A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P R S T U V W X Z

History of Louisisana

L >> Le Page Du Pratz >> History of Louisisana




Notwithstanding this answer, M. de Biainville made warlike
preparations against the Chicasaws, sent off Captain le Blanc, with
six armed boats under his command; one laden with gun-powder, the rest
with goods, the whole allotted for the war against the Chicasaws; the
Captain at the same time carrying orders to M. d'Artaguette,
Commandant of the Post of the Illinois, to prepare to set out at the
head of all the troops, inhabitants and Indians, he could march from
the Illinois, in order to be at the Chicasaws the 10th of May
following, as the Governor himself was to be there at the same time.

The Chicasaws, apprized of the warlike preparations of the French,
resolved to guard the Missisippi, imagining they would be attacked on
that side. In vain they attempted to surprise M. le Blanc's convoy,
which got safe to the Arkansas, where the gun-powder was left, for
reasons no one can surmise.

From thence he had no cross accident to the Illinois, at which place
he delivered the orders the Governor had dispatched for M.
d'Artaguette; who finding a boat laden with gun-powder, designed for
his post, and for the service of the war intended against the
Chicasaws, left at the Arkansas, sent off the same day a boat to fetch
it up; which on its return was taken by a party of Chicasaws; who
killed all but M. du Tiffenet, junior, and one Rosalie, whom they made
slaves.

In the mean time, M. de Biainville went by sea to Fort Mobile, where
the Grand Chief of the Chactaws waited for him, in consequence of his
engaging to join his Warriours with ours, in order to make war upon
the Chicasaws, in consideration of a certain quantity of goods, part
to be paid down directly, the rest at a certain time prefixed. The
Governor, {89} after this, returned to New Orleans, there to wait the
opening of the campaign.

M. de Biainville, on his return, made preparations against his own
departure, and that of the army, consisting of regular troops, some
inhabitants and free negroes, and some slaves, all which set out from
New Orleans for Mobile; where, on the 10th of March, 1736, the army,
together with the Chactaws, was assembled; and where they rested till
the 2d of April, when they began their march, those from New Orleans
taking their route by the river Mobile, in thirty large boats and as
many pettyaugres; the Indians by land, marching along the east bank of
that river; and making but short marches, they arrived at Tombecbec
only the 20th of April, where M. de Biainville caused a fort to be
built: here he gave the Chactaws the rest of the goods due to them,
and did not set out from thence till the 4th of May. All this time was
taken up with a Council of War, held on four soldiers, French and
Swiss, who had laid a scheme to kill the Commandant and garrison, to
carry off M. du Tiffenet and Rosalie, who had happily made their
escape from the Chicasaws, and taken refuge in the fort, and to put
them again into the hands of the enemy, in order to be better received
by them, and to assist, and shew them how to make a proper defence
against the French, and from thence to go over to the English of
Carolina.

From the 4th of May, on which the army set out from Tombeebee, they
took twenty days to come to the landing-place. After landing, they
built a very extensive inclosure of palisadoes, with a shed, as a
cover for the goods and ammuninition, then the army passed the night.
On the 25th powder and ball were given out to the soldiers, and
inhabitants, the sick with some raw soldiers being left to guard this
old sort of fort.

From this place to the fort of the Chicasaws are seven leagues: this
day they marched five leagues and a half in two columns and in file,
across the woods. On the wings marched the Chactaws, to the number of
twelve hundred at least, commanded by their Grand Chief. In the
evening they encamped in a meadow, surrounded with wood.

{90} On the 26th of May they marched to the enemy's fort, across thin
woods; and with water up to the waist, passed over a rivulet, which
traverses a small wood; on coming out of which, they entered a fine
plain: in this plain stood the fort of the Chicasaws, with a village
defended by it. This fort is situated on an eminence, with an easy
ascent; around it stood several huts, and at a greater distance
towards the bottom, other huts, which appeared to have been put in a
state of defence: quite close to the fort ran a little brook, which
watered a part of the plain.

The Chactaws no sooner espied the enemy's fort, than they rent the air
with their death-cries, and instantly flew to the fort: but their
ardour flagged at a carabin-shot from the place. The French marched in
good order, and got beyond a small wood, which they left in their
rear, within cannon-shot of the enemy's fort, where an English flag
was seen flying. At the same time four Englishmen, coming from the
huts, were seen to go up the ascent, and enter the fort, where their
flag was set up.

Upon this, it was imagined, they would be summoned to quit the enemy's
fort, and to surrender, as would in like manner the Chicasaws: but
nothing of this was once proposed. The General gave orders to the
Majors to form large detachments of each of their corps, in order to
go and take the enemy's fort. These orders were in part executed:
three large detachments were made; namely, one of grenadiers, one of
soldiers, and another of militia, or train-bands; who, to the number
of twelve hundred men, advanced with ardour towards the enemy's fort,
crying out aloud several times, _Vive le Roi_, as if already masters of
the place; which, doubtless, they imagined to carry sword in hand; for
in the whole army there was not a single iron tool to remove the
earth, and form the attacks.

The rest of the army marched in battle-array, ten men deep; mounted
the eminence whereon the fort stood, and being come there, set fire to
some huts, with wild-fire thrown at the ends of darts; but the smoke
stifled the army.

The regular troops marched in front, and the militia, or train-bands,
in rear. According to rule these train-bands {91} made a quarter turn
to right and left, with intent to go and invest the place. But M. de
Jusan, Aid-Major of the troops, stopt short their ardor, and sent them
to their proper post, reserving for his own corps the glory of
carrying the place, which continued to make a brisk defence.
Biainville remained at the quarters of reserve; where he observed what
would be the issue of the attack, than which none could be more
disadvantageous.

Both the regulars and inhabitants, or train-bands, gave instances of the
greatest valour: but what could they do, open and exposed as they were,
against a fort, whose stakes or wooden posts were a fathom in compass,
and their joinings again lined with other posts, almost as big? From
this fort, which was well garrisoned, issued a shower of balls; which
would have mowed down at least half the assailants, if directed by men
who knew how to fire. The enemy were under cover from all the attacks of
the French, and could have defended themselves by their loop-holes.
Besides, they formed a gallery of flat pallisadoes quite round, covered
with earth, which screened it from the effects of grenadoes. In this
manner the troops lavished their ammunition against the wooden posts, or
stakes, of the enemy's fort, without any other effect than having
thirty-two men killed, and almost seventy wounded; which last were
carried to the body of reserve; from whence the General, seeing the bad
success of the attack, ordered to beat the retreat, and sent a large
detachment to favour it. It was now five in the evening, and the attack
had been begun at half an hour after one. The troops rejoined the body
of the army, without being able to carry off their dead, which were left
on the field of battle, exposed to the rage of the enemy.

After taking some refreshment, they directly fortified themselves, by
felling trees, in order to pass the night secure from the insults of
the enemy, by being carefully on their guard. Next day it was observed
the enemy had availed themselves of that night to demolish some huts,
where the French, during the attack, had put themselves under cover,
in order from thence to batter the fort.

{92} On the 27th, the day after the attack, the army began its march,
and lay at a league from the enemy. The day following, at a league
from the landing-place, whither they arrived next day, the French
embarked for Fort Mobile, and from thence for the Capital, from which
each returned to his own home.

A little time after, a serjeant of the garrison of the Illinois
arrived at New Orleans, who reported, that, in consequence of the
General's orders, M. d'Artaguette had taken his measures so well, that
on the 9th of May he arrived with his men near the Chicasaws, sent out
scouts to discover the arrival of the French army; which he continued
to do till the 20th: that the Indians in alliance hearing no accounts
of the French, wanted either to return home, or to attack the
Chicasaws; which last M. d'Artaguette resolved upon, on the 21st, with
pretty good success at first, having forced the enemy to quit their
village and fort: that he then attacked another village with the same
success, but that pursuing the runaways, M. d'Artaguette had received
two wounds, which the Indians finding, resolved to abandon that
Commandant, with forty-six soldiers and two serjeants, who defended
their Commandant all that day, but were at last obliged to surrender;
that they were well used by the enemy, who understanding that the
French were in their country, prevailed on M. d'Artaguette to write to
the General: but that this deputation having had no success, and
learning that the French were retired, and despairing of any ransom
for their slaves, put them to death by a slow fire. The serjeant
added, he had the happiness to fall into the hands of a good master,
who favoured his escape to Mobile.

M. de Biainville, desirous to take vengeance of the Chicasaws, wrote
to France for succours, which the Court sent, ordering also the Colony
of Canada to send succours. In the mean time M. de Biainville sent off
a large detachment for the river St. Francis, in order to build a fort
there, called also St. Francis.

The squadron which brought the succours from France being arrived,
they set out, by going up the Missisippi, for the fort that had been
just built. This army consisted of Marines, {93} of the troops of the
Colony, of several Inhabitants, many Negroes, and some Indians, our
allies; and being assembled in this place, took water again, and still
proceeded up the Missisippi to a little river called Margot, near the
Cliffs called Prud'homme, and there the whole army landed. They
encamped on a fine plain, at the foot of a hill, about fifteen leagues
from the enemy; fortified themselves by way of precaution, and built
in the fort a house for the Commandant, some cazerns, and a warehouse
for the goods. This fort was called Assumption, from the day on which
they landed.

They had waggons and sledges made, and the roads cleared for
transporting cannon, ammunition, and other necessaries for forming a
regular siege. There and then it was the succours from Canada arrived,
consisting of French, Iroquois, Hurons, Episingles, Algonquins, and
other nations: and soon after arrived the new Commandant of the
Illinois, with the garrison, inhabitants, and neighbouring Indians,
all that he could bring together, with a great number of horses.

This formidable army, consisting of so many different nations, the
greatest ever seen, and perhaps that ever will be seen, in those
parts, remained in this camp without undertaking any thing, from the
month of August 1739, to the March following. Provisions, which at
first were in great plenty, came at last to be so scarce, that they
were obliged to eat the horses which were to draw the artillery,
ammunition, and provisions: afterwards sickness raged in the army. M.
de Biainville, who hitherto had attempted nothing against the
Chicasaws, resolved to have recourse to mild methods. He therefore
detached, about the 15th of March, the company of Cadets, with their
Captain, M. de Celoron, their Lieutenant, M. de St. Laurent, and the
Indians, who came with them from Canada, against the Chicasaws, with
orders to offer peace to them in his name, if they sued for it.

What the General had foreseen, failed not to happen. As soon as the
Chicasaws saw the French, followed by the Indians of Canada, they
doubted not in the least, but the rest of that numerous army would
soon follow; and they no sooner saw them approach, but they made
signals of peace, and came out {94} of their fort in the most humble
manner, exposing themselves to all the consequences that might ensue,
in order to obtain peace. They solemnly protested that they actually
were, and would continue to be inviolable friends of the French; that
it was the English, who prevailed upon them to act in this manner; but
that they had fallen out with them on this account, and at that very
time had two of that nation, whom they made slaves; and that the
French might go and see whether they spoke truth.

M. de St. Laurent asked to go, and accordingly went with a young
slave: but he might have had reason to have repented it, had not the
men been more prudent than the women, who demanded the head of the
Frenchman: but the men, after consulting together, were resolved to
save him, in order to obtain peace of the French, on giving up the two
Englishmen. The women risk scarce any thing near so much as the men;
these last are either slain in battle, or put to death by their
enemies; whereas the women at worst are but slaves; and they all
perfectly well know, that the Indian women are far better off when
slaves to the French, than if married at home. M. de St. Laurent,
highly pleased with this discovery, promised them peace in the name of
M. de Biainville, and of all the French: after these assurances, they
went all in a body out of the fort, to present the Pipe to M. de
Celoron, who accepted it, and repeated the same promise.

In a few days after, he set out with a great company of Chicasaws,
deputed to carry the Pipe to the French General, and deliver up the
two Englishmen. When they came before M. de Biainville, they fell
prostrate at his feet, and made him the same protestations of fidelity
and friendship, as they had already made to M. de Celoron; threw the
blame on the English; said they were entirely fallen out with them,
and had taken these two, and put them in his hands, as enemies. They
protested, in the most solemn manner, they would for ever be friends
of the French and of their friends, and enemies of their enemies; in
fine, that they would make war on the English, if it was thought
proper, in order to shew that they renounced them as traitors.

{95} Thus ended the war with the Chicasaws, about the beginning of
April, 1740. M. de Biainville dismissed the auxiliaries, after making
them presents; razed the Fort Assumption, thought to be no longer
necessary, and embarked with his whole army; and in passing down,
caused the Fort St. Francis to be demolished, as it was now become
useless; and he repaired to the Capital, after an absence of more than
ten months.

Some years after, we had disputes with a part of the Chactaws, who
followed the interests of the Red-Shoe, a Prince of that nation, who,
in the first expedition against the Chicasaws, had some disputes with
the French. This Indian, more insolent than any one of his nation,
took a pretext to break out, and commit several hostilities against
the French. M. de Vaudreuil, then Governor of Louisiana, being
apprised of this, and of the occasion thereof, strictly forbad the
French to frequent that nation, and to truck with them any arms or
ammunition, in order to put a stop to that disorder in a short time,
and without drawing the sword.

M. de Vaudreuil, after taking these precautions, sent to demand of the
Grand Chief of the whole nation, whether, like the Red-Shoe, he was
also displeased with the French. He made answer, he was their friend:
but that the Red-Shoe was a young man, without understanding. Having
returned this answer, they sent him a present: but he was greatly
surprised to find neither arms, powder, nor ball in this present, at a
time when they were friends as before. This manner of proceeding,
joined to the prohibition made of trucking with them arms or
ammunition, heightened their surprise, and put them on having an
explication on this head with the Governor; who made answer, That
neither arms nor ammunition would be trucked with them, as long as the
Red-Shoe had no more understanding; that they would not fail, as being
brethren, to share a good part of the ammunition and arms with the
Warriors of the Red-Shoe. This answer put them on remonstrating to the
Village that insulted us; told them, if they did not instantly make
peace with the French, they would themselves make war upon them. This
threatening declaration made them sue for peace with the French, who
were not in a condition to maintain {96} a war against a nation so
numerous. And thus the prudent policy of M. de Vaudreuil put a stop to
this war, without either expence or the loss of a man.




CHAPTER XIV.

_Reflections on what gives Occasions to Wars in_ Louisiana. _The Means
of avoiding Wars in that Province, as also the Manner of coming off with
Advantage and little Expence in them._


The experience I have had in the art of war, from some campaigns I
made in a regiment of dragoons till the peace of 1713, my application
to the study of the wars of the Greeks, Romans, and other ancient
people, and the wars I have seen carried on with the Indians of
Louisiana, during the time I resided in that Province, gave me
occasion to make several reflections on what could give rise to a war
with the Indians, on the means of avoiding such a war, and on such
methods as may be employed, in order either to make or maintain a war
to advantage against them, when constrained thereto.

In the space of sixteen years that I resided in Louisiana, I remarked,
that the war, and even the bare disputes we have had with the Indians
of this Colony, never had any other origin, but our too familiar
intercourse with them.

In order to prove this, let us consider the evils produced by this
familiarity. In the first place, it makes them gradually drop that
respect, which they naturally entertain for our nation.

In the second place, the French traffickers, or traders, are generally
young people without experience, who, in order to gain the good-will
of these people, afford them lights, or instruction, prejudicial to
our interest. These young merchants are not, it is true, sensible of
these consequences: but again, these people never lose sight of what
can be of any utility to them, and the detriment thence accruing is
not less great, nor less real.

In the third place, this familiarity gives occasion to vices, whence
dangerous distempers ensue, and corruption of blood, {97} which is
naturally highly pure in this colony. These persons, who frequently
resort to the Indians, imagined themselves authorized to give a loose
to their vices, from the practice of these last, which is to give
young women to their guests upon their arrival; a practice that
greatly injures their health, and proves a detriment to their
merchandizing.

In the fourth place, this resorting to the Indians puts these last
under a constraint, as being fond of solitude; and this constraint is
still more heightened, if the French settlement is near them; which
procures them too frequent visits, that give them so much more
uneasiness, as they care not on any account that people should see or
know any of their affairs. And what fatal examples have we not of the
dangers the settlements which are too near the Indians incur. Let but
the massacre of the French be recollected, and it will be evident that
this proximity is extremely detrimental to the French.

In the fifth and last place, commerce, which is the principal
allurement that draws us to this new world instead of flourishing, is,
on the contrary, endangered by the too familiar resort to the Indians
of North America. The proof of this is very simple.

All who resort to countries beyond sea, know by experience, that when
there is but one ship in the harbour, the Captain sells his cargo at
what price he pleases: and then we hear it said, such a ship gained
two, three, and sometimes as high as four hundred per cent. Should
another ship happen to arrive in that harbour, the profit abates at
least one half; but should three arrive, or even four successively,
the goods then are, so to speak, thrown at the head of the buyer: so
that in this case a merchant has often great difficulty to recover his
very expenses of fitting out. I should therefore be led to believe,
that it would be for the interest of commerce, if the Indians were
left to come to fetch what merchandize they wanted, who having none
but us in their neighbourhood, would come for it, without the French
running any risk in their commerce, much less in their lives.

For this purpose, let us suppose a nation of Indians on the banks of
some river or rivulet, which is always the case, as all {98} men
whatever have at all times occasion for water. This being supposed, I
look out for a spot proper to build a small terras-fort on, with
fraises or stakes, and pallisadoes. In this fort I would build two
small places for lodgings, of no great height; one to lodge the
officers, the other the soldiers: this fort to have an advanced work,
a half-moon, or the like, according to the importance of the post. The
passage to be through this advanced work to the fort, and no Indian
allowed to enter on any pretence whatever; not even to receive the
Pipe of Peace there, but only in the advanced work; the gate of the
fort to be kept shut day and night against all but the French. At the
gate of the advanced work a sentinel to be posted, and that gate to be
opened and shut on each person appearing before it. By these
precautions we might be sure never to be surprised, either by avowed
enemies, or by treachery. In the advanced work a small building to be
made for the merchants, who should come thither to traffick or truck
with the neighbouring Indians; of which last only three or four to be
admitted at a time, all to have the merchandize at the same price, and
no one to be favoured above another. No soldier or inhabitant to go to
the villages of the neighbouring Indians, under severe penalties. By
this conduct disputes would be avoided, as they only arise from too
great a familiarity with them. These forts to be never nearer the
villages than five leagues, or more distant than seven or eight. The
Indians would make nothing of such a jaunt; it would be only a walk
for them, and their want of goods would easily draw them, and in a
little time they would become habituated to it. The merchants to pay a
salary to an interpreter, who might be some orphan, brought up very
young among these people.

This fort, thus distant a short journey, might be built without
obstruction, or giving any umbrage to the Indians: as they might be
told it was built in order to be at hand to truck their furs, and at
the same time to give them no manner of uneasiness. One advantage
would be, besides that of commerce, which would be carried on there,
that these forts would prevent the English from having any
communication with the Indians, as these last would find a great
facility for their truck, and in forts so near them, every thing they
could want.

{99} The examples of the surprise of the forts of the Natchez, the
Yazoux, and the Missouris, shew but too plainly the fatal consequences
of negligence in the service, and of a misplaced condescension in
favour of the soldiers, by suffering them to build huts near the fort,
and to lie in them. None should be allowed to lie out of the fort, not
even the Officers. The Commandant of the Natchez, and the other
Officers, and even the Serjeants, were killed in their houses without
the fort. I should not be against the soldiers planting little fields
of tobacco, potatoes, and other plants, too low to conceal a man: on
the contrary, these employments would incline them to become settlers;
but I would never allow them houses out of the fort. By this means a
fort becomes impregnable against the most numerous; because they never
will attack, should they have ever so much cause, as long as they see
people on their guard.

Should it be objected that these forts would cost a great deal: I
answer, that though there was to be a fort for each nation, which is
not the case, it would not cost near so much as from time to time it
takes to support wars, which in this country are very expensive, on
account of the long journeys, and of transporting all the implements
of war, hitherto made use of. Besides, we have a great part of these
forts already built, so that we only want the advanced works; and two
new forts more would suffice to compleat this design, and prevent the
fraudulent commerce of the English traders.

Copyright (c) 2007. famouswriterz.com. All rights reserved.