A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P R S T U V W X Z

History of Louisisana

L >> Le Page Du Pratz >> History of Louisisana




By the same accounts, taken by the custom-house officers, it appeared,
that the number of British ships employed in all America, including
the fishery, were 1400, with 17,000 seamen; besides 9000 or 10,000
seamen belonging to North-America, who are all ready to enter into the
service of Britain on, any emergency or encouragement.

Of these there were but 4000 seamen employed in the fishery from
Britain; and about as many, or 3600, in the sugar trade.

The French, on the other hand, employ upwards of 20,000 seamen in the
fishery, and many more than we do in the sugar trade.

In short, the plantation trade of North America is to Britain, what
the fishery is to France, the great nursery of seamen, which may be
much improved. It is for this reason that we have always thought this
nation ought, for its safety, to enjoy an exclusive right to the one
or the other of these at least.] and brings in more money to the
nation than all the products of America perhaps put together.

But those gross commodities that afford these sources of navigation,
however valuable they may be to the public, and to this nation in
particular, are far from being so to individuals: they are cheap, and
of small value, either to make, or to trade {xviii} in them; and for
that reason they are neglected by private people, who never think of
making them, unless the public takes care to give them all due
encouragement, and to set them about those employments; for which
purpose good and proper lands, such as those on the Missisippi, are
absolutely necessary, without which nothing can be done.

The many advantages of such lands that produce a staple for Britain,
in North America, are not to be told. The whole interest of the nation
in those colonies depends upon them, if not the colonies themselves.
Such lands alone enable the colonies to take their manufactures and
other necessaries from Britain, to the mutual advantage of both. And
how necessary that may be will appear from the state of those colonies
in North America, which do not make, one with another, as much as is
sufficient to supply them only with the necessary article of
cloathing; not to mention the many other things they want and take
from Britain; and even how they pay for that is more than any man can
tell. In short, it would appear that our colonies in North America
cannot subsist much longer, if at all, in a state of dependence for
all their manufactures and other necessaries, unless they are provided
with other lands that may enable them to purchase them; and where they
will find any such lands, but upon the Missisippi, is more than we can
tell. When their lands are worn out, are poor and barren, or in an
improper climate or situation, or that they will produce nothing to
send to Britain, such lands can only be converted into corn and
pasture grounds; and the people in our colonies are thereby
necessarily obliged, for a bare subsistence, to interfere with
Britain, not only in manufactures, but in the very produce of their
lands.

By this we may perceive the absurdity of the popular outcry, that we
have already _land enough_, and more than we can make use of in North
America. They who may be of that opinion should shew us, where that
land is to be found, and what it will produce, that may turn to any
account to the nation. Those people derive their opinion from what
they see in Europe, where the quantity of land that we possess in
North America, will, no doubt, maintain a greater number of people
than we have there. But they should consider, that those people in
{xix} Europe are not maintained by the planting of a bare raw
commodity, with such immense charges upon it, but by farming,
manufactures, trade, and commerce; which they will soon reduce our
colonies to, who would confine them to their present settlements,
between the sea coast and the mountains that surround them.

Some of our colonies perhaps may imagine they cannot subsist without
these employments; which indeed would appear to be the case in their
present state: but that seems to be as contrary to their true
interest, as it is to their condition of British colonies. They have
neither skill, materials, nor any other conveniences to make
manufactures; whereas their lands require only culture to produce a
staple commodity, providing they are possessed of such as are fit for
that purpose. Manufactures are the produce of labour, which is both
scarce and dear among them; whereas lands are, or may, and should be
made, both cheap and in plenty; by which they may always reap much
greater profits from the one than the other. That is, moreover, a
certain pledge for the allegiance and dependance of the colonies; and
at the same time makes their dependance to become their interest. It
has been found by frequent experience, that the making of a staple
commodity for Britain, is more profitable than manufactures, providing
they have good lands to work.

It were to be wished indeed, that we could support our interest in
America, and those sources of navigation, by countries that were more
convenient to it, than those on the Missisippi. But that, we fear, is
not to be done, however it may be desired. We wish we could say as much
of the lands in Florida, and on the bay of Mexico, as of those on the
Missisippi: but they are not to be compared to these, by all accounts,
however convenient they may be in other respects to navigation. In all
those southern and maritime parts of that continent the lands are in
general but very poor and mean, being little more than _pine barrens_,
or _sandy desarts_. The climate is at the same time so intemperate, that
white people are in a great measure unfit for labour in it, as much as
they are in the islands; this obliges them to make use of slaves, which
are now become so dear, that it is to be doubted, whether all the
produce {xx} of those lands will enable the proprietors of them to
purchase slaves, or any other labourers; without which they can turn to
little or no account to the nation, and those countries can support but
very few people, if it were only to protect and defend them.

The most convenient part of those countries seems to be about Mobile
and Pensacola; which are, as it were, an entrepot between our present
settlements and the Missisippi, and safe station for our ships. But it
is a pity that the lands about them are the most barren, and the
climate the most intemperate, by all accounts, of any perhaps in all
America. [Footnote: See page 49, 111, &c. _Charlevoix_ Hist. N. France,
Tom. III. 484. _Laval, infra_, &c.] And our author tells us, the lands
are not much better even on the river of Mobile; which is but a very
inconsiderable one. But the great inconvenience of those countries
proceeds from the number of Indians in them; which will make it very
difficult to settle any profitable plantations among them, especially
in the inland parts that are more fertile; whereas the Missisippi is
free from Indians for 1000 miles. It was but in the year 1715, that
those Indians overran all the colony of Carolina, even to
Charles-Town; by which the French got possession of that country, and
of the Missisippi; both which they had just before, in June 1713,
dispossessed us of.

If we turn our eyes again to the lands in our northern colonies, it is
to be feared we can expect much less from them. There is an
inconvenience attending them, with regard to any improvements on them
for Britain, which is not to be remedied. The climate is so severe,
and the winters so long, that the people are obliged to spend that
time in providing the necessaries of life, which should be employed in
profitable colonies, on the making of some staple commodity, and
returns to Britain. They are obliged to feed their creatures for five
or six months in the year, which employs their time in summer, and
takes up the best of their lands, such as they are, which should
produce their staple commodities, to provide for themselves and their
stocks against winter. For that reason the people in all our northern
colonies are necessarily obliged to become farmers, {xxi} to make corn
and provisions, instead of planters, who make a staple commodity for
Britain; and thereby interfere with their mother country in the most
material and essential of all employments to a nation, agriculture.

In short, neither the soil nor climate will admit of any improvements
for Britain, in any of those northern colonies. If they would produce
any thing of that kind, it must be hemp; which never could be made in
them to any advantage, as appears from many trials of it in New
England. [Footnote: See _Douglas's_ Hist. N. America. _Elliot's_
Improvements on New England, &c.] The great dependance of those
northern colonies is upon the supplies of lumber and provisions which
they send to the islands. But as they increase and multiply, their
woods are cut down, lumber becomes scarce and dear, and the number of
people inhances the value of land, and of every thing it produces,
especially provisions.

If this is the case of those northern colonies on the sea coast, what
can we expect from the inland parts; in which the soil is not only
more barren, and the climate more severe, but they are, with all these
disadvantages, so inconvenient to navigation, both on account of their
distance, and of the many falls and currents in the river St.
Lawrence, that it is to be feared those inland parts of our northern
colonies will never produce any thing for Britain, more than a few
furrs; which they will do much better in the hands of the natives,
than in ours. These our northern colonies, however, are very populous,
and increase and multiply very fast. There are above a million of
people in them, who can make but very little upon their lands for
themselves, and still less for their mother country. For these reasons
it is presumed, it would be an advantage to them, as well as to the
whole nation, to remove their spare people, who want lands, to those
vacant lands in the southern parts of the continent, which turn to so
much greater account than any that they are possessed of. There they
may have the necessaries of life in the greatest plenty; their stocks
maintain themselves the whole year round, with little or no cost or
labour; "by which means many people have a thousand head {xxii} of
cattle, and for one man to have two hundred, is very common, with
other stock in proportion." [Footnote: Description of South Carolina, p.
68.] This enables them to bestow their whole labour, both in summer
and winter, on the making of some staple commodity for Britain,
getting lumber and provisions for the islands, &c. which both enriches
them and the whole nation. That is much better, surely, than to perish
in winter for want of cloathing, which they must do unless they make
it; and to excite those grudges and jealousies, which must ever
subsist between them and their mother country in their present state,
and grow so much the worse, the longer they continue in it.

The many advantages that would ensue from the peopling of those
southern parts of the continent from our northern colonies, are hardly
to be told. We might thereby people and secure those countries, and
reap the profits of them, without any loss of people; which are not to
be spared for that purpose in Britain, or any other of her dominions.
This is the great use and advantage that may be made of the expulsion
of the French from those northern parts of America. They have hitherto
obliged us to strengthen those northern colonies, and have confined
the people in them to towns and townships, in which their labour could
turn to no great account, either to themselves or to the nation, by
which we have, in a great measure, loss the labour of one half of the
people in our colonies. But as they are now free from any danger on
their borders, they may extend their settlements with safety, disperse
themselves on plantations, and cultivate those lands that may turn to
some account, both to them and to the whole nation. In short, they may
now make some staple commodity for Britain; on which the interest of
the colonies, and of the nation in them, chiefly depends; and which we
can never expect from those colonies in their present situation.

What those commodities are, that we might get from those southern
parts of North America, will appear from the following accounts; which
we have not room here to consider more particularly. We need only
mention hemp, flax, and silk, those great articles and necessary
materials of manufactures; for which alone this nation pays at least a
million and an half {xxiii} a-year, if not two millions, and could
never get them from all the colonies we have. Cotton and indigo are
equally useful. Not to mention copper, iron, potash, &c. which, with
hemp, flax, and silk, make the great balance of trade against the
nation, and drain it of its treasure; when we might have those
commodities from our colonies for manufactures, and both supply
ourselves and others with them. Wine, oil, raisins, and currants, &c.
those products of France and Spain, on which Britain expends so much
of her treasure, to enrich her enemies, might likewise be had from
those her own dominions. Britain might thereby cut off those resources
of her enemies; secure her colonies for the future; and prevent such
calamities of war, by cultivating those more laudable arts of peace:
which will be the more necessary, as these are the only advantages the
nation can expect, for the many millions that have been expended on
America.

_A Description of the Harbour of_ PENSACOLA.

As the harbour of Pensacola will appear to be a considerable
acquisition to Britain, it may be some satisfaction to give the
following account of it, from F. Laval, royal professor of
mathematics, and master of the marine academy at Toulon; who was sent
to Louisiana, on purpose to make observations, in 1719; and had the
accounts of the officers who took Pensacola at that time, and surveyed
the place.

"The colonies of Pensacola, and of Dauphin-Island, are at present on
the decline, the inhabitants having removed to settle at Mobile and
Biloxi, or at New-Orleans, where the lands are much better; for at the
first the soil is chiefly sand, mixed with little earth. The land,
however, is covered with woods of pines, firs, and oaks; which make
good trees, as well as at Ship-Island. The road of Pensacola is the
only good port thereabouts for large ships, and Ship-Island for small
ones, where vessels that draw from thirteen to fourteen feet water,
may ride in safety, under the island, in fifteen feet, and a good
holding ground; as well as in the other ports, which are all only open
roads, exposed to the south, and from west to east.

"Pensacola is in north-latitude 30° 25'; and is the only road in the
bay of Mexico, in which ships can be safe from all {xxiv} winds. It is
land-locked on every side, and will hold a great number of ships,
which have very good anchorage in it, in a good holding ground of soft
sand, and from twenty-five to thirty-four feet of water. You will find
not less than twenty-one feet of water on the barr, which is at the
entrance into the road, providing you keep in the deepest part of the
channel. Before a ship enters the harbour, she should bring the fort
of Pensacola to bear between north and north 1/4 east, and keep that
course till she is west or west 1/4 south, from the fort on the island
of St. Rose, that is, till that fort bears east, and east 1/4 north.
Then she must bear away a little to the land on the west side, keeping
about mid-way between that and the island, to avoid a bank on this
last, which runs out to some distance west-north-west from the point
of the island.

"If there are any breakers on the ledge of rocks, which lie to the
westward of the barr, as often happens; if there is any wind, that may
serve for a mark to ships, which steer along that ledge, at the
distance of a good musket-shot, as they enter upon the barr; then keep
the course above mentioned. Sometimes the currents set very strong out
of the road, which you should take care of, less they should carry you
upon these rocks.

"As there is but half a foot rising (_levèe_) on the barr of Pensacola,
every ship of war, if it be not in a storm, may depend upon nineteen
(perhaps twenty) feet of water, to go into the harbour, as there are
twenty-one feet on the barr. Ships that draw twenty feet must be towed
in. By this we see, that ships of sixty guns may go into this harbour:
and even seventy gun ships, the largest requisite in that country in
time of war, if they were built flat-bottomed, like the Dutch ships,
might pass every where in that harbour.

"In 1719 Pensacola was taken by Mr. Champmelin, in the Hercules man of
war, of sixty-four guns, but carried only fifty-six; in company with
the Mars, pierced for sixty guns, but had in only fifty-four; and the
Triton, pierced for fifty-four guns, but carried only fifty; with two
frigates of thirty-six and twenty guns. [Footnote: The admiral was on
board of the Hercules, which drew twenty-one feet of water, and there
were but twenty-two feet into the harbour in the highest tides; so
that they despaired of carrying in this ship. But an old Canadian,
named Crimeau, a man of experience, who was perfectly acquainted with
that coast, boasted of being able to do it, and succeeded; for which
he was the next year honoured with letters of noblesse. _Dumont_ (an
officer there at that time) 11.22.

But _Bellin_, from the charts of the admiralty, makes but twenty feet of
water on the barr of Pensacola. The difference may arise from the
tides, which are very irregular and uncertain on all that coast,
according to the winds; never rising above three feet, sometimes much
less. In twenty-four hours the tide ebbs in the harbour for eighteen
or nineteen hours, and flows five or six. _Laval_.]

{xxv} "This road is subject to one inconvenience; several rivers fall
into it, which occasion strong currents, and make boats or canoes, as
they pass backwards and forwards, apt to run a-ground; but as the
bottom is all sand, they are not apt to founder. On the other hand
there is a great advantage in this road; it is free from worms, which
never breed in fresh water, so that vessels are never worm-eaten in
it."

But F. Charlevoix seems to contradict this last circumstance: "The bay
of Pensacola would be a pretty good port, (says he) if the worms did
not eat the vessels in it, and if there was a little more water in the
entrance into it; for the Hercules, commanded by Mr. Champmelin,
touched upon it." It is not so certain then, that this harbour is
altogether free from worms; although it may not be so subject to them,
as other places in those climes, from the many small fresh water
rivers that fall into this bay, which may have been the occasion of
these accounts, that are seemingly contradictory.

In such a place ships might at least be preserved from worms, in all
likelihood, by paying their bottoms with aloes, or mixing it with
their other stuff. That has been found to prevent the biting of these
worms; and might be had in plenty on the spot. Many kinds of aloes
would grow on the barren sandy lands about Pensacola, and in Florida,
which is the proper soil for them; and would be a good improvement for
those lands, which will hardly bear any thing else to advantage,
whatever use is made of it.

Having room in this place, we may fill it up with an answer to a
common objection against Louisiana; which is, {xxvi} that this country
is never likely to turn to any account, because the French have made
so little of it.

But that objection, however common, will appear to proceed only from
the ignorance of those who make it. No country can produce any thing
without labourers; which, it is certain, the French have never had in
Louisiana, in any numbers at least, sufficient to make it turn to any
greater account than it has hitherto done. The reason of this appears
not to be owing to the country, but to their proceedings and
misconduct in it. Out of the many thousand people who were contracted
for by the grantees, to be sent to Louisiana in 1719, there were but
eight hundred sent, we see; and of these the greatest part were ruined
by their idle schemes, which made them and others abandon the country
entirely. The few again who remained in it were cut off by an Indian
massacre in 1729, which broke up the only promising settlements they
had in the country, those of the Natchez, and Yasous, which were never
afterwards reinstated. Instead of encouraging the colony in such
misfortunes, the minister, Cardinal Fleuri, either from a spirit of
oeconomy, or because it might be contrary to some other of his views,
withdrew his protection from it, gave up the public plantations, and
must thereby, no doubt, have very much discouraged others. By these
means they have had few or no people in Louisiana, but such as were
condemned to be sent to it for their crimes, women of ill fame,
deserted soldiers, insolvent debtors, and galley-slaves, _forçats_, as
they call them; "who, looking on the country only as a place of exile,
were disheartened at every thing in it; and had no regard for the
progress of a colony, of which they were only members by compulsion,
and neither knew nor considered its advantages to the state. It is
from such people that many have their accounts of this country; and
throw the blame of all miscarriages in it upon the country, when they
are only owing to the incapacity and negligence of those who were
instructed to settle it." [Footnote: _Charlevoix_ Hist. New France, Tom.
III. p. 447.]

{1}






THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA






BOOK I.

_The Transactions of the_ French _in_ LOUISIANA.




CHAPTER I.

_Of the first Discovery and Settlement of_ LOUISIANA.


After the Spaniards came to have settlements on the Great Antilles, it
was not long before they attempted to make discoveries on the coasts
of the Gulf of Mexico. In 1520, Lucas Vasquez de Aillon landed on the
continent to the north of that Gulf, being favourably received by the
people of that country, who made him presents in gold, pearls, and
plated silver. This favourable reception made him return thither four
years after; but the natives having changed their friendly sentiments
towards him, killed two hundred of his men, and obliged him to retire.

In 1528, Pamphilo Nesunez [Footnote: Narvaez.] landed also on that
coast, receiving from the first nations he met in his way, presents
made in gold; which, by signs, they made him to understand, came from
the Apalachean mountains, in the country which at this day goes under
the name of Florida: and thither he attempted to go, undertaking a
hazardous journey of twenty-five days. In this march he was so often
attacked by the new people he continually discovered, and lost so many
of his men, as only to think of re-embarking with the few that were
left, {2} happy to have himself escaped the dangers which his
imprudence had exposed him to.

The relation published by the Historian of Dominico [Footnote:
Ferdinando.] Soto, who in 1539 landed in the Bay of St. Esprit, is so
romantic, and so constantly contradicted by all who have travelled
that country, that far from giving credit to it, we ought rather to
suppose his enterprize had no success; as no traces of it have
remained, any more than of those that went before. The inutility of
these attempts proved no manner of discouragement to the Spaniards.
After the discovery of Florida, it was with a jealous eye they saw the
French settle there in 1564, under René de Laudonniere, sent thither
by the Admiral de Coligni, where he built Fort Carolin; the ruins of
which are still to be seen above the Fort of Pensacola. [Footnote: This
intended settlement of Admiral Coligni was on the east coast of
Florida, about St. Augustin, instead of Pensacola. De Laet is of
opinion, that their Fort Carolin was the same with St. Augustin.]
There the Spaniards some time after attacked them, and forcing them to
capitulate, cruelly murdered them, without any regard had to the
treaty concluded between them. As France was at that time involved in
the calamities of a religious war, this act of barbarity had remained
unresented, had not a single man of Mont Marfan, named Dominique de
Gourges, attempted, in the name of the nation, to take vengeance
thereof. In 1567, having fitted out a vessel, and sailed for Florida,
he took three forts built by the Spaniards; and after killing many of
them in the several attacks he made, hanged the rest: and having
settled there a new post, [Footnote: He abandoned the country without
making any settlement; nor have the French ever had any settlement in
it from that day to this. See Laudonniere. Hakluyt, &c.] returned to
France. But the disorders of the state having prevented the
maintaining that post, the Spaniards soon after retook possession of
the country, where they remain to this day.

From that time the French seemed to have dropped all thoughts of that
coast, or of attempting any discoveries therein; when the wars in
Canada with the natives afforded them the {3} knowledge of the vast
country they are possessed of at this day. In one of these wars a
Recollet, or Franciscan Friar, name F. Hennepin, was taken and carried
to the Illinois. As he had some skill in surgery, he proved
serviceable to that people, and was also kindly treated by them: and
being at full liberty, he travelled over the country, following for a
considerable time the banks of the river St. Louis, or Missisipi,
without being able to proceed to its mouth. However, he failed not to
take possession of that country, in the name of Louis XIV., calling it
Louisiana. Providence having facilitated his return to Canada, he gave
the most advantageous account of all he had seen; and after his return
to France, drew up a relation thereof, dedicated to M. Colbert.

Copyright (c) 2007. famouswriterz.com. All rights reserved.