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Afghanistan and the Anglo Russian Dispute

T >> Theo. F. Rodenbough >> Afghanistan and the Anglo Russian Dispute




The artillery--under the title of the Royal Regiment of Artillery--
is divided into three classes; the Royal Horse Artillery of two
brigades of twelve batteries each, making a brigade total of sixty
guns; the Field Artillery of four, brigades of seventy-six
batteries, and the Garrison Artillery of eleven brigades. For the
non-professional reader it may be well to say that, in the horse
artillery, all the _personnel_ of a battery is mounted, the better
to act with cavalry or mounted infantry; under the general term
"field artillery" may be classed mountain batteries (only maintained
in India), field batteries proper, in which the guns are somewhat
heavier, and served by gunners who are not mounted, but on occasion
are carried on the limbers and on seats attached to the axles, and
in an emergency may be carried on the "off" horses of teams. Under
the class "field artillery," also, would come such large guns as are
required in war for siege or other heavy operations, and which in
India or Afghanistan would be drawn by bullocks.

The infantry is composed of the Guards, the Line, and the Rifles.
The Guards consist of three regiments--Grenadier Guards, Coldstream
Guards, and Scots Fusilier Guards; in all seven battalions. The Line
comprises 102 regiments (204 battalions); the Rifles four
battalions. Besides these there are two regiments of Colonial (West
India) colored troops.

The Militia is intended for local defence, but can be ordered
anywhere within the United Kingdom, and is available for garrison
duty in the Mediterranean. Enlistment in the militia is for six
years. The officers are commissioned by the Queen, and, as before
noted, all the details of control and recruitment are entrusted to
district commanders. For instruction this force may be called out,
for a period not to exceed eight weeks annually, with regular
officers as instructors. There are 212 battalions of infantry, 25
brigades of garrison artillery, and 3 regiments of engineers
comprised in this force.

The Militia Reserve, limited to one fourth of the active militia, is
liable to army service in case of an emergency, and for the term of
six years is entitled to L1 per annum.

The Volunteers represent "the bulwark" in case of invasion; they are
organized principally as garrison artillery and infantry. The
officers are commissioned by the county lieutenants, subject to the
approval of the Queen. The men are recruited, armed, and instructed
by the Government. Recruits are required to attend thirty drills,
and afterward not less than nine drills annually. The volunteer
force is composed of 278 battalions of infantry, 46 brigades of
garrison artillery and 15 battalions of engineers.

The Yeomanry Cavalry are equipped as light cavalry, drill eight days
per year, and are subject to call in case of riot and insurrection,
when each man with a horse receives seven pence a day. There are
thirty-eight regiments.

The Army of India differs from that of the United Kingdom, not only
in its composition, but in the character of its organization. This
organization dates from 1858, when the government passed from the
East India Company to the Crown.

The European regiments serving in India are in all respects
organized and maintained, as in England. In each presidency forming
the three political subdivisions, and among which the Anglo-Indian
army is distributed, exists a staff corps which supplies all
European officers, permitted to serve with native troops. These
officers must pass certain examinations before they can be assigned
to any of the following vacancies in any native regiment.

INDIAN REGIMENT.

EUROPEANS

1 Commandant,
1 Second-in-command and wing officer,
1 Wing-officer,
2 Wing-subalterns,
1 Adjutant,
1 Quartermaster,
1 Medical officer.

NATIVES

2 Subadars (captains), 1st class,
2 " " 2d "
4 " " 3d "
4 Jemandars (lieuts.), 1st "
4 " " 2d "
1 Havildar (sergt.-major),
40 Havildars (sergeants),
40 Naicks (corporals),
16 Drummers,
600 Sepoys (privates).

The duties of the commandant of a native regiment correspond in
general to those of a similar officer in a European corps. Three
times a week he holds a "durbar," for the trial of offenders and
transaction of general regimental business. The men are paid by the
native officers in presence of the European "Wing-officer," who is
responsible for all public property issued to his half battalion, or
wing.

The native officers are commissioned by the Indian Government, and,
as a rule, are promoted from the ranks, and are of the same caste as
the privates. Certain native officers of the engineers and artillery
may be eligible to appointment in the corresponding European corps;
one is always assigned as an aide-de-camp to the Viceroy. When on
detailed service, a native officer is allowed to command his
company, but "no battalion parades should take place without the
presence of a British officer." [Footnote: Indian Army Regulations.]
In each regiment there is a drill-sergeant and drill-corporal, who
receive extra pay for their services. Corporals are promoted from
privates who know how to read and write in at least one character,
or who have displayed extraordinary courage. The pay per month of a
sepoy is equal to $3.50; havildar, $7; jemandar, $17.50; subadar,
$33.50 to $50. European officers with native regiments: commandant,
$620; wing-officers, $302 to $322; adjutant, $237.86; quartermaster,
$187.86; medical officers, $300, monthly. The annual pay-roll of a
native regiment of 720 combatants and 45 non-combatants amounts to
about $69,114. In consideration of the pay each sepoy is required to
provide his rations and clothing, except one coat and one pair of
trousers issued by the Government every two years; in consequence,
each regiment is accompanied by a native village called a bazaar,
containing tradesmen of all kinds; this bazaar is under strict
discipline and is managed by the quartermaster. The entire outfit
follows the regiment into the field.

Colonel Gordon of the Indian army testifies: "With regard to native
troops under a cannonade I may say that I saw our native infantry
twice under the fire of the Afghan mountain guns, and they behaved
very steadily and coolly. Ammunition was economically expended. I
attributed much the small loss sustained by the troops in
Afghanistan to our excellent straight shooting."

The cavalry of India has in certain instances borne an excellent
reputation for efficiency in action, is well set up, and in its
instruction and discipline is modelled after the British system. The
artillery comprises well-instructed native organizations, but its
principal experience has been with light field guns against
irregular troops. The Achilles heel of the Indian army consists in
this, that there are but eight European officers to each regiment,
and of these but six would be available to lead in battle: the
quartermaster and surgeon being at such a time otherwise engaged.
The native officers, seldom having an opportunity to command in
Peace, would be unreliable leaders in such an emergency. At the
action of Ali Musjid, November 21, 1878, the day before the
occupation of that fort, six British officers of a native battalion
were placed _hors de combat_, so that on the first day after
crossing the Afghan frontier there was but one European officer to
manage the regiment.

Besides the regular establishment there are about 10,000 European
volunteers (including 4,000 railway officials and employes)
available for local defence.

The feudatory chiefs of India enjoy an aggregate revenue of some
L15,000,000, equal to more than one third of the income of the
British Government of India. They maintain forces aggregating
350,000 men with 4,000 guns to perform the duties of court
ceremonial, garrison, military police, guards, and escorts,
throughout territories aggregating nearly 600,000 square miles with
50,000,000 of inhabitants. These forces are unreservedly held at the
disposal of the Crown by the native Princes.

_Transport and Supply_.--This essential feature of all wars will be
briefly considered in the light of the Anglo-Afghan War of 1879-80.
Large quantities of supplies were transported from the main base of
operations on the Indus, and distributed to the troops in the field
over four or five distinct lines of communication, and over roads,
and mountain paths of varied degrees of ruggedness. The country on
both sides of the Indo-Afghan frontier was severely taxed to furnish
the necessary animals. Part of the transport was hired--and as in
the case of the Brahuis camels--with the services of the owners, who
were easily offended and likely to decamp with their property in a
night. During the first year the system was under the direct control
of the commissariat department; but as this proved unsatisfactory,
in the subsequent campaign it was entirely reorganized and
superintended by an officer of engineers, with a large number of
officers from the Line to assist. This gave better satisfaction.
Immense numbers of camels died from heat, [Footnote: Of a train of
eighteen hundred unloaded camels on the road from Dadur to
Jacobabad, for six days in June, six hundred died of exhaustion. In
March, 1855 Col. Green, C.B., lost one hundred and seventeen horses
out of four hundred, from the heat, during a march of thirty miles.]
overwork, irregular food, and neglect. Owing to the dryness of the
climate and intense heat of the summer the bullock-carts were
perpetually falling to pieces. The mules, donkeys, and ponies gave
the best results, but do not abound in sufficient quantities to
enable an army in Afghanistan to dispense with camels. A successful
experiment in rafting, from Jelalabad to Dakka, was tried. The rafts
consisted of inflated skins lashed together with a light framework;
between June 4-13, seven thousand skins were used, and, in all, 885
soldiers and one thousand tons of stores were transported forty
miles down the Kabul River, the journey taking five hours. A great
deal of road-making and repairing was done under the supervision of
the transport corps. A system of "stages" or relays of pack-animals
or carts was organized, by which a regular quantity of supplies was
forwarded over the main lines, daily, with almost the regularity, if
not the speed, of rail carriage. The great number of animals
employed required a corresponding force of attendants, inspectors,
and native doctors, all of whom served to make up that excessive
army of "followers" for which Anglo-Indian expeditions are famous.
Drivers were required at the following rate: one driver for each
pair of bullocks, every four camels, every three mules and ponies,
every six donkeys. [Footnote: The average carrying power of certain
kinds of transport, in pounds, is as follows: _bullock-carts_ (with
two pairs), on fairly level ground, 1,400; on hilly ground, 1,000;
(with one pair) on fairly level ground, 850; on hilly ground, 650;
_camels_, 400; _mules_, 200; _ponies_, 175; _men_, 50.]


[Illustration: Khelat-i-Ghilzi, between Kandahar and Ghazni.]


The great obstacle to the satisfactory operation of the transport
system was its novelty and experimental character, and that its
organization had to be combined with its execution. Besides which,
cholera broke out in June and swept away three hundred employes.
Grazing camps were established in the neighborhood of the Bolan Pass
for the bullocks, and aqueducts built for the conveyance of a water
supply; one of these was of masonry, more than a mile in length,
from Dozan down to the Bolan. It has been stated that grazing was
scarce in the region of the Bolan: in 1879 more than four thousand
bullocks were grazed there during the summer, and large quantities
of forage were cut for winter use.

Any prolonged military operations in Afghanistan must, to a certain
extent, utilize hired transport, although there are many objections
urged.

Sir Richard Temple said (1879): "That the amount of transport
required for active service, such as the late campaign in
Afghanistan, is so great that to hire transport is synonymous to
pressing it from the people of the district from which it is hired,
and impressment of the means of transport must lead to impressment
of drivers, who naturally (having no interest whatever in the
campaign in which they are called upon to serve) render the most
unwilling service and take the earliest opportunity of rendering
their animals unserviceable in hopes of escaping a distasteful duty.
This service is frequently so unpopular that, sooner than leave the
boundaries of their native country, the impressed drivers desert,
leaving their animals in the hands of the transport authorities or
take them away with them. . . . For the above reasons I should
recommend that all transport for a campaign should be the property
of Government."

In commenting on this subject, Lord Wolseley relates that when
serving in China with Indian troops he "awoke one morning and found
that all our drivers had bolted. Our transport consisted of carts
supplied by the Chinese Government, by contractors, and by the
country generally. I do not think that the carts had been carried
away, but all the mules and men had disappeared except three drivers
who belonged to me. I was very much astonished that these men had
not bolted also. I had a small detachment of cavalry with me and a
very excellent duffadar in charge of it. I asked him how he had
managed to keep these drivers--having some time before said that
unless he looked after them well he would never get to Pekin. He
replied, with some hesitation: 'I remember what you told me, and the
fact is I tied the tails of those three men together, overnight, and
then tied them to the tent pole, and put a man over them.'"

The Elephant, like the stage coach, finds his field of usefulness,
as a means of transport, growing smaller by degrees. He is still a
feature in India, and has been used for military purposes to some
extent in the eastern part of Afghanistan. He will doubtless form
part of the means of transportation employed by the British forces
near their present base, and in rear of the Kabul-Kandahar line, and
for that reason is noticed here. [Footnote: The use of elephants in
transporting field guns in Afghanistan is emphatically discouraged
by those who served with it last; very few flankers were employed to
protect the Elephant artillery used in the Kuram valley, and its
success can only be interpreted by supposing the direct
interposition of Providence or the grossest stupidity to our feeble
enemy.]

The Superintendent of the Government Elephant Kheddahs at Dakka has
given us, in a recent paper, much information concerning the
elephant in freedom and captivity. He does not claim a high order of
intelligence, but rather of extraordinary obedience and docility for
this animal Very large elephants are exceptional. Twice round the
forefoot gives the height at the shoulder; few females attain the
height of eight feet; "tuskers," or male elephants, vary from eight
to nine feet; the Maharajah of Nahur, Sirmoor, possesses one
standing ten feet five and one half inches. The age varies from 80
to 150 years, according to the best authorities, and it is recorded
that those familiar with the haunts of the wild elephant have never
found the bones of an elephant that had died a natural death. In
freedom they roam in herds of thirty to fifty, always led by a
female; mature about twenty-five. In India the males only have
tusks; in Ceylon only the females. They are fond of the water, swim
well, [Footnote: Elephants have been known to swim a river three
hundred yards wide with the hind legs tied together.] but can
neither trot nor gallop; their only pace is a walk, which may be
Increased to a _shuffle_ of fifteen miles an hour for a very short
distance; they cannot leap, and a ditch eight by eight feet would be
impassable.


[Illustration: Elephant with Artillery; on the Road to Ali Musjid.]


In Bengal and Southern India elephants particularly abound, and seem
to be increasing in numbers. In the Billigurungan Hills, a range of
three hundred square miles on the borders of Mysore, they made their
appearance about eighty years ago; yet prior to that time this
region was under high cultivation, traces of orchards, orange
groves, and iron-smelting furnaces remaining in what is now a
howling wilderness. Elephants are caught in stockades or kraals. The
Government employs hunting parties of 350 natives trained to the
work, and more than 100 animals are sometimes secured in a single
drive.

New elephants are trained by first rubbing them down with bamboo
rods, and shouting at them, and by tying them with ropes; they are
taught to kneel by taking them into streams about five feet deep,
when the sun is hot, and prodding them on the back with sharp
sticks.

The total number of elephants maintained is eight hundred, of which
one half are used for military purposes. They consume about 400
pounds of green, or 250 pounds of dry fodder daily, and are also
given unhusked rice. An elephant is expected to carry about 1,200
pounds with ease. In the Abyssinian Expedition elephants travelled
many hundreds of miles, carrying from 1,500 to 1,800 pounds
(including their gear), but out of forty-four, five died from
exhaustion; they are capable of working from morning to night, or of
remaining under their loads for twenty hours at a stretch.
[Footnote: There is no "elephant gun-drill" laid down in the
Imperial Regulations, but when the gun goes into action the elephant
is made to kneel, and long "skids" are placed against the cradle
upon which the gun rests, so as to form an inclined plane to the
ground. The gun is then lifted off the cradle and down the skids by
levers and tackle.]

An elephant's gear consists of a _gaddela_, or quilted cloth, 1-1/2
inches thick, reaching half-way down his sides and from the neck to
the croup. On this is placed the _guddu_, or pad, 6x5 feet and 9
inches thick, formed of stout sacking stuffed with dried grass. The
whole is girthed with a long rope passed twice around the body,
round the neck as a breast-strap, and under the tail as a crupper.
The whole weighs 200 pounds. An improvement upon this has been made
by our authority (Mr. Sanderson), which seems to bear the same
relation to the old gear that the open McClellan saddle does to the
ordinary British hunting saddle. It consists (see illustration) of
two pads entirely detached, each 4 feet long, 15 inches wide, and 6
inches thick, made of blanket covered with tarpaulin, and encased in
stout sacking. One is placed on each side of the elephant's spine,
and retained there by two iron arches. There is no saddle-cloth, the
load rests on the ribs; the breast-strap and crupper hook into rings
on the saddle; there are rings to fasten the load to; it weighs 140
pounds. With foot-boards it is convenient for riding; a cradle can
also be attached for carrying field guns. Recent experiments have
shown the practicability of conveying elephants by rail in ordinary
open cattle-trucks; they were indifferent to the motion, noises, or
bridges; it is said that 32 elephants could be thus carried on one
train.


[Illustration: Detail of Elephant Saddle.]


The excellent railway facilities for moving troops and supplies to
the Indo-Afghan frontier were described in 1880, by Traffic Manager
Ross, of the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi Railway, before the United
Service Institution of India.

He stated that experiments had been made by the military and railway
authorities in loading and disembarking troops and war _materiel_,
and that much experience had been afforded by the Afghan operations
of 1878-9.

The movement of troops to and from the frontier commenced in
October, 1878, and ended June, 1879. During that period were
conveyed over his road 190,000 men, 33,000 animals, 500 guns,
112,000,000 pounds of military stores. The maximum number carried in
any one month was in November--40,000 men, 8,000 animals, and
20,800,000 pounds of stores. The greatest number of special trains
run in one day was eight, carrying 4,100 men, 300 animals, and
800,000 pounds of stores. As an instance of rapid loading, when the
both Bengal Cavalry left for Malta, 80 horses were loaded on a train
in 10 minutes appears to have been clean forgotten. The Politicals
were by no means silent, and the amount of knowledge they possessed
of border statistics was something marvellous. Did any step appear
to the military sense advisable, there was a much better, though
less comprehensible, _political_ reason why it should not be
undertaken. The oracle has spoken and the behest must be obeyed. An
enemy in sight who became afterwards hostile, must not be kept at a
distance; through political glasses they appear as 'children of
nature,' while the country out of sight must not be explored, the
susceptibilities of the sensitive 'Tammizais' having to be
respected. That much valuable service was performed by political
officers there can be no doubt, but that they caused great
exasperation among soldiers cannot be denied, and the example of the
War of 1839-40 causes them to be looked upon as a very possible
source of danger.

_Anglo-Afghan Operations_.--The observations of a participant
[Footnote: Lieut. Martin, R. E. (_Journal U. S. I. of India_).]
in the last British campaign in Afghanistan will be found of value
in the study of future operations in that country. Of the Afghan
tactics he says: "The enemy (generally speaking, a race of
Highlanders) vastly preferred the attack, and usually obtained the
advantage of superior numbers before risking an attack; . . . being
able to dispense (for the time) with lines of communication and
baggage and commissariat columns, the Afghan tribes were often able
to raise large gatherings on chosen ground. They could always attack
us; we were rarely able (except when they chose) to find them at
home." This observer says the regular troops of the Ameer were
not so formidable as the tribal gatherings. The presence of a
tactically immovable artillery hinders the action of an Asiatic
army. The mounted men are usually the first to leave when the
fight is going against their side in a general engagement. One of
the best specimens of their tactics was at Ahmed-Kheyl, on the
Ghazni-Kandahar road, when the British division was one hundred
miles from any support. The Afghans assembled a force outnumbering
the British ten to one. The attack was made in a series of rushes,
twice dispersing the British cavalry, and once driving back the
infantry. Exposed to a constant fire of field guns, the Afghans
stood their ground, although poorly armed with a variety of obsolete
weapons--from an Enfield to a handjar or a stick. Trouble may
always be expected from the night attacks of certain tribes like the
Alizais and Waziris.

The English infantry formation was an objectionably close one, and
Lieut. Martin says that the bayonets and rifle-barrels of the front
rank were sometimes struck and jammed _by bullets from the rear
rank_. The action of the English cavalry, as at Ahmed-Kheyl, was
suicidal in receiving the enemy's charge--practically at a halt.
Occasionally shelter trenches were used, but disapproved.

In the Kuram valley column, under General Roberts, the cavalry
(principally native, with one regular squadron and a battery of
horse artillery) formed a brigade, but was never used independently,
nor was it instructed (although well equipped) for modern cavalry
work. The opposition to dismounted cavalry duty is still so great,
in the British army, that the mounted arm is paralyzed for effective
service.

Very little was done by the horse artillery with the Kuram column.
In the case of the field artillery it was found necessary on two
occasions to transfer the ammunition boxes from the bullock-carts to
the backs of elephants, on account of the steepness of the hills.
The mountain artillery (native) was the most serviceable; a Gatling
battery, packed on ponies, and in charge of a detachment of
Highlanders, was never used however.

The armament of the infantry included both Martini and Snider
rifles, requiring two kinds of ammunition, but, as the service by
pack-mules was ample, no confusion ensued, although Lieut. Martin
says: "In one case I heard a whisper that a regimental reserve of
ammunition was found to be _blank cartridges_, but this must be
a heavy joke." Intrenching tools were carried on camels. A mixture
of military and civil-engineer administration and operation
is mentioned as unsatisfactory in results. There was great
difficulty in getting tools and materials at the opening of the
campaign--particularly those required for road and bridge work,
although a railroad within two hundred miles had a large stock on
hand.


[Illustration: Noah's Valley, Kunar River.]


The art of camping and rough fortification was well practised. The
best defended camp was surrounded by bush abatis and flanked
by half-moon _sungas_ of boulder-stone work, which held the
sentries. The most approved permanent camps or "posts" were mud
_serais_ flanked by bastions at the alternate angles and overlooking
a yard or "kraal." These were established about ten miles apart, to
protect communications, and furnished frequent patrols. During the
latter part of the campaign these outposts were manned by the native
contingents of the Punjab who volunteered.

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