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The Agrarian Crusade, A Chronicle of the Farmer in Politics

S >> Solon J. Buck >> The Agrarian Crusade, A Chronicle of the Farmer in Politics




Although Donnelly was technically still a farmer, he was quite
content to leave the management of his farm to his capable wife,
while he made politics his profession, with literature and
lecturing as avocations. His frequent and brilliant lectures no
less than his voluminous writings* attest his amazing industry.
Democrat, Republican, Liberal-Republican, and Anti-Monopolist;
speculator, lawyer, farmer, lecturer, stump-speaker, editor, and
author; preacher of morals and practicer of shrewd political
evasions; and always a radical--he was for many years a force to
be reckoned with in the politics of his State and of the nation.

* The Great Cryptogram, for instance, devotes a thousand pages to
proving a Bacon cipher in the plays of Shakespeare!



CHAPTER IV. CURBING THE RAILROADS

Though the society of the Patrons of Husbandry was avowedly
non-political in character, there is ample justification for the
use of the term "Granger" in connection with the radical railroad
legislation enacted in the Northwestern States during the
seventies. The fact that the Grange did not take direct political
action is immaterial: certainly the order made political action
on the part of the farmers possible by establishing among them a
feeling of mutual confidence and trust whereby they could
organize to work harmoniously for their common cause. Before the
advent of the Patrons of Husbandry the farmers were so isolated
from each other that cooperation was impossible. It is hard for
us to imagine, familiar as we are with the rural free delivery of
mail, with the country telephone line, with the automobile, how
completely the average farmer of 1865 was cut off from
communication with the outside world. His dissociation from any
but his nearest neighbors made him unsocial, narrow-minded,
bigoted, and suspicious. He believed that every man's hand was
against him, and he was therefore often led to turn his hand
against every man. Not until he was convinced that he might at
least trust the Grangers did he lay aside his suspicions and join
with other farmers in the attempt to obtain what they considered
just railroad legislation.

Certain it is, moreover, that the Grangers made use of the
popular hostility to the railroads in securing membership for the
order. "Cooperation" and "Down with Monopoly" were two of the
slogans most commonly used by the Grange between 1870 and 1875
and were in large part responsible for its great expansion.
Widely circulated reprints of articles exposing graft and
corruption made excellent fuel for the flames of agitation.

How much of the farmers' bitterness against the railroads was
justified it is difficult to determine. Some of it was
undoubtedly due to prejudice, to the hostility of the "producer"
for the "nonproducer," and to the suspicion which the Western
farmer felt for the Eastern magnate. But much of the suspicion
was not without foundation. In some cases manipulation of railway
stock had absolutely cheated farmers and agricultural towns and
counties out of their investments. It is a well-known fact that
the corporations were not averse to creating among legislators a
disposition to favor their interests. Passes were commonly given
by the railroads to all public officials, from the local
supervisors to the judges of the Supreme Court, and opportunities
were offered to legislators to buy stock far below the market
price. In such subtle ways the railroads insinuated themselves
into favor among the makers and interpreters of law. Then, too,
the farmers felt that the railway companies made rates
unnecessarily high and frequently practised unfair discrimination
against certain sections and individuals. When the Iowa farmer
was obliged to burn corn for fuel, because at fifteen cents a
bushel it was cheaper than coal, though at the same time it was
selling for a dollar in the East, he felt that there was
something wrong, and quite naturally accused the railroads of
extortion.

The fundamental issue involved in Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, and
Wisconsin, where the battle was begun and fought to a finish, was
whether or not a State had power to regulate the tariffs of
railway companies incorporated under its laws. Railway companies,
many jurists argued, were private concerns transacting business
according to the laws of the State and no more to be controlled
in making rates than dry goods companies in fixing the price of
spools of thread; rates, like the price of merchandise, were
determined by the volume of trade and the amount of competition,
and for a State to interfere with them was nothing less than
tyranny. On the other hand, those who advocated regulation argued
that railroads, though private corporations, were from the nature
of their business public servants and, as such, should be subject
to state regulation and control.

Some States, foreseeing difficulties which might arise later from
the doctrine that a charter is a contract, as set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in the famous Dartmouth College
case,* had quite early in their history attempted to safeguard
their right to legislate concerning corporations. A clause had
been inserted in the state constitution of Wisconsin which
declared that all laws creating corporations might at any time be
altered or repealed by the legislatures. The constitution of
Minnesota asserted specifically that the railroads, as common
carriers enjoying right of way, were bound to carry freight on
equal and reasonable terms. When the Legislature of Iowa turned
over to the railroad companies lands granted by the Federal
Government, it did so with the reservation that the companies
should be subject to the rules and regulations of the General
Assembly. Thus these States were fortified not only by arguments
from general governmental theory but also by written articles,
more or less specifically phrased, on which they relied to
establish their right to control the railroads.

* See "John Marshall and the Constitution", by Edward S. Corwin
(in "The Chronicles of America"), p. 154 ff.


The first gun in this fight for railroad regulation was fired in
Illinois. As early as 1869, after several years of agitation, the
legislature passed an act declaring that railroads should be
limited to "just, reasonable, and uniform rates, " but, as no
provision was made for determining what such rates were, the act
was a mere encumbrance on the statute books. In the new state
constitution of 1870, however, the framers, influenced by a
growing demand on the part of the farmers which manifested itself
in a Producers' Convention, inserted a section directing the
legislature to "pass laws to correct abuses and to prevent unjust
discrimination and extortion in the rates of freight and
passenger tariffs on the different railroads in this State." The
legislature at its next session appears to have made an honest
attempt to obey these instructions. One act established maximum
passenger fares varying from two and one-half to five and
one-half cents a mile for the different classes into which the
roads were divided. Another provided, in effect, that freight
charges should be based entirely upon distance traversed and
prohibited any increases over rates in 1870. This amounted to an
attempt to force all rates to the level of the lowest competitive
rates of that year. Finally, a third act established a board of
railroad and warehouse commissioners charged with the enforcement
of these and other laws and with the collection of information.

The railroad companies, denying the right of the State to
regulate their business, flatly refused to obey the laws; and the
state supreme court declared the act regulating freight rates
unconstitutional on the ground that it attempted to prevent not
only unjust discrimination but any discrimination at all. The
legislature then passed the Act of 1873, which avoided the
constitutional pitfall by providing that discriminatory rates
should be considered as prima facie but not absolute evidence
of unjust discrimination. The railroads were thus permitted to
adduce evidence to show that the discrimination was justified,
but the act expressly stated that the existence of competition at
some points and its nonexistence at others should not be deemed a
sufficient justification of discrimination. In order to prevent
the roads from raising all rates to the level of the highest
instead of lowering them to the level of the lowest, the
commissioners were directed to establish a schedule of maximum
rates; and the charging of rates higher than these by any company
after January 15, 1874, was to be considered prima facie evidence
of extortion. Other provisions increased the penalties for
violations and strengthened the enforcing powers of the
commission in other ways. This act was roundly denounced at the
time, especially in the East, as an attempt at confiscation, and
the railroad companies refused to obey it for several years; but
ultimately it stood the test of the courts and became the
permanent basis of railroad regulation in Illinois and the model
for the solution of this problem in many other States.

The first Granger law of Minnesota, enacted in 1871, established
fixed schedules for both passengers and freight, while another
act of the same year provided for a railroad commissioner. In
this instance also the companies denied the validity of the law,
and when the state supreme court upheld it in 1873, they appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the meantime there
was no way of enforcing the law, and the antagonism toward the
roads fostered by the Grange and the Anti-Monopoly party became
more and more intense. In 1874 the legislature replaced the Act
of 1871 with one modeled on the Illinois law of 1873; but it soon
discovered that no workable set of uniform rates could be made
for the State because of the wide variation of conditions in the
different sections. Rates and fares which would be just to the
companies in the frontier regions of the State would be
extortionate in the thickly populated areas. This difficulty
could have been avoided by giving the commission power to
establish varying schedules for different sections of the same
road; but the anti-railroad sentiment was beginning to die down,
and the Legislature of 1875, instead of trying to improve the
law, abandoned the attempt at state regulation.

The Granger laws of Iowa and Wisconsin, both enacted in 1874,
attempted to establish maximum rates by direct legislative
action, although commissions were also created to collect
information and assist in enforcing the laws. The Iowa law was
very carefully drawn and appears to have been observed, in form
at least, by most of the companies while it remained in force. In
1878, however, a systematic campaign on the part of the railroad
forces resulted in the repeal of the act. In Wisconsin, a
majority of the members of the Senate favored the railroads and,
fearing to show their hands, attempted to defeat the proposed
legislation by substituting the extremely radical Potter Bill for
the moderate measure adopted by the Assembly. The senators found
themselves hoist with their own petard, however, for the lower
house, made up largely of Grangers, accepted this bill rather
than let the matter of railroad legislation go by default. The
rates fixed by the Potter Law for many commodities were certainly
unreasonably low, although the assertion of a railroad official
that the enforcement of the law would cut off twenty-five per
cent of the gross earnings of the companies was a decided
exaggeration. Relying upon the advice of such eminent Eastern
lawyers as William M. Evarts, Charles O'Conor, E. Rockwood Roar,
and Benjamin R. Curtis that the law was invalid, the roads
refused to obey it until it was upheld by the state supreme court
late in 1874. They then began a campaign for its repeal. Though
they obtained only some modification in 1875, they succeeded
completely in 1876.

The contest between the railroads and the farmers was intense
while it lasted. The farmers had votes; the railroads had money;
and the legislators were sometimes between the devil and the deep
sea in the fear of offending one side or the other. The farmers'
methods of campaign were simple. Often questionnaires were
distributed to all candidates for office, and only those who went
on record as favoring railroad restriction were endorsed by the
farmers' clubs and committees. An agricultural convention,
sometimes even a meeting of the state Grange, would be held at
the capital of the State while the legislature was in session,
and it was a bold legislator who, in the presence of his farmer
constituents, would vote against the measures they approved. When
the railroads in Illinois refused to lower their passenger rates
to conform to the law, adventurous farmers often attempted to
"ride for legal fares," giving the trainmen the alternative
of accepting the low fares or throwing the hardy passengers from
the train.

The methods of the railroads in dealing with the legislators were
most subtle. Whether or not the numerous charges of bribery were
true, railroad favors were undoubtedly distributed among well
disposed legislators. In Iowa passes were not given to the
senators who voted against the railroads, and those sent to the
men who voted in the railroads' interest were accompanied by
notes announcing that free passes were no longer to be given
generally but only to the friends of the railroads. At the
session of the Iowa Legislature in 1872, four lawyers who posed
as farmers and Grange members were well known as lobbyists for
the railroads. The senate paid its respects to these men at the
close of its session by adopting the following resolution:

WHEREAS, There have been constantly in attendance on the Senate
and House of this General Assembly, from the commencement of the
session to the present time, four gentlemen professing to
represent the great agricultural interest of the State of Iowa,
known as the Grange; and--

WHEREAS, These gentlemen appear entirely destitute of any visible
means of support; therefore be it--

RESOLVED, By the Senate, the House concurring, that the janitors
permit aforesaid gentlemen to gather up all the waste paper, old
newspapers, &c., from under the desks of the members, and they be
allowed one postage stamp each, The American Agriculturist, What
Greeley Knows about Farming, and that they be permitted to take
with them to their homes, if they have any, all the rejected
railroad tariff bills, Beardsley's speech on female suffrage,
Claussen's reply, Kasson's speech on barnacles, Blakeley's dog
bill, Teale's liquor bill, and be given a pass over the Des
Moines Valley Railroad, with the earnest hope that they will
never return to Des Moines.


Once the Granger laws were enacted, the railroads either fought
the laws in court or obeyed them in such a way as to make them
appear most obnoxious to the people, or else they employed both
tactics. The lawsuits, which began as soon as the laws had been
passed, dragged on, in appeal after appeal, until finally they
were settled in the Supreme Court of the United States. These
suits were not so numerous as might be expected, because in most
of the States they had to be brought on the initiative of the
injured shipper, and many shippers feared to incur the animosity
of the railroad. A farmer was afraid that, if he angered the
railroad, misfortunes would befall him: his grain might be
delivered to the wrong elevators or left to stand and spoil in
damp freight cars; there might be no cars available for grain
just when his shipment was ready; and machinery destined for him
might be delayed at a time when lack of it would mean the loss of
his crops. The railroads for their part whenever they found an
opportunity to make the new laws appear obnoxious in the eyes of
the people, were not slow to seize it. That section of the
Illinois law of 1873 which prohibited unjust discrimination went
into effect in July, but the maximum freight rates were not fixed
until January of 1874. As a result of this situation, the
railroads in July made all their freight rates uniform, according
to the law, but accomplished this uniformity by raising the low
rates instead of lowering the high. In Minnesota, similarly, the
St. Paul and Pacific road, in its zeal to establish uniform
passenger rates, raised the fare between St. Paul and Minneapolis
from three to five cents a mile, in order to make it conform to
the rates elsewhere in the State. The St. Paul and Sioux City
road declared that the Granger law made its operation
unprofitable, and it so reduced its train service that the people
petitioned the commission to restore the former rate. In
Wisconsin, when the state supreme court affirmed the
constitutionality of the radical Potter law, the railroads
retaliated in some cases by carrying out their threat to give the
public "Potter cars, Potter rails, and Potter time." As a result
the public soon demanded the repeal of the law.

In all the States but Illinois the Granger laws were repealed
before they had been given a fair trial. The commissions remained
in existence, however, although with merely advisory functions;
and they sometimes did good service in the arbitration of
disputes between shippers and railroads. Interest in the railroad
problem died down for the time, but every one of the Granger
States subsequently enacted for the regulation of railroad rates
statutes which, although more scientific than the laws of the
seventies, are the same in principle. The Granger laws thus paved
the way not only for future and more enduring legislation in
these States but also for similar legislation in most of the
other States of the Union and even for the national regulation of
railroads through the Interstate Commerce Commission.

The Supreme Court of the United States was the theater for the
final stage of this conflict between the railroads and the
farmers. In October, 1876, decisions were handed down together in
eight cases which had been appealed from federal circuit and
state courts in Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, and
which involved the validity of the Granger laws. The fundamental
issue was the same in all these cases--the right of a State to
regulate a business that is public in nature though privately
owned and managed.

The first of the "Granger cases," as they were termed by Justice
Field in a dissenting opinion, was not a railroad case primarily
but grew out of warehouse legislation which the farmers of
Illinois secured in 1871. This act established maximum charges
for grain storage and required all warehousemen to publish their
rates for each year during the first week in January and to
refrain from increasing these rates during the year and from
discriminating between customers. In an endeavor to enforce this
law the railroad and warehouse commission brought suit against
Munn and Scott, a warehouse firm in Chicago, for failure to take
out the license required by the act. The suit, known as Munn vs.
Illinois, finally came to the United States Supreme Court and was
decided in favor of the State, two of the justices dissenting.*
The opinion of the court in this case, delivered by Chief Justice
Waite, laid down the principles which were followed in the
railroad cases. The attorneys for the warehousemen had argued
that the act in question, by assuming to limit charges, amounted
to a deprivation of property without due process of law and was
thus repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. But the court declared that it had long been
customary both in England and America to regulate by law any
business in which the public has an interest, such as ferries,
common carriers, bakers, or millers, and that the warehouse
business in question was undoubtedly clothed with such a public
interest. Further, it was asserted that this right to regulate
implied the right to fix maximum charges, and that what those
charges should be was a legislative and not a judicial question.

* 94 United States Reports, 113.


In deciding the railroad cases the courts applied the same
general principles, the public nature of the railroad business
having already been established by a decision in 1872.* Another
point was involved, however, because of the contention of the
attorneys for the companies that the railway charters were
contracts and that the enforcement of the laws would amount to an
impairment of contracts, which was forbidden by the Constitution.
The court admitted that the charters were contracts but denied
that state regulation could be considered an impairment of
contracts unless the terms of the charter were specific.
Moreover, it was pointed out that contracts must be interpreted
in the light of rights reserved to the State in its constitution
and in the light of its general laws of incorporation under which
the charters were granted.

* Olcott vs. The Supervisors, 16 Wallace, 678.


These court decisions established principles which even now are
of vital concern to business and politics. From that time to this
no one has denied the right of States to fix maximum charges for
any business which is public in its nature or which has been
clothed with a public interest; nor has the inclusion of the
railroad and warehouse businesses in that class been questioned.
The opinion, however, that this right of the States is unlimited,
and therefore not subject to judicial review, has been
practically reversed. In 1890 the Supreme Court declared a
Minnesota law invalid because it denied a judicial hearing as to
the reasonableness of rates*; and the courts now assume it to be
their right and duty to determine whether or not rates fixed by
legislation are so low as to amount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law. In spite of this later limitation
upon the power of the States, the Granger decisions have
furnished the legal basis for state regulation of railroads down
to the present day. They are the most significant achievements of
the antimonopoly movement of the seventies.

* 134 United States Reports, 418.



CHAPTER V. THE COLLAPSE OF THE GRANGER MOVEMENT

The first phase of the agrarian crusade, which centered around
and took its distinctive name from the Grange, reached its
highwater mark in 1874. Early in the next year the tide began to
ebb. The number of Granges decreased rapidly during the remainder
of the decade, and of over twenty thousand in 1874 only about
four thousand were alive in 1880.

Several causes contributed to this sudden decline. Any
organization which grows so rapidly is prone to decay with equal
rapidity; the slower growths are better rooted and are more
likely to reach fruition. So with the Grange. Many farmers had
joined the order, attracted by its novelty and vogue; others
joined the organization in the hope that it would prove a panacea
for all the ills that agriculture is heir to and then left it in
disgust when they found its success neither immediate nor
universal.

Its methods of organization, too, while admirably adapted to
arousing enthusiasm and to securing new chapters quickly, did not
make for stability and permanence. The Grange deputy, as the
organizer was termed, did not do enough of what the salesman
calls "follow-up work." He went into a town, persuaded an
influential farmer to go about with him in a house-to-house
canvass, talked to the other farmers of the vicinity, stirred
them up to interest and excitement, organized a Grange, and then
left the town. If he happened to choose the right material, the
chapter became an active and flourishing organization; if he did
not choose wisely, it might drag along in a perfunctory existence
or even lapse entirely. Then, too, the deputy's ignorance of
local conditions sometimes led him to open the door to the
farmers' enemies. There can be little doubt that insidious harm
was worked through the admission into the Grange of men who were
farmers only incidentally and whose "interest in agriculture" was
limited to making profits from the farmer rather than from the
farm. As D. Wyatt Aiken, deputy for the Grange in the Southern
States and later member of the executive committee of the
National Grange, shrewdly commented, "Everybody wanted to join
the Grange then; lawyers, to get clients; doctors, to get
customers; Shylocks, to get their pound of flesh; and sharpers,
to catch the babes in the woods."

Not only the members who managed thus to insinuate themselves
into the order but also the legitimate members proved hard to
control. With that hostility to concentrated authority which so
often and so lamentably manifests itself in a democratic body,
the rank and file looked with suspicion upon the few men who
constituted the National Grange. The average farmer was
interested mainly in local issues, conditions, and problems, and
looked upon the National Grange not as a means of helping him in
local affairs, but as a combination of monopolists who had taken
out a patent on the local grange and forced him to pay a royalty
in order to enjoy its privileges. The demand for reduction in the
power of the National Grange led to frequent attempts to revise
the constitution in the direction of decentralization; and the
revisions were such as merely to impair the power of the National
Grange without satisfying the discontented members.

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