A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P R S T U V W X Z

Afghanistan and the Anglo Russian Dispute

T >> Theo. F. Rodenbough >> Afghanistan and the Anglo Russian Dispute





[Illustration: An Afghan Post-Chaise; Going to the Front. ]


Lieut. Martin, R. E., states that his company, of Sappers and
Miners, was able to get an exceptional percentage of labor from
the camels under his charge by attention to certain details; and
says further, that "camels are very quarrelsome and bite each other
badly when grazing. They can ford four feet of moderately running
water, easily, if the bed is good; but a yard of greasy mud, a few
inches deep, will throw many camels and delay a convoy for hours.
Camel-bridges were carried on the leading camels, with a few
shovels and picks, in every convoy of the Kandahar Field Force, and
all small cuts or obstructions were thus bridged in a few minutes;
the camels remaining by their bridges (two gang-boards eight by
three feet) until the last baggage camel had passed. In perfectly
open country, such as Kandahar to Girishk, it was found possible to
march the camels on a broad front, the whole convoy being a rough
square; camels starting at 3 A.M. have been known to arrive at camp
ten miles off as late as 5 P.M."

Captain Yaldwyn says: "A camel's carrying-power is equal to that of
two and a half mules or ponies, whilst his ration is only about that
of one mule or pony. Thus 500 camels only eat as much as 500 mules
or ponies, and whilst the latter can only carry 1,000 _maunds_
[Footnote: A _maund_ is 80 pounds.] the former can carry 2,500.
Again, 500 camels only require 125 attendants to be paid, clothed,
and fed, whilst 500 mules or ponies require 167 attendants." But, on
the other hand, the immense losses of camels from excessive heat or
cold, or over-exertion in mountainous or rough roads, and other
causes, greatly neutralize the force of this comparison.

The _yabu_ is a hardy mountain pony used by the Afghans for the
saddle and packing purposes; they are very strong, active, and
sure-footed, and have been frequently used by the British forces in
their military operations. In 1839 Captain (afterward General)
Outram relates that his _yabu_, "although but thirteen hands high,
carried me and my saddlebags, weighing altogether upward of sixteen
stone, the whole distance from Kalat in seven days and a half (an
average of nearly forty-seven miles a day), during which time I had
passed 111 hours on its back; there was no saddle on the pony,
merely a cloth over his back."

They will carry from four to five _maunds_ with perfect ease, making
journeys of thirty miles a day. Those which are ridden and which
amble, are called _yurgas_. The Afghans tie a knot in the middle of
the long tails of their horses, which, they say, strengthens the
animal's backbone!

The Afghan donkey was severely tested in 1880 during the operations
of Sir Donald Stewart between Kabul and Kandahar, and this class of
carriage was found very useful in the conveyance of provisions.
Afghan donkeys will march with troops and carry loads of grain or
flour, averaging ninety pounds, without difficulty. They keep pace
with mules or ponies in a baggage column, as they avoid the frequent
checks which retard the larger animals; they browse on the line of
march, and find their own forage easily in the neighborhood of camp;
they are easily controlled and cared for, and are on all accounts
the most inexpensive transport in Eastern countries. [Footnote:
Lieut.-Col. E. F. Chapman, C.B., R.A.]

The transport animals found in India and Turkestan will be described
in the parts of this book devoted to the military resources of those
regions.

In concluding this sketch of the "Threshold of India," a mere glance
at the military history of the country will suffice. In fact, only
so far as it may have a bearing upon the present, has reference to
the past any place in this volume.

The early periods of eventful interest to Afghanistan have been
already noted at the opening of this chapter. Its purely Oriental
experiences were beginning to fade with the death of Nadir Shah--
variously termed the "Butcher of Delhi," and the "Wallace of
Persia," in 1747. His progress toward India, from which he was to
tear its choicest treasure and loot its greatest city, reminds one
of the Arabian Nights. A camp-follower from Jelalabad reported as
follows: "He has 36,000 horsemen with himself . . . After morning
prayers he sits on a throne, the canopy of which is in the form of a
dome and of gold. One thousand young men, with royal standards of
red silk and the lance tops and tassels of silver, are disposed
regularly; and, at a proper distance, five hundred beautiful slaves,
from twelve to twenty years old, stand--one half on his right and
the other on his left. All the great men stand fronting him; and the
Arzbegi stands between, in readiness to represent whatever he is
desired, and everybody has his cause decided at once: bribery is not
so much as known here. He has particular information given him of
every thing that passes; all criminals, great and small, rich and
poor, meet with immediate death. He sits till noon, after which he
dines, then reposes a little; when afternoon prayers are over he
sits till the evening prayers, and when they are over he shoots five
arrows into the _Khak Tudah_, and then goes into the women's
apartments." [Footnote: Fraser's "Nadir Shah."]

The splendor of the Robber King has departed, but his deeds of blood
and treachery have often been repeated in the country of the
Afghans.

A succession of struggles between Afghan and Persian leaders for the
control of Afghanistan marked the next fifty years.

When the project of Russian invasion of India, suggested by
Napoleon, was under consideration in Persia, a British envoy was
sent, in 1809, to the then Shah Sujah, and received the most cordial
reception at Peshawur. But Shah Sujah was, in 1810, superseded by
his brother, Mahmud, and the latter was pressed hard by the son of
his Wazir to such an extent that Herat alone remained to him. In
1823 his former kingdom passed to Dost Mohammed, who in 1826
governed Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni, and Peshawur. The last-named place
fell into the hands of Runjeet Singh, the "Lion of the Punjab." Dost
Mohammed then applied to England for aid in recovering Peshawur,
failing in which he threatened to turn to Russia.

That Power was (1837) engaged in fomenting trouble in the western
part of Afghanistan, encouraging an attack by 30,000 Persians, led
by Russian officers, upon Herat. Instead of acceding to the request
of Dost Mohammed, the British Governor-General--Lord Auckland--
declared war against that potentate, alleging in a proclamation that
"the welfare of the English possessions in the East rendered it
necessary to have an ally on their western frontier who would be in
favor of peace, and opposed to all disorders and innovations."

This was the beginning of intrigues relating to Afghanistan on the
part, alternately, of England and Russia, in which John Bull has had
to pay, literally, "the lion's share" of the cost in blood and
treasure. In 1850, Sir John Cam Hobhouse, President of the Board of
Control in India confessed: "The Afghan war _was done by myself_;
the Court of Directors had nothing to do with it." The reason
already mentioned was alleged as an excuse for hostilities. They
were declared, notwithstanding that the British political agent at
the Court of Dost Mohammed reported that ruler as "entirely English"
in his sympathies. This report was suppressed. Twenty years later
the facts were given to Parliament, Russian letters were found
implicating the Czar's ministers, and the English agent, Burnes, was
vindicated.

The Anglo-Indian army--consisting of twenty thousand troops, fifty
thousand followers, and sixty thousand camels--advanced in two
columns, one from Bengal, and the other from Bombay by the Indus.
Scinde, which had hitherto been independent, like the Punjab and
Lahore, was subjugated _en route_, and nine thousand men were
left behind to occupy it. On the 23d of February, 1839, a
simultaneous advance from Shikarpur, on the Bolan Pass, commenced.
Kandahar was occupied April 25th, Ghazni July 23d, and Kabul August
6th, and Shah Sujah was proclaimed Ameer by British authority. By
the following September the greater part of the English forces
returned to India. Only five regiments of infantry and one of
cavalry remained in Afghanistan, where suspicious symptoms of
discontent with the new order of things began very soon to show
themselves. During the summer of 1840 insurrections had to be put
down by force in several places. In November of the same year Dost
Mohammed defeated the English in the Perwan Pass. From that time
until the autumn of 1841 a sultry calm reigned in the country.

The English commanders, although fully aware of the state of mind of
the people, neglected to take the most simple measures of
precaution.

The local control was vested in a mixed military and civil council,
consisting of General Elphinstone, unfitted by disease and natural
irresolution from exercising the functions of command, and Sir
William McNaghten, the British envoy, whose self-confidence and
trust in the treacherous natives made him an easy victim. In the
centre of an insurrection which was extending day by day under their
eyes and under their own roofs, these representatives of a powerful
nation, with a small but effective force, deliberately buried their
heads in the sand of their credulity, not realizing the nature of
the danger which for weeks was evident to many of their
subordinates.

Finally a force of the insurgents, under the direction of the son of
the deposed ruler, Akbar Khan, threw off the disguise they had
assumed before the English, and taking possession of the Khurd Kabul
Pass near the city, entirely cut off the retreat to India which
Elphinstone had commenced.

As there was no intelligent concert of action among the British
leaders, the garrison melted away in detail, the Afghan auxiliaries
refused to fight, or turned their arms against the Europeans. Sir
William McNaghten was murdered by Akbar, at a council in sight of
the garrison. A few attempts to force a passage, or to defend
themselves, made by certain brave officers of the beleagured force,
failed.

On January 6, 1842, an agreement was made by which the Afghan leader
promised to ensure to the British forces a safe withdrawal to India.
This was violated with Afghan readiness, and the entire Anglo-Indian
contingent of seventeen thousand souls was destroyed; sacrificed to
the murderous brutality of the Afghan insurgents, or dying from
exposure to one of the most severe winters known to that region.
Months after, heaps of dead bodies, preserved by the intense cold,
obstructed the mountain passes. The horrors of Moscow were repeated
in the Khurd Kabul, and the noblest attributes of humanity were
exemplified in the acts of the officers and soldiers of the doomed
party. Only twenty of this entire force survived. The news of this
horrible disaster was brought to Jelalabad by the only man who
penetrated the Afghan environment, Dr. Brydon.

On receipt of the news of this overwhelming catastrophe, the Indian
Government endeavored to rescue the garrisons of Kandahar and
Ghazni, as well as that of Jelalabad; but the Mohammedan troops
refused to march against their co-religionists, and the Sikhs also
showed great unwillingness. The garrison of Ghazni, thinking to
secure its safety by capitulation, was cut to pieces December 23,
1841. Jelalabad, held by 2,400 men under General Sale, still
withstood the storm like a rock of iron. General Nott, the energetic
officer commanding at Kandahar, on receiving the news of the
destruction of the British, blew up the citadel of the town,
destroyed every thing not necessary to his object, and started,
August 8, 1842, for Ghazni, which he also destroyed, September 6th.


[Illustration: Gate of the Bazaar at Kabul.]


Another British force of twelve thousand men, under General Pollock,
was organized at Peshawur, to punish the Afghans, and, so far as
might be, retrieve the errors of Elphinstone and McNaghten.
Pollock's operations were, in the sense of retaliation, successful.
An eminent German authority wrote: "Kabul and other towns were
levelled with the ground; Akbar's troops were blown from guns, and
the people were collected together and destroyed like worms."
General Pollock carried the famous Khaiber Pass, in advancing to the
relief of Jelalabad in April, 1842. This was the first time that the
great defile--twenty-eight miles in length--had ever been forced by
arms. Timur Lang and Nadir Shah, at the head of their enormous
hosts, bought a safe passage through it from the Afridis. Akbar the
Great, in 1587, is said to have lost forty thousand men in
attempting to force it, and Aurangzeb failed to get through.

The misfortune of Elphinstone's command, great as it was, would have
been much more humiliating to England, had it not been for the
firmness of the gallant General Pollock, who, ordered to withdraw
with his command to Peshawur, by Lord Ellenborough, without
effecting one of the objects of the expedition--the deliverance of
the English captives in Akbar's hands at Kabul,--protested against
such a suicidal act on the part of any Englishman or any
Administration, and, at great personal risk, gained his point.

In the forced march to Kabul, which Pollock made subsequently, the
force of about eight thousand men moved in as light order as
possible. After loading the commissariat camels to their utmost
carrying capacity, the General discovered that the mounted men had
in their kit a spare pair of pantaloons apiece, on which he ordered
the legs to be filled with grain and carried by the men in front of
them, on their saddles. By the middle of December the British had
started on their return march, pursued as far as the Indus by the
Afghans, and by this hurried conclusion to the war lessened their
prestige in Asia to an enormous degree.

As Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote:

"It was not so much the fact of our retreat; disaster would have
been diminished, if not altogether overcome; but retreating as we
did, pursued even through the last pass into the plains by an
implacable enemy, the impression became universal in India as well
as in Central Asia, that we had simply been driven back across the
mountains."

A very able Hindu gentleman, very loyal to the British, traced the
mutiny of 1857 in a great measure to the Afghan campaign of 1842. He
said: "It was a direct breach of faith to take the Sepoys out of
India. Practically they were compelled to go for fear of being
treated as mutineers, but the double pay they received by no means
compensated them for losing caste. The Sepoys mistrusted the
Government from that time forward, and were always fearing that
their caste would be destroyed; besides, the Kabul disaster taught
them that Europeans were not invincible."

The departure of the English forces was followed by the
reestablishment of Dost Mohammed's authority in Afghanistan. Once,
at the time of the Sikh insurrection, the Dost crossed the Indian
border with two thousand horsemen, and narrowly escaped falling into
the hands of the British in the affair of Gujrat, February 21, 1849,
where the speed of his horse alone saved him from capture. In 1855 a
better understanding was effected between the son of Dost Mohammed
and his powerful European neighbor. He reconquered Balkh in 1850,
and gained Kandahar by inheritance in 1855, while he lost Herat to
the Persians in 1856. With the aid of Great Britain, in 1857, Persia
relinquished all claims to Herat, but the Dost had eventually to
besiege that city, occupied by a rebellious faction, in 1863, and
after a siege of ten months reduced the place, only to find a tomb
within its walls. After the usual struggle for the throne, peculiar
to a change of dynasty in Afghanistan, Shere Ali, one of the Dost's
sons, prevailed, and was recognized in 1868. The next decade was
notable for a series of diplomatic manoeuvres between England and
Russia for Afghan friendship. Shere Ali now leaned toward the Lion,
now in the direction of the Bear, with the regularity of a pendulum.
The advances were received with presents and promises on the one
hand, and promises, powerful embassies, and imposing military
expeditions on the other. On September 21, 1878, a British
ambassador was turned back by the Afghan commandant of the frontier
fort of Ali Musjid, and on the 20th of November, of the same year,
war was declared against Shere Ali by the Anglo-Indian Government.
At that time the Russian General Kaufmann was operating on the
northern border of Afghanistan with a force of fifteen thousand men
and sixty guns, and the Ameer had reason to think that he could rely
on Russian cooperation against the English, who, with a force of
forty thousand men, promptly invaded his dominion.

This force moved into Afghanistan in four columns, under the
command, respectively, of Generals Browne, Roberts, Biddulph, and
Stewart, with reserves under Generals Maude and Primrose.

We shall have occasion later to consider some of the details of the
protracted operations which followed. They embraced several
admirably conducted marches, exposure to excessively severe winter
weather, the successful surmounting of great natural obstacles, the
development of the usual weakness in the department of transport,
with unnecessary losses in animals, a considerable sick-list, and an
inconsiderable proportion of killed and wounded in action.

The military benefits were those resulting from a long and arduous
field experience in a rough country. The interruption to these
actual "field manoeuvres," this "fire-drill," by the enemy, was
comparatively feeble,--as a rule, stimulating the Anglo-Indian force
to put its best foot foremost. Under this system, at the end of the
two years' campaign, all departments of the army had become moulded
into the efficient machines essential to success in any military
venture.

Politically, the campaign had been a failure. The fate of the
gallant Major Cavagnari and his mission, murdered at Kabul,
September 3, 1879, made a deeper impression on the Afghan mind than
the British occupation of Afghan cities or the Afghan losses in
battle.

In the same year the British Secretary for India, in London, wrote
to the Governor-General that: "It appears that as the result of two
successful campaigns, of the employment of an immense force, and of
the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet been
accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it was
desired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the assumption of
fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces,
and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country."

Early in the year 1880, the British Government prepared to make a
dignified withdrawal from Afghanistan. That volcanic region was by
no means tranquil, although the chief rebel, Yakoub Khan, had been
driven out of Kabul by General Roberts, and had retired to the
distant country of the Her-i-rud. At this time appeared the
exiled Abdurrahman Khan, who had long resided at Tashkend, and who
was welcomed warmly by the local sirdars on the northern frontier of
Afghanistan. As he approached Kabul his authority and influence
increased, and the British political officers, acting under
instructions, formally recognized him as Ameer of that district. In
the meanwhile Yakoub advanced westward from Herat with a strong
force, encountered a British brigade, under General Burrows, near
the Helmund, and utterly routed it. The remnant of the European
force took refuge in Kandahar, where General Primrose was in
command. Surrounding the city, Yakoub succeeded in effectually
"bottling up" the British garrison for some time. Sir Frederick
Roberts, however, made a rapid march from Kabul on Kandahar, and
after a successful and decisive battle with the Afghans, completely
dispersed the native force, and relieved the beleaguered garrison.
Soon after, Abdurrahman was formally installed as Ameer of
Afghanistan, and the British army withdrew from the country.




III.

THE BRITISH FORCES AND ROUTES.


A sketch of the military resources of Great Britain, more especially
those available for field service in Afghanistan, with notes upon
the strength and composition of the forces, means of transport and
supply, nature of important lines of communication, and of certain
strategic points in the probable theatre of operations, will be
attempted in this chapter.

_Organization_.--The military system of Great Britain is based
upon voluntary enlistment instead of the usual European plan of
universal liability to service. Recruits may enlist either for the
"short-service" or "long-service" term; the first being for six
years in the ranks and six on furlough, and the last for twelve
years in the ranks; the furlough of short-service men is passed in
the army reserve, and then, in consideration of liability to be
recalled to the colors, the men are paid sixpence a day.

The troops of the Standing Army, (United Kingdom,) March, 1885, were
proportionately distributed as follows: forty-three per cent. in
England, two per cent. in Scotland, twenty-five per cent. in
Ireland, and thirty-five per cent. abroad, not including India.


[Illustration: Major-General, Sir F. S. Roberts, V.C., K.C.B.]


AVAILABLE BRITISH LAND FORCES.
[Footnote: Approximately, from late returns (1885), but short of
authorized "establishment" by 90,000.]


ENGLAND.
==================================================================
Army Army Militia Yeomanry Volunteers
Reserve
==================================================================
Class:
Engineers
Officers 423
Men 4,762

Cavalry
Officers 559
Men 11,840 11,441

Royal Horse Artillery
Officers 108
Men 2,426

Royal Artillery
Officers 690
Men 18,351

Infantry
Officers 2,862
Men 80,324

Aggregate ------- ------- ------- ------ -------
All Ranks 122,345 44,503 108,462 11,441 209,365
==================================================================
Grand
Aggregate 469,116
==================================================================


INDIA. [Native Contingents, Independent States of India, [2]
about 349,831.]
==================================================================
Army (E'r'p'n) (Native)
==================================================================
Engineers
Officers 436
Men [3] 232 3,109
Cavalry
Officers 198 304
Men 4,086 18,071
Royal Horse Artillery
Officers
Men
Royal Artillery
Officers 453 19
Men 10,809 1,842
Infantry
Officers 1,400 1,068
Men 44,106 102,648
------- -------
Aggregate
All Ranks 61,488 127,263
=================================================================
Grand
Aggregate 188,751
=================================================================

[Footnote 2: Cashmere 27,000, Nepaul 100,000, Hyderabad 44,000.]

[Footnote 3: Sappers and Miners.]

For purposes of administration, instruction, and mobilization, Great
Britain and Ireland are partitioned into thirteen military districts
commanded by general officers. These are sub-divided as follows: for
the infantry one hundred and two sub-districts under regimental
commanders; for the artillery there are twelve sub-districts,
and for the cavalry two districts. The brigade of an infantry
sub-district comprises usually two line battalions, two militia
battalions, the brigade depot, rifle volunteer corps, and infantry
of the army reserve. Of the line battalions one is generally at home
and one abroad. In an artillery sub-district are comprised a
proportion of the royal artillery and artillery of the militia,
volunteers, and army reserve respectively. In like manner a cavalry
sub-district includes the yeomanry and army reserve cavalry.

The officers on duty in the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster's
departments of the British army are, as a rule, detailed for a term
of five years from the Line, but must rejoin their regiments
immediately upon orders for foreign service.

The Royal Engineers then were and are organized into forty-three
companies.

The cavalry is divided into the Household Cavalry and Cavalry of the
Line. The first named comprises the 1st and 2d Life Guards and Royal
Horse Guards,--three regiments. The Line is composed of twenty-eight
regiments, as follows: seven of dragoon guards, three of dragoons,
thirteen of hussars, five of lancers. The strength of regiments
varies from 450 to 625 men with from 300 to 400 troop horses each.

Copyright (c) 2007. famouswriterz.com. All rights reserved.