth, Ore probo, animo inverecundo, made it his design, by
infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute anarchy
and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for
necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon
him, and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he
thought) to that point when he was chosen consul alone, as never any
was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men understood
him not; but was fain in the end to go the beaten track of getting
arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of Caesar's designs: so
tedious, casual, and unfortunate are these deep dissimulations:
whereof it seemeth Tacitus made this judgment, that they were a
cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy; attributing
the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius; where, speaking of
Livia, he saith, Et cum artibus mariti simulatione filii bene
compostia: for surely the continual habit of dissimulation is but a
weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic.

(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom
our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they
conduce and are material to our particular ends; and that to do
substantially and not superficially. For we shall find the logical
part (as I may term it) of some men's minds good, but the
mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of
consequences, but not of proportions and comparison, preferring
things of show and sense before things of substance and effect. So
some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular fame
and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in
many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So
some measure things according to the labour and difficulty or
assiduity which are spent about them; and think, if they be ever
moving, that they must needs advance and proceed; as Caesar saith in
a despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how
laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose, Haec omnia
magno studio agebat. So in most things men are ready to abuse
themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should
be the fittest.

(38) As for the true marshalling of men's pursuits towards their
fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand
thus. First the amendment of their own minds. For the removal of
the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of
fortune than the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of
the mind. In the second place I set down wealth and means; which I
know most men would have placed first, because of the general use
which it beareth towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion
I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that
moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the true
sinews of the wars are the sinews of men's arms, that is, a valiant,
populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority
of Solon, who, when Croesus showed him his treasury of gold, said to
him, that if another came that had better iron, he would be master
of his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not
moneys that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and
steel of men's minds, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper,
industry, and the like. In the third place I set down reputation,
because of the peremptory tides and currents it hath; which, if they
be not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being
extreme hard to play an after-game of reputation. And lastly I
place honour, which is more easily won by any of the other three,
much more by all, than any of them can be purchased by honour. To
conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in matter, so
is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the
commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they should
intend their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as
they come on, but marshal them according to greatness and not
according to instance; not observing the good precept, Quod nunc
instat agamus.

(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters
which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that
sounding in a man's ears, Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile
tempus: and that is the cause why those which take their course of
rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful
divines, and the like, are not commonly so politic for their own
fortune, otherwise than in their ordinary way, because they want
time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and to devise plots.

(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature, which
doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well
interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon that
which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in every particular
action so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing
under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best
degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third; and if he can
have no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to
somewhat else; and if he cannot make anything of it for the present,
yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if he can
contrive no effect or substance from it, yet to win some good
opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact an account of
himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed
and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is
more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that
doth so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many
times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need
afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present; and
therefore men must be perfect in that rule, Haec oportet facere, et
illa non imittere.

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