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Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him

J >> Joseph P. Tumulty >> Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him




I vividly recall the day the Associated Press bulletin reached the White
House. I took it immediately to the President who was at his desk in his
private office. As I entered, he looked up from his writing, casual
inquiry in his eyes. Without comment I laid the fateful slip of paper on
his desk, and silently watched him as he read and then re-read it. I
seemed to read his mind in the expressions that raced across his strong
features: first, blank amazement; then incredulity that even Germany could
be guilty of such perfidy; then gravity and sternness, a sudden grayness
of colour, a compression of the lips and the familiar locking of the jaw
which always characterized him in moments of supreme resolution. Handing
the paper back to me, he said in quiet tones: "This means war. The break
that we have tried so hard to prevent now seems inevitable."

On February 4th, he addressed Congress, announcing the severance of
diplomatic relations with Germany, and stating his hope that Germany would
pause before it was too late. On February 26th, the steamship. _Aneona_,
with Americans on board, was sunk, and on the next day the President
addressed Congress, suggesting the proclamation of armed neutrality as a
final effort to apply pressure to the Government of Germany, to show that
the United States was in earnest and would protect its rights against
lawless attacks at sea; but these measures failed. Germany seemed bent
upon a break with us, and on April 6, 1917, in response to a memorable
address delivered by the President on April second, the Congress of the
United States declared solemnly that a state of war existed between the
United States and the Imperial German Government.

In concluding his war message, the President said:

It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war,
into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself
seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than
peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried
nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit
to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights
and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by
such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all
nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can
dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and
everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day
has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might
for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace
which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

I accompanied the President to Capitol Hill on the day of the delivery of
his war message, and on that fateful day I rode with him from the Capitol
back to the White House, the echo of applause still ringing in my ears.

For a while he sat silent and pale in the Cabinet Room. At last he said:
"Think what it was they were applauding" [he was speaking of the people
who were lined along the streets on his way to the Capitol]. "My message
to-day was a message of death for our young men. How strange it seems to
applaud that."

That simple remark is one key to an understanding of Woodrow Wilson. All
politicians pretend to hate and to dread war, but Woodrow Wilson really
hates and dreads it in all the fibres of his human soul; hates it and
dreads it because he has an imagination and a heart; an imagination which
shows his sensitive perception the anguish and the dying which war
entails; a heart which yearns and aches over every dying soldier and
bleeds afresh with each new-made wound.

I shall never forget that scene in the Cabinet Room between the President
and myself. He appeared like a man who had thrown off old burdens only to
add new ones.

It was apparent in his talk with me that he felt deeply wounded at the
criticism that for months had been heaped upon him for his seeming
unwillingness to go to war with Germany. As he discussed the step he had
just taken, it was evident to me that he keenly felt the full solemnity
and tragedy of it all. Turning to me, he said: "Tumulty, from the very
beginning I saw the end of this horrible thing; but I could not move
faster than the great mass of our people would permit. Very few understood
the difficult and trying position I have been placed in during the years
through which we have just passed. In the policy of patience and
forbearance I pursued I tried to make every part of America and the varied
elements of our population understand that we were willing to go any
length rather than resort to war with Germany. As I told you months ago,
it would have been foolish for us to have been rushed off our feet and to
have gone to war over an isolated affair like the _Lusitania_. But now we
are certain that there will be no regrets or looking back on the part of
our people. There is but one course now left open to us. Our consciences
are clear, and we must prepare for the inevitable--a fight to the end.
Germany must be made to understand that we have rights that she must
respect. There were few who understood this policy of patience. I do not
mean to say this in a spirit of criticism. Indeed, many of the leading
journals of the country were unmindful of the complexities of the
situation which confronted us."

The President then took out of his pocket an old and worn newspaper
clipping, saying: "I wish to read you an analysis of my position and my
policy by a special writer for the _Manchester Guardian_, who seemed,
without consulting me or ever conferring with me, to know just what I am
driving at."

This special writer, commenting upon the Wilson policy, had said:

Mr. Wilson's patience, now derided and criticized, will inevitably be
the means by which he will lead his people by easy stages to the side
of the Allies. By his methods of patience and apparent subservience to
Germany, he will convince the whole American people that no other
course save war is possible. This policy of Wilson's, now determined
on, will work a complete transformation in his people. It will not
evidence itself quickly or overnight. The moral preachment of Wilson
before and after war will be the cause that will finally bring his
people to the side of the Allies.

Again turning to me, the President said: "Our course from this time on is
clear. The whole business of war that we are now engaged upon is fraught
with the gravest difficulties. There will be great enthusiasm in the
country from this day. I trust it will not slacken or weaken as the
horrors of the war and its tragedies are disclosed. Of course our motives
will be misconstrued, our purposes misunderstood; some of our best friends
will misinterpret what we seek to do. In carrying on the war we will be
obliged to do certain unusual things, things that will interfere with the
lives and habits of our people, which will bring down upon us a storm of
criticism and ridicule. Our life, therefore, until this thing is over, and
God only knows when it will be over, will be full of tragedy and
heartaches."

As he spoke, he was no longer Woodrow Wilson, the protagonist of peace,
but Woodrow Wilson, the stern warrior, now grimly determined to pursue the
great cause of America to the end.

The President continued talking to me. He said: "It has not been easy to
carry these burdens in these trying times. From the beginning I saw the
utter futility of neutrality, the disappointment and heartaches that would
flow from its announcement, but we had to stand by our traditional policy
of steering clear of European embroilments. While I have appeared to be
indifferent to the criticism which has been my portion during these
critical days, a few have tried to understand my purpose and have
sympathized throughout with what I sought to do."

Then, as he lowered his voice, he said: "There is a fine chap in
Springfield, Massachusetts, editor of a great paper there, who understood
my position from the beginning and who has sympathized with me throughout
this whole business." For a moment he, paused, and then went on: "I want
to read you the letter I received from this fine man." As he read, the
emotion he felt at the tender sympathy which the words conveyed gripped
him. The letter is as follows:

Springfield, Massachusetts,
March 28, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

In acknowledging your very kind and appreciative note of March 22nd, I
must say at once that the note has given me the greatest possible
pleasure. I prize this word from you all the more because after the
political experience and conflicts of the past few years, I am
conscious of a very real yet peculiar feeling of having summered and
wintered with you, in spite of the immeasurable and rather awful
distance that separates our respective places in the life and work of
our time. Your note, for the moment, suddenly annihilates the distance
and brings to me what I recognize as a very human touch.

There is summering and wintering to come,--with more wintering perhaps
than we shall enjoy;--even so, I shall hope to be of timely service,
as opportunity favours me.

I have the honour to be your admirer and friend.

Most sincerely,
(Signed) WALDO L. COOK.

"That man understood me and sympathized." As he said this, the President
drew his handkerchief from his pocket, wiped away great tears that stood
in his eyes, and then laying his head on the Cabinet table, sobbed as if
he had been a child.




CHAPTER XXX

CARRYING ON


The critics of the President will ask the question: "What was the
President doing to prepare the country for war, which to him seemed
inevitable?" From the inside, and without the blare of trumpets, he was
quietly engaged in conferring with the heads of the Army and Navy
departments. Indeed, from the minute the third _Lusitania_ note was
dispatched, actual preparations for war were begun. Immediately upon the
dispatch of the note, the following statement was issued from the White
House, under date of July 21, 1916.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1916.

The President in association with the heads of departments, regardless
of present-day conditions or controversies, has long been giving a
great deal of consideration to the preparation of a reasonable and
adequate naval programme, which he intends to propose to Congress at
the proper time.

That is one of the things he is now considering in the quiet of
Cornish. He feels, now that the note has been dispatched, that it is
best, for the time being, to drop the discussion of it as far as he is
concerned and is turning to questions of permanent national policy.

Of course, he realizes that he must have the best practical advice
obtainable in this matter and is seeking for it from every available
source. In fact, it is known that the best minds of the various
departments of the Government, both of the Army and the Navy, are now
and have been at work on these important matters for some time; that
is, he is seeking advice from the men in those departments who have
been most directly in touch with the new conditions of defence that
have been evolved out of modern experience. He not only wishes advice
from those who have a knowledge of actual modern conditions of
warfare, but he is seeking light from those who are able to understand
and comprehend the altered conditions of land and naval warfare. He
wishes the Navy to stand upon an equality with the most efficient and
serviceable.

As to the Army, it is known here that he is preparing to incorporate
in his next message to Congress a programme in regard to the
development and equipment of the Army and a proper training of the
citizens of the United States to arms which, while in every way
consistent with American traditions and national policy, will be of
such a character as to commend itself to every patriotic and practical
mind. In this matter he is working with the Secretary of War and his
professional associates, who, it is understood, have reached some very
definite conclusions on these exceedingly important matters. He is
anxious to have a programme that will be definite and positive, and
wishes to have the information in hand before laying the matter before
the committees of the Senate and the House.

Contemporaneously with this statement was issued the following, which was
prepared by the President, but issued over my name, the full significance
of which was not apparent at the time:

The note [Third _Lusitania_ note] having been dispatched, the
President felt that it was best to drop further discussion of the
matter for the present, as far as he was concerned. He will be free
now to devote his time to a full consideration of a matter that the
country has for a long time been thoughtful of, that is a reasonable
programme of national defense. Of course, this programme will be
considered regardless of present-day conditions.

It is known that the President has been considering this important
matter in all its aspects, and has been in touch with the Secretary of
War and the Secretary of the Navy regarding it. It is also known in
official circles here that the President had taken steps before
leaving for Cornish to instruct the Army and Navy departments to make
ready for his consideration a careful programme of national defense in
preparation for the presentation of his views to Congress at the
proper time.

He desires to have the programme based on the most practicable lines
obtainable from the departments and it is said that the best minds in
the departments are at present at work on the subject. He hopes that
the programme will express the best traditions of the country and not
lose sight of modern experience. He is anxious to have a programme
that will be definite and positive, and wishes to have the information
in hand before laying the matter before the committees of the Senate
and the House.

On July 21, 1915, he addressed the following letters to the Secretary of
War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have been giving scarcely less thought than you yourself have to the
question of adequate preparation for national defense, and I am
anxious, as you know, to incorporate in my next message to Congress a
programme regarding the development and equipment of the Army and a
proper training of our citizens to arms which, while in every way
consistent with our traditions and our national policy, will be of
such a character as to commend itself to every patriotic and practical
mind.

I know that you have been much in conference with your professional
associates in the department and that you have yourself come to some
very definite conclusions on these exceedingly important matters. I
shall be away from Washington for a few days, but I would be very much
obliged if you would be kind enough to prepare for me a programme,
with estimates, of what you and the best-informed soldiers in your
counsels think the country ought to undertake to do. I should like to
discuss this programme with you at as early a time as it can be made
ready. Whether we can reasonably propose the whole of it to the
Congress immediately or not we can determine when we have studied it.
The important thing now is to know and know fully what we need.
Congress will certainly welcome such advice and follow it to the limit
of its opportunity.

Cordially and faithfully yours,
WOODROW WILSON.

* * * * *

HON. LINDLEY M. GARRISON,
Secretary Of War.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1915.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have been giving, as I am sure you have also, a great deal of
thought to the matter of a wise and adequate naval programme to be
proposed to the Congress at its next session, and I would like to
discuss the whole subject with you at the earliest possible date.

But first we must have professional advice. I would be very much
obliged to you if you would get the best minds in the department to
work on the subject: I mean the men who have been most directly in
contact with actual modern conditions, who have most thoroughly
comprehended what the Navy must be in the future in order to stand
upon an equality with the most efficient and most practically
serviceable. I want their advice, a programme by them formulated in
the most definite way. Whether we can reasonably propose the whole of
it to the Congress immediately or not we can determine when we have
studied it. The important thing now is to know fully what we need.
Congress will certainly welcome such advice and follow it to the limit
of its opportunity.

It should be a programme planned for a consistent and progressive
development of this great defensive arm of the nation and should be of
such a kind as to commend itself to every patriotic and practical man.

I shall return to Washington in a few days and shall be glad to take
this important matter up with you at your early convenience.

Cordially and faithfully yours,
WOODROW WILSON.

HON. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

Immediately after the war message there arose an insistent demand for a
coalition cabinet. It was the beginning of the Republican drive for what
was called a bi-partisan government. Republicans chose to forget the
experiences of England and France under their coalition cabinets, and when
the President refused to act upon the suggestion, the impression was
subtly conveyed to the unthinking that the President's refusal arose from
his dislike of counsel and coöperation, and his unwillingness to share the
responsibilities and glories of the war with people outside his own party.

As an historian, the President knew the troubles of Washington with a
coalition cabinet, Lincoln's embarrassments from Cabinet members not of
his own party, McKinley's sagacious refusal in 1898 to form a coalition
cabinet. He also knew human nature; knew that with the best intentions,
men sometimes find it difficult to work whole-heartedly with a leader of a
political party not their own. He could not risk a chance of division, in
his own official family in the face of the common enemy.

The President looked upon the agitation for a coalition cabinet as a
partisan effort to hamper and embarrass his administration, and so he
coldly turned away from every suggestion that looked toward the
establishment of a cabinet of the kind suggested by his too-solicitous
Republican friends.

The following note which I addressed to the President and his reply, bear
upon the subject:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DEAR GOVERNOR:

The newspaper men asked me this morning what the attitude of the
Administration was toward the proposed super-cabinet. I hedged as much
as I could, but I asked if it was not the same proposition that came
up some months ago, advocated by Senator Weeks, in a new disguise--if
it was not the same kind of a commission that had harassed Mr.
Lincoln. I think we ought to let our attitude be known unofficially
for the guidance of men who wish to help us. If we do nothing at this
time to let it be known, it would seem that our opposition to this
kind of legislation had been silenced by the furore over the fuel
order. In other words, we ought to show by our attitude that the
tantrums on the Hill are making no impression on us whatever.

TUMULTY.

* * * * *

DEAR TUMULTY:

Of course, I am opposed to the idea of a "super-cabinet," and regard
it as nothing more nor less than a renewal of the perpetual effort of
the Republicans to force representation in the Administration.
Republicans of the finest sort and of the finest capacity are working
for and with the Administration on all hands and there is no need
whatever for a change at the head of the administering departments. I
am utterly opposed to anything of the sort and will never consent to
it. You will know how to create the impression on the minds of the
newspaper men that I regard it as merely a partisan effort to hamper
and embarrass the Administration.

THE PRESIDENT.

There were many misgivings in the minds of the people when war was
declared in April, 1917, and the nation embarked upon the most gigantic of
all its wars, under the leadership of a college professor, a doctrinaire,
who did not believe in war as a method of permanently solving
international problems, and a Secretary of War who was an avowed pacifist.
There was another matter which greatly disturbed the peace of mind of the
average American. The political party that was conducting the struggle was
the Democratic party, the party of the plain folk, of the average men and
women of America. Our Republican friends had so cleverly "advertised"
their conduct of the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, that many
people in the country felt that the Republican party, because of its
leading minds and the business genius of its masters, was the only
political organization that could be depended upon successfully to carry
on a great war.

Colonel Roosevelt's diary, first made public on September 28, 1921, throws
interesting light on Republican claims of efficient management by
Republicans of the Spanish-American War. Under date of May 7, 1898, the
Colonel, then a lieutenant-colonel, recorded in his diary: "The delays and
stupidity of the Ordnance Department surpass belief. The Quartermaster's
Department is better, but bad. The Commissary Department is good. There is
no management whatever in the War Department. Against a good nation we
should be helpless," and these animadversions are reiterated in subsequent
entries. Interesting comments from the greatest of contemporary
Republicans on the divine right of the Republican party to conduct all
American wars and transact all other American business of importance. But
doubtless the Colonel had forgotten all this in 1917, and many other good
Americans had also forgotten what was notorious in 1898 and the ineptitude
of the Republican War Department, which, as Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt
said under date of May 21, 1898, had "no head, no energy, no
intelligence." But the old myth sedulously cultivated by Republicans
continued in 1917, that only Republicans are fit to govern, no matter how
badly they govern. Direful prophecies and predictions of disaster to the
country by reason of the Democratic auspices under which the war was to be
conducted were freely made.

It is an unpleasant fact that some of the leading Republicans in the
Senate and the House harboured for the President a partisan and personal
hatred which made the wish father to the thought. Yet the expected did not
happen, to the amazement and chagrin of the Republican enemies of the
President. No other war was attended with so little scandal and with
greater expedition. The cause was plain. It was the magnificent and
aggressive leadership of Woodrow Wilson exerting itself all along the
line, and that leadership was based upon certain fundamental resolutions
which had been taking form in the President's mind for many months
previous to his appearance before Congress asking for the passage of a war
declaration. They were as follows: (1) There was to be no "politics" in
the conduct of the war; (2) no political generals would be selected; (3)
every ounce of energy and force in the nation was to be put back of the
heads of the Army and the Navy in a supreme effort to make our influence,
moral and physical, quickly felt. Every effort was made to cut out scandal
and to put an absolute embargo on the activities of army speculators,
contractors, and profiteers.

Speaking to me one day about the conduct of the war, shortly after the
delivery of his war message, he said: "We must not in our conduct of this
war repeat the scandals of the Civil and the Spanish-American wars. The
politics of generals and admirals must be tabooed. We must find the best
trained minds that we can get and we must back them up at every turn. Our
policy must be 'the best man for every job,' regardless of his political
affiliations. This must be the only test, for, after all, we are the
trustees of the boys whose lives will be spent in this enterprise of war."

This was not an easy policy to pursue. Every kind of harassing demand came
from Democratic senators and representatives to induce the President to
recognize political considerations in the conduct of the war, the argument
being that after all the responsibility for its conduct resting with the
Democrats, the administration of the war ought to be under Democratic
tutelage throughout. But the President was firm--in his resolve to see the
war through to the end without political considerations. The political
predilections of generals, admirals, and war workers of every kind was
ignored.

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