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The Advancement of Learning

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III. (1) History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with
history civil: but further in the propriety thereof may be divided
into the history of the Church, by a general name; history of
prophecy; and history of providence. The first describeth the times
of the militant Church, whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah,
or movable, as the ark in the wilderness, or at rest, as the ark in
the Temple: that is, the state of the Church in persecution, in
remove, and in peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as
deficient; only I would that the virtue and sincerity of it were
according to the mass and quantity. But I am not now in hand with
censures, but with omissions.

(2) The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of two
relatives--the prophecy and the accomplishment; and, therefore, the
nature of such a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the
Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the same throughout
the ages of the world, both for the better confirmation of faith and
for the better illumination of the Church touching those parts of
prophecies which are yet unfulfilled: allowing, nevertheless, that
latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies,
being of the nature of their Author, with whom a thousand years are
but as one day, and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once,
but have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many
ages, though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one
age. This is a work which I find deficient, but is to be done with
wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.

(3) The third, which is history of Providence, containeth that
excellent correspondence which is between God's revealed will and
His secret will; which though it be so obscure, as for the most part
it is not legible to the natural man--no, nor many times to those
that behold it from the tabernacle--yet, at some times it pleaseth
God, for our better establishment and the confuting of those which
are as without God in the world, to write it in such text and
capital letters, that, as the prophet saith, "He that runneth by may
read it"--that is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God's
judgments, and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are
nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it. Such
are the notable events and examples of God's judgments,
chastisements, deliverances, and blessings; and this is a work which
has passed through the labour of many, and therefore I cannot
present as omitted.

(4) There are also other parts of learning which are appendices to
history. For all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words
and deeds, whereof history doth properly receive and retain in
memory the deeds; and if words, yet but as inducements and passages
to deeds; so are there other books and writings which are
appropriate to the custody and receipt of words only, which likewise
are of three sorts--orations, letters, and brief speeches or
sayings. Orations are pleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives,
invectives, apologies, reprehensions, orations of formality or
ceremony, and the like. Letters are according to all the variety of
occasions, advertisements, advises, directions, propositions,
petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of compliment,
of pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of action. And
such as are written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in
my judgment, the best; for they are more natural than orations and
public speeches, and more advised than conferences or present
speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as manage them, or
are privy to them, are of all others the best instructions for
history, and to a diligent reader the best histories in themselves.
For apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book of Caesar's; for as
his history, and those few letters of his which we have, and those
apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men's else, so I
suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done; for as for
those which are collected by others, either I have no taste in such
matters or else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these
three kinds of writings I do not insist, because I have no
deficiences to propound concerning them.

(5) Thus much therefore concerning history, which is that part of
learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices
of the mind of man, which is that of the memory.

IV. (1) Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words, for the
most part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed,
and doth truly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to
the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath
severed, and sever that which nature hath joined, and so make
unlawful matches and divorces of things--Pictoribus atque poetis,
&c. It is taken in two senses in respect of words or matter. In
the first sense, it is but a character of style, and belongeth to
arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present. In the
latter, it is--as hath been said--one of the principal portions of
learning, and is nothing else but feigned history, which may be
styled as well in prose as in verse.

(2) The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of
satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature
of things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to
the soul; by reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of
man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more
absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things.
Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not that
magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and
events greater and more heroical. Because true history propoundeth
the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits
of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in
retribution, and more according to revealed Providence. Because
true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less
interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and
more unexpected and alternative variations. So as it appeareth that
poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality and to
delectation. And therefore, it was ever thought to have some
participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the
mind, by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind;
whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of
things. And we see that by these insinuations and congruities with
man's nature and pleasure, joined also with the agreement and
consort it hath with music, it hath had access and estimation in
rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning stood
excluded.

(3) The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof
(besides those divisions which are common unto it with history, as
feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as
feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) is into poesy
narrative, representative, and allusive. The narrative is a mere
imitation of history, with the excesses before remembered, choosing
for subjects commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes
pleasure or mirth. Representative is as a visible history, and is
an image of actions as if they were present, as history is of
actions in nature as they are (that is) past. Allusive, or
parabolical, is a narration applied only to express some special
purpose or conceit; which latter kind of parabolical wisdom was much
more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of AEsop, and the
brief sentences of the seven, and the use of hieroglyphics may
appear. And the cause was (for that it was then of necessity to
express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtle than the
vulgar in that manner) because men in those times wanted both
variety of examples and subtlety of conceit. And as hieroglyphics
were before letters, so parables were before arguments; and
nevertheless now and at all times they do retain much life and
rigour, because reason cannot be so sensible nor examples so fit.

(4) But there remaineth yet another use of poesy parabolical,
opposite to that which we last mentioned; for that tendeth to
demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and
this other to retire and obscure it--that is, when the secrets and
mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are involved in fables
or parables. Of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorised.
In heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out
sometimes with great felicity: as in the fable that the giants
being overthrown in their war against the gods, the earth their
mother in revenge thereof brought forth Fame:


"Illam terra parens, ira irritat Deorum,
Extremam, ut perhibent, Coeo Enceladoque soroem,
Progenuit."


Expounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and
open rebels, then the malignity of people (which is the mother of
rebellion) doth bring forth libels and slanders, and taxations of
the states, which is of the same kind with rebellion but more
feminine. So in the fable that the rest of the gods having
conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called Briareus with his hundred
hands to his aid: expounded that monarchies need not fear any
curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, as long as by
wisdom they keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come
in on their side. So in the fable that Achilles was brought up
under Chiron, the centaur, who was part a man and part a beast,
expounded ingeniously but corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth
to the education and discipline of princes to know as well how to
play the part of a lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the
man in virtue and justice. Nevertheless, in many the like
encounters, I do rather think that the fable was first, and the
exposition devised, than that the moral was first, and thereupon the
fable framed; for I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus,
that troubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions
of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient poets; but yet that
all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not
figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of these poets which are now
extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made a kind of
scripture by the later schools of the Grecians), yet I should
without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such
inwardness in his own meaning. But what they might have upon a more
original tradition is not easy to affirm, for he was not the
inventor of many of them.

(5) In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no
deficience; for being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the
earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad
more than any other kind. But to ascribe unto it that which is due,
for the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and
customs, we are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers'
works; and for wit and eloquence, not much less than to orators'
harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let
us now pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which we
are to approach and view with more reverence and attention.

V. (1) The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from
above, and some springing from beneath: the one informed by the
light of nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. The light
of nature consisteth in the notions of the mind and the reports of
the senses; for as for knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it
is cumulative and not original, as in a water that besides his own
spring-head is fed with other springs and streams. So then,
according to these two differing illuminations or originals,
knowledge is first of all divided into divinity and philosophy.

(2) In philosophy the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto
God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted
upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three
knowledges--divine philosophy, natural philosophy, and human
philosophy or humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with
this triple character--the power of God, the difference of nature
and the use of man. But because the distributions and partitions of
knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so
touch but in a point, but are like branches of a tree that meet in a
stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and
continuance before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms
and boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into the former
distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the
name of philosophia prima, primitive or summary philosophy, as the
main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide
themselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or
no, I stand doubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody of natural
theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that part of natural
philosophy which concerneth the principles, and of that other part
of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit--all these
strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to
me rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto
some height of terms, than anything solid or substantive of itself.
Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is
current, that the same things are handled but in several respects.
As for example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in
notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature--the one in
appearance, the other in existence; but I find this difference
better made than pursued. For if they had considered quantity,
similitude, diversity, and the rest of those extern characters of
things, as philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of
force have been of a far other kind than they are. For doth any of
them, in handling quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how
far it multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason why some things
in nature are so common, and in so great mass, and others so rare,
and in so small quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and
diversity, assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which
is more like, but move to the loadstone, which is less like? Why in
all diversities of things there should be certain participles in
nature which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be
referred? But there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature
and operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in nature; and
only a resuming and repeating of the force and use of them in speech
or argument. Therefore, because in a writing of this nature I avoid
all subtlety, my meaning touching this original or universal
philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by negative:
"That it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations and
axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of
philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage."

(3) Now that there are many of that kind need not be doubted. For
example: Is not the rule, Si inoequalibus aequalia addas, omnia
erunt inaequalia, an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics?
and is there not a true coincidence between commutative and
distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion?
Is not that other rule, Quae in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se
conveniunt, a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent in
logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the observation,
Omnia mutantur, nil interit, a contemplation in philosophy thus,
that the quantum of nature is eternal? in natural theology thus,
that it requireth the same omnipotency to make somewhat nothing,
which at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the
Scripture, Didici quod omnia opera, quoe fecit Deus, perseverent in
perpetuum; non possumus eis quicquam addere nec auferre. Is not the
ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth concerning
governments, that the way to establish and preserve them is to
reduce them ad principia--a rule in religion and nature, as well as
in civil administration? Was not the Persian magic a reduction or
correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature to the
rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept of a musician,
to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet
accord, alike true in affection? Is not the trope of music, to
avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common with the trope of
rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of the
quavering upon a stop in music the same with the playing of light
upon the water?


"Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus."


Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of
reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait,
determined and bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as men
of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same
footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or
matters. This science therefore (as I understand it) I may justly
report as deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of
wits, in handling some particular argument, will now and then draw a
bucket of water out of this well for their present use; but the
spring-head thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited, being of
so excellent use both for the disclosing of nature and the
abridgment of art.

VI. (1) This science being therefore first placed as a common parent
like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, omnes
coelicolas, omnes supera alta tenetes; we may return to the former
distribution of the three philosophies--divine, natural, and human.
And as concerning divine philosophy or natural theology, it is that
knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God which may be
obtained by the contemplation of His creatures; which knowledge may
be truly termed divine in respect of the object, and natural in
respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it
sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion; and
therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert an
atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a
God; but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the
superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to declare the
will and true worship of God. For as all works do show forth the
power and skill of the workman, and not his image, so it is of the
works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker,
but not His image. And therefore therein the heathen opinion
differeth from the sacred truth: for they supposed the world to be
the image of God, and man to be an extract or compendious image of
the world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the
world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only THE WORK OF
HIS HANDS; neither do they speak of any other image of God but man.
Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and enforce the
acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, providence, and
goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently
handled by divers, but on the other side, out of the contemplation
of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or
persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not
safe; Da fidei quae fidei sunt. For the heathen themselves conclude
as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain,
"That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth;
but, contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven." So
as we ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of
God to our reason, but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason
to the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, touching
divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficience, as I
rather note an excess; whereunto I have digressed because of the
extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy hath received
and may receive by being commixed together; as that which
undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and
fabulous philosophy.

(2) Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an
appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither
inscrutable nor interdicted. For although the Scripture saith, "Let
no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching the worship of
angels, pressing into that he knoweth not," &c., yet notwithstanding
if you observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that there
be two things only forbidden--adoration of them, and opinion
fantastical of them, either to extol them further than appertaineth
to the degree of a creature, or to extol a man's knowledge of them
further than he hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry,
which may arise out of the passages of Holy Scriptures, or out of
the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and
revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the employment of them
is prohibited, much more any veneration towards them; but the
contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their
illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual
wisdom. For so the apostle saith, "We are not ignorant of his
stratagems." And it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of
evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the
nature of sin and vice in morality. But this part touching angels
and spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied
themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many of the writers
thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.

VII. (1) Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology
(not divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of
all as the haven and sabbath of all man's contemplations) we will
now proceed to natural philosophy. If then it be true that
Democritus said, "That the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep
mines and caves;" and if it be true likewise that the alchemists do
so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth
that dexterously and compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages
and length of time, it were good to divide natural philosophy into
the mine and the furnace, and to make two professions or occupations
of natural philosophers--some to be pioneers and some smiths; some
to dig, and some to refine and hammer. And surely I do best allow
of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and scholastical
terms: namely, that these be the two parts of natural philosophy--
the inquisition of causes, and the production of effects;
speculative and operative; natural science, and natural prudence.
For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom
of direction; so is it in natural. And here I will make a request,
that for the latter (or at least for a part thereof) I may revive
and reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of natural magic,
which in the true sense is but natural wisdom, or natural prudence;
taken according to the ancient acception, purged from vanity and
superstition. Now although it be true, and I know it well, that
there is an intercourse between causes and effects, so as both these
knowledges, speculative and operative, have a great connection
between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful natural
philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent,
ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and
descending from causes to the invention of new experiments;
therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be
severally considered and handled.

(2) Natural science or theory is divided into physic and metaphysic;
wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysic
in a differing sense from that that is received. And in like
manner, I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of judgment,
that in this and other particulars, wheresoever my conception and
notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the
ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by
the order and perspicuous expressing of that I do propound, I am
otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from
antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and
the proficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little marvel
at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of
difference and contradiction towards all antiquity; undertaking not
only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and
extinguish all ancient wisdom; insomuch as he never nameth or
mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and reprove;
wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he took the
right course. For certainly there cometh to pass, and hath place in
human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest
truth:- Veni in nomine partis, nec recipits me; si quis venerit in
nomine suo eum recipietis. But in this divine aphorism (considering
to whom it was applied, namely, to antichrist, the highest
deceiver), we may discern well that the coming in a man's own name,
without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth,
although it be joined with the fortune and success of an eum
recipietis. But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will think
of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom it
seemeth he did emulate; the one to conquer all opinions, as the
other to conquer all nations. Wherein, nevertheless, it may be, he
may at some men's hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a
like title as his scholar did:-

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