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Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him

J >> Joseph P. Tumulty >> Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him




No men ever winced less under the criticism or bitter ridicule of his
enemies than did Woodrow Wilson. Whether the criticism was directed at him
or at some member of his Cabinet, or, mayhap, at a subordinate like
myself, for some act, statement, or even an indiscretion, he bore up under
the criticism like a true sportsman. I remember how manfully he met the
storm of criticism that was poured upon him after the issuance of the
famous Garfield Fuel Order. He courageously took the responsibility for
the issuance of the order and stood by Doctor Garfield to the last.

It will be recalled what a tremendous impression and reaction the Garfield
order caused when it was published throughout the country. Many about the
President were greatly worried and afraid of the disastrous effect of it
upon the country. Cabinet officers rushed in upon him and endeavoured to
persuade him to recall it and even to repudiate Garfield for having issued
the order without consulting the Cabinet, but their remonstrances fell
unheeded upon the President's ears. I remember at the time that I wrote
the President regarding the matter and called his attention to what
appeared to me to be the calamitous results of the issuance of the Fuel
Order.

My letter to the President is as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON

17 January, 1918.

DEAR GOVERNOR:

At twelve o'clock last night, Mr. Lincoln of the New York World called
me out of bed by telephone to notify me that the Fuel Administration
had issued a drastic order shutting down the factories of the country
for five days, etc.

I do not know about the details of the order. I assume of course that
it was necessary because of the tremendous shortage throughout the
country. But what I am afraid of is that my own readiness to accept
this assumption may not be shared by people outside. In other words,
has the groundwork been laid for this radical step? Do the people know
how much coal we have on hand and what the real shortage is? Have they
not been led to believe that our chief ill was transportation and that
by subjecting themselves to hardships by cutting down trains, etc.,
enough cars have been provided to carry coal?

In other words, I am afraid the country will want to be shown that the
step just taken was absolutely necessary and if this cannot be proved,
I greatly fear the consequences upon the morale of the people. I am so
afraid that it will weaken their confidence in any action the
Government may take hereafter which depends for its execution on the
voluntary cooperation of the people. Again, it seems to me unjust that
all industries are put on the same footing. It is a difficult thing I
know to distinguish between the essential and non-essential
industries, but I am sure the country will understand if such a
distinction is made of, for instance, institutions that make pianos
and talking machines and candy and articles that are not immediately
necessary for our life, were cut down altogether and things necessary
to our sustenance kept.

Sincerely yours,
TUMULTY

THE PRESIDENT

[Illustration: An inside view of a well-remembered national crisis.
[Transcriber's note: contains a reproduction of the above-quoted letter.]]

The President's reply, written on his own typewriter, is as follows:

DEAR TUMULTY:

Of course, this is a tremendous matter and has given me the deepest
concern, but I really think this direct road is the road out of
difficulties which never would have been entirely remedied if we had
not taken some such action. We must just bow our heads and let the
storm beat.

WOODROW WILSON.

Even to Mr. James M. Beck, a prominent Republican lawyer and one of his
bitterest opponents and critics, he showed a tolerance and magnanimity
that were worthy of the man himself. It appears that Mr. Beck was invited
to confer at the White House on a matter having to do with the war, and
the question was presented to the President by Mr. Creel as to whether the
President considered Mr. Beck _persona non grata_. The President at once
sent me the following note:

DEAR TUMULTY:

Mr. James M. Beck expressed some hesitation about coming with the
committee which Creel has organized and which is coming to see me on
Monday afternoon, because he was not sufficiently _persona grata_ at
the White House. I think his criticism and his whole attitude before
we went into the war were abominable and inexcusable, but I "ain't
harbouring no ill will" just now and I hope that you will have the
intimation conveyed to him through Mr. Creel or otherwise that he will
be welcomed.

WOODROW WILSON.

While the President was busily engaged in France in laying the foundation
stones of peace, his partisan enemies were busily engaged in destroying
the things he held so dear, and had industriously circulated the story
that the mission to France was a mere political one, that the purpose back
of it was personal exploitation, or an attempt on the part of the
President to thrust himself into the councils of the Democratic party as
an active and aggressive candidate for a third term. The President's
attitude in this matter, his fear that talk of this kind would embarrass
the League of Nations, is disclosed by the following correspondence:

Received at the White House,
June 2, 1919.

Paris.
TUMULTY,
White House, Washington.

Have just read the editorial in the Springfield _Republican_,
discussing "_Wilson the Third Term and the Treaty_," and would very
much value your opinion with regard to the situation as it analyzes
it. Please talk with Glass, Secretary Baker, Secretary Wilson, and
Cummings and let me know what your opinion is and what theirs is. _We
must let nothing stand in the way of the Treaty and the adoption of
the League._ I will, of course, form no resolution until I reach home
but wish to think the matter out in plenty of time.

WOODROW WILSON.

* * * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON

2 June, 1919.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Paris.

Cummings on campaign trip covering Middle West and coast. Will be away
six weeks. My own opinion is that it would be unwise at this time to
act upon suggestion contained in Springfield _Republican_ editorial.
[The editorial suggested that the President withdraw his name from
consideration in connection with a third term.] This is not the time
to say anything about your attitude toward matter discussed in
editorial because there is a depression in our ranks and a feeling
that our prospects for 1920 are not bright. Republicans would say you
had retreated under the threat of defeat and the cause of the League
of Nations would be weakened instead of strengthened. The issue of the
League of Nations is so clear-cut that your attitude toward a third
term at present is not a real cause of embarrassment. In fact, I can
see great advantage to be gained for the ratification of the League by
giving the impression that you are seriously considering going to the
country on the League of Nations. Am strongly of belief, as you know,
that you should not under any circumstances consider or accept
nomination for third term. In this matter I have very few supporters
in our party. A trip I just made to Illinois and St. Louis over
Decoration Day convinces me that a big drive will be made to induce
you to allow your name to be used again. The Presidency for another
four years would not add one whit to the honour that will be yours and
the place of dignity that you will occupy in the hearts of our people
when the League of Nations is consummated and your present term
expires.

Upon your return to this country and with a clearer perception of what
you are trying to do, there will come a turn of the tide in our
favour. Many factors not now very clear are leading in that direction.
The Republicans by the selection of Penrose have made the Republican
party again the stand-pat party of America and their failure, which
will become more evident as the days pass, to correct abuses that some
months ago they called grave, will prove more and more the strength
and value of Democratic policies.

Prosperity now sweeping in from coast and Middle West will soon be
upon us. Even business which turned away from us in last campaign in
the hope that Excess Profit Tax and other burdensome taxes would be
reduced, will soon find out how fatuous and futile is the Republican
policy. Many Progressive leaders will soon come to the front and will
take up the work left undone by Roosevelt. My opinion, therefore, is
that what action you take in this matter should await the turn of the
tide so that as the hopes of Democracy rise and success for 1920 looks
more promising than it does to-day, then that time in my opinion will
offer the psychological moment for you to say what really is in your
heart about a third term and thus help not only the party but the
League of Nations. Therefore, until the psychological moment comes,
the politic thing to do is to keep "mum" about this matter and await
the happenings of the future.

TUMULTY.

A clear, inside view of the feeling of the man toward the Treaty, his deep
heart interest in it, and his characterization of the opposition were
disclosed in a speech delivered by him to the members of the Democratic
National Committee at the White House on February 28, 1919. This speech is
now published for the first time, and is as follows:

The real issue of the day, gentlemen, is the League of Nations, and I
think we must be very careful to serve the country in the right way
with regard to that issue. We ought not, as I know you already feel
from the character of the action you have just taken--we ought not
even to create the appearance of trying to make that a party issue.
And I suggested this to Mr. Cummings and the others who sat by me: I
think it would be wise if the several National Committeemen were to
get in touch with their state organizations upon returning home and
suggest this course of action--that the Democratic state organizations
get into conference with the Republican state organizations and say to
them: "Here is this great issue upon which the future peace of the
world depends; it ought not to be made a party issue or to divide upon
party lines; the country ought to support it regardless of party (as
you stated in your resolution); now we propose to you that you pass
resolutions supporting it, as we intend to do, and we will not
anticipate you in the matter if you agree to that policy; let us stand
back of it and not make a party issue of it." Of course, if they
decline, then it is perfectly legitimate, it seems to me, for the
Democratic organization if it pleases to pass resolutions, framing
these resolutions in as non-partisan language as is possible, but
nevertheless doing what citizens ought to do in matters of this sort.
But not without first making it a matter of party record that it has
made these approaches to the Republican organizations and has proposed
this similarity of action. In that way we accomplish a double object.
We put it up to them to support the real opinion of their own people
and we get instructed by the resolutions, and we find where the weak
spots are and where the fighting has to be done for this great issue.
Because, believe me, gentlemen, the civilized world cannot afford to
have us lose this fight. I tried to state in Boston what it would mean
to the people of the world if the United States did not support this
great ideal with cordiality, but I was not able to speak when I tried
fully to express my thoughts. I tell you, frankly, I choked up; I
could not do it. The thing reaches the depth of tragedy. There is a
sense in which I can see that the hope entertained by the people of
the world with regard to us is a tragical hope--tragical in this
sense, that it is so great, so far-reaching, it runs out to such
depths that we cannot in the nature of things satisfy it. The world
cannot go as fast in the direction of ideal results as these people
believe the United States can carry them, and that is what makes me
choke up when I try to talk about it--the consciousness of what they
want us to do and of our relative inadequacy. And yet there is a great
deal that we can do, and the immediate thing that we can do is to have
an overwhelming national endorsement of this great plan. If we have
that we will have settled most of the immediate political difficulties
in Europe. The present danger of the world--of course, I have to say
this in the confidence of this company--but the present danger in this
world is that the peoples of the world do not believe in their own
governments. They believe these governments to be made up of the kind
of men who have always run them, and who did not know how to keep them
out of this war, did not know how to prepare them for war, and did not
know how to settle international controversies in the past without
making all sorts of compromising concessions. They do not believe in
them, and therefore they have got to be buttressed by some outside
power in which they do not believe. Perhaps it would not do for them
to examine us too narrowly. We are by no means such ideal people as
they believe us to be, but I can say that we are infinitely better
than the others. We do purpose these things, we do purpose these great
unselfish things; that is the glory of America, and if we can confirm
that belief we have steadied the whole process of history in the
immediate future; whereas if we do not confirm that belief I would not
like to say what would happen in the way of utter dissolution of
society.

The only thing that that ugly, poisonous thing called Bolshevism feeds
on is the doubt of the man on the street of the essential integrity of
the people he is depending on to do his governing. That is what it
feeds on. No man in his senses would think that a lot of local Soviets
could really run a government, but some of them are in a temper to
have anything rather than the kind of thing they have been having; and
they say to themselves: "Well, this may be bad but it is at least
better and more immediately in touch with us than the other, and we
will try it and see whether we cannot work something out of it."

So that our immediate duty, not as Democrats, but as American
citizens, is to concert the most powerful campaign that was ever
concerted in this country in favour of supporting the League of
Nations and to put it up to everybody--the Republican organizations
and every other organization--to say where they stand, and to make a
record and explain this thing to the people.

In one sense it does not make any difference what the Constitution of
the League of Nations is. This present constitution in my judgment is
a very conservative and sound document. There are some things in it
which I would have phrased otherwise. I am modest enough to believe
that the American draft was better than this, but it is the result of
as honest work as I ever knew to be done. Here we sat around the table
where there were representatives of fourteen nations. The five great
powers, so-called, gave themselves two delegates apiece and they
allowed the other nine one delegate apiece. But it did not count by
members--it counted by purpose.

For example, among the rest was a man whom I have come to admire so
much that I have come to have a personal affection for him, and that
is Mr. Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, as genuine a friend of man
as ever lived and as able a friend honest people ever had, and a man
on whose face a glow comes when you state a great principle, and yet
who is intensely practical and who was there to insist that nothing
was to be done which would put the small nations of the world at the
disposal of the big nations. So that he was the most influential
spokesman of what may be called the small powers as contrasted with
the great. But I merely single him out for the pleasure of paying him
this tribute, and not because the others were less earnest in pursuing
their purpose. They were a body of men who all felt this. Indeed,
several of them said this to us: "The world expects not only, but
demands of us that we shall do this thing successfully, and we cannot
go away without doing it." There is not a statesman in that conference
who would dare to go home saying that he had merely signed a treaty of
peace no matter how excellent the terms of that treaty are, because he
has received if not an official at least an influential mandate to see
to it that something is done in addition which will make the thing
stand after it is done; and he dare not go home without doing that. So
that all around that table there was coöperation--generous coöperation
of mind to make that document as good as we could make it. And I
believe it is a thoroughly sound document. There is only one
misleading sentence in it--only one sentence that conveys a wrong
impression. That can, I dare say, be altered, though it is going to be
extremely difficult to set up that fourteen-nation process again as
will have to be done if any alteration is made.

The particular and most important thing to which every nation that
joins the League agrees is this: That it won't fight on any question
at all until it has done one of two things. If it is about a question
that it considers suitable for arbitration it will submit it to
arbitration. You know, Mr. Taft and other serious advocates of this
general idea have tried to distinguish between justiciable and non-
justiciable subjects, and while they have had more or less success
with it, the success has not been satisfactory. You cannot define
expressly the questions which nations would be willing to submit to
arbitration. Some question of national pride may come in to upset the
definition. So we said we would make them promise to submit every
question that they considered suitable to arbitration and to abide by
the result. If they do not regard it as suitable for arbitration they
bind themselves to submit it to the consideration of the Executive
Council for a period not exceeding six months, but they are not bound
by the decision. It is an opinion, not a decision. But if a decision,
a unanimous decision, is made, and one of the parties to the dispute
accepts the decision, the other party does bind itself not to attack
the party that accepts the opinion. Now in discussing that we saw this
difficulty. Suppose that Power B is in possession of a piece of
territory which Power A claims, and Power A wins its claim so far as
the opinion of the Executive Council is concerned. And suppose that
the power in possession of the territory accepts the decision but then
simply stands pat and does nothing. It has got the territory. The
other party, inasmuch as the party that has lost has accepted the
decision, has bound itself not to attack it and cannot go by force of
arms and take possession of the country. In order to cure that
quandary we used a sentence which said that in case--I have forgotten
the phraseology but it means this--in case any power refuses to carry
out the decision the Executive Council was to consider the means by
which it could be enforced. Now that apparently applies to both
parties but was intended to apply to the non-active party which
refuses to carry it out. And that sentence is open to a
misconstruction. The Commission did not see that until after the
report was made and I explained this to the General Conference. I made
an explanation which was substantially the same as I have made to you,
and that this should be of record may be sufficient to interpret that
phrase, but probably not. It is not part of the Covenant and possibly
an attempt ought to be made to alter it.

But I am wandering from my real point. My point is that this is a
workable beginning of a thing that the world insists on. There is no
foundation for it except the good faith of the parties, but there
could not be any other foundation for an arrangement between nations.

The other night after dinner Senator Thomas, of Colorado, said: "Then
after all it is not a guarantee of peace." Certainly not. Who said
that it was? If you can invent an actual guarantee of peace you will
be a benefactor of mankind, but no such guarantee has been found. But
this comes as near being a guarantee of peace as you can get.

I had this interesting experience when the Covenant was framed. I
found that I was the only member of the Committee who did not take it
for granted that the members of the League would have the right to
secede. I found there was a universal feeling that this treaty could
be denounced in the usual way and that a state could withdraw. I
demurred from that opinion and found myself in a minority of one, and
I could not help saying to them that this would be very interesting on
the other side of the water, that the only Southerner on this
conference should deny the right of secession. But nevertheless it is
instructive and interesting to learn that this is taken for granted;
that it is not a covenant that you would have to continue to adhere
to. I suppose that is a necessary assumption among sovereign states,
but it would not be a very handsome thing to withdraw after we had
entered upon it. The point is that it does rest upon the good faith of
all the nations. Now the historic significance of it is this:

We are setting up right in the path that German ambition expected to
tread a number of new states that, chiefly because of their newness,
will for a long time be weak states. We are carving a piece of Poland
out of Germany's side; we are creating an independent Bohemia below
that, an independent Hungary below that, and enlarging Rumania, and we
are rearranging the territorial divisions of the Balkan States. We are
practically dissolving the Empire of Turkey and setting up under
mandatories of the League of Nations a number of states in Asia Minor
and Arabia which, except for the power of the mandatories, would be
almost helpless against any invading or aggressive force, and that is
exactly the old Berlin-to-Bagdad route. So that when you remember that
there is at present a strong desire on the part of Austria to unite
with Germany, you have the prospect of an industrial nation with
seventy or eighty millions of people right in the heart of Europe, and
to the southeast of it nothing but weakness, unless it is supported by
the combined power of the world.

Unless you expect this structure built at Paris to be a house of
cards, you have got to put into it the structural iron which will be
afforded by the League of Nations. Take the history of the war that we
have just been through. It is agreed by everybody that has expressed
an opinion that if Germany had known that England would go in, she
never would have started. What do you suppose she would have done if
she had known that everybody else would have gone in? Of course she
would never have started. If she had known that the world would have
been against her, this war would not have occurred; and the League of
Nations gives notice that if anything of that sort is tried again, the
world will be against the nation that tries it, and with that
assurance given that such a nation will have to fight the world, you
may be sure that whatever illicit ambitions a nation may have, it
cannot and will not attempt to realize them. But if they have not that
assurance and can in the meantime set up an infinite network of
intrigue such as we now know ran like a honeycomb through the world,
then any arrangement will be broken down. This is the place where
intrigue did accomplish the disintegration which made the realization
of Germany's purposes almost possible. So that those people will have
to make friends with their powerful neighbour Germany unless they have
already made friends with all the rest of the world. So that we must
have the League of Nations or else a repetition of the catastrophe we
have just gone through.

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