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The Naval War of 1812

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Nothing remained to be done, and at 6.20 the _Essex_ surrendered
and was taken possession of. The _Phoebe_ had lost 4 men killed,
including her first lieutenant, William Ingram, and 7 wounded; the
_Cherub_, 1 killed, and 3, including Captain Tucker, wounded. Total,
5 killed and 10 wounded. [Footnote: James says that most of the loss
was occasioned by the first three broadsides of the _Essex_; this
is not surprising, as in all she hardly fired half a dozen, and the
last were discharged when half of the guns had been disabled, and
there were scarcely men enough to man the remainder. Most of the
time her resistance was limited to firing such of her six long guns
as would bear.] The difference in loss was natural, as, owing to
their having long guns and the choice of position, the British had
been able to fire ten shot to the Americans' one.

The conduct of the two English captains in attacking Porter as soon
as he was disabled, in neutral waters, while they had been very careful
to abstain from breaking the neutrality while he was in good condition,
does not look well; at the best it shows that Hilyar had only been
withheld hitherto from the attack by timidity, and it looks all the
worse when it is remembered that Hilyar owed his ship's previous
escape entirely to Porter's forbearance on a former occasion when
the British frigate was entirely at his mercy, and that the British
captain had afterward expressly said that he would not break the
neutrality. Still, the British in this war did not act very differently
from the way we ourselves did on one or two occasions in the Civil
War,--witness the capture of the _Florida_. And after the battle
was once begun the sneers which most of our historians, as well as
the participators in the fight, have showered upon the British
captains for not foregoing the advantages which their entire masts
and better artillery gave them by coming to close quarters, are
decidedly foolish. Hilyar's conduct during the battle, as well as
his treatment of the prisoners afterward, was perfect, and as a minor
matter it may be mentioned that his official letter is singularly
just and fair-minded. Says Lord Howard Douglass: [Footnote: "Naval
Gunnery," p. 149.] "The action displayed all that can reflect honor
on the science and admirable conduct of Captain Hilyar and his crew,
which, without the assistance of the _Cherub_, would have insured
the same termination. Captain Porter's sneers at the respectful
distance the _Phoebe_ kept are in fact acknowledgments of the ability
with which Captain Hilyar availed himself of the superiority of his
arms; it was a brilliant affair." While endorsing this criticism,
it may be worth while to compare it with some of the author's comments
upon the other actions, as that between Decatur and the _Macedonian_.
To make the odds here as great against Garden as they were against
Porter, it would be necessary to suppose that the _Macedonian_ had
lost her main-top-mast, had but six long 18's to oppose to her
antagonist's 24's, and that the latter was assisted by the corvette
_Adams_; so that as a matter of fact Porter fought at fully double
or treble the disadvantage Garden did, and, instead of surrendering
when he had lost a third of his crew, fought till three fifths of
his men were dead or wounded, and, moreover, inflicted greater loss
and damage on his antagonists than Garden did. If, then, as Lord
Douglass says, the defence of the _Macedonian_ brilliantly upheld
the character of the British navy for courage, how much more did
that of the _Essex_ show for the American navy; and if Hilyar's
conduct was "brilliant," that of Decatur was more so.

This was an action in which it is difficult to tell exactly how to
award praise. Captain Hilyar deserves it, for the coolness and skill
with which he made his approaches and took his positions so as to
destroy his adversary with least loss to himself, and also for the
precision of his fire. The Cherub's behavior was more remarkable
for extreme caution than for any thing else. As regards the mere
fight, Porter certainly did every thing a man could do to contend
successfully with the overwhelming force opposed to him, and the
few guns that were available were served with the utmost precision.
As an exhibition of dogged courage it has never been surpassed since
the time when the Dutch captain, Klaesoon, after fighting two long
days, blew up his disabled ship, devoting himself and all his crew
to death, rather than surrender to the hereditary foes of his race,
and was bitterly avenged afterward by the grim "sea-beggars" of
Holland; the days when Drake singed the beard of the Catholic king,
and the small English craft were the dread and scourge of the great
floating castles of Spain. Any man reading Farragut's account is
forcibly reminded of some of the deeds of "derring do" in that, the
heroic age of the Teutonic navies. Captain Hilyar in his letter says:
"The defence of the _Essex_, taking into consideration our superiority
of force and the very discouraging circumstances of her having lost
her main-top-mast and being twice on fire, did honor to her brave
defenders, and most fully evinced the courage of Captain Porter and
those under his command. Her colors were not struck until the loss
in killed and wounded was so awfully great and her shattered condition
so seriously bad as to render all further resistance unavailing."
[Footnote: James (p. 419) says: "The _Essex_, as far as is borne
out by proof (the only safe way where an American is concerned),
had 24 men killed and 45 wounded. But Capt. Porter, thinking by
exaggerating his loss to prop up his fame, talks of 58 killed and
mortally wounded, 39 severely, 27 slightly," etc., etc. This would
be no more worthy of notice than any other of his falsifications,
were it not followed by various British writers. Hilyar states that
he has 161 prisoners, has found 23 dead, that 3 wounded were taken
off, between 20 and 30 reached the shore, and that the "remainder
are either killed or wounded." It is by wilfully preserving silence
about this last sentence that James makes out his case. It will be
observed that Hilyar enumerates 161 + 23 + 3 + 25 (say) or 212, and
says the remainder were either killed or wounded; Porter having 255
men at first, this remainder was 43. Hilyar stating that of his 161
prisoners, 42 were wounded, his account thus gives the Americans 111
killed and wounded. James' silence about Hilyat's last sentence
enables him to make the loss but 69, and his wilful omission is quite
on a par with the other meannesses and falsehoods which utterly
destroy the reliability of his work. By Hilyar's own letter it is
thus seen that Porter's loss in killed and wounded was certainly 111,
perhaps 116, or if Porter had, as James says, 265 men, 126. There
still remain some discrepancies between the official accounts, which
can be compared in tabular form:

Hilyar. Porter.
Prisoners unwounded. 119 75 prisoners unwounded.
" wounded. 42 27 " slightly wounded,
Taken away wounded. 3 39 " severely "
Those who reached shore. 25 58 killed.
Remainder killed or wounded. 43 31 missing.
Killed. 23 25 reached shore.
------ -----
255 255

The explanation probably is that Hilyar's "42 wounded" do not include
Porter's "27 slightly wounded," and that his "161 prisoners" include
Porter's "25 who reached shore," and his "25 who reached shore" comes
under Porter's "31 missing." This would make the accounts nearly
tally. At any rate in Porter's book are to be found the names of
all his killed, wounded, and missing; and their relatives received
pensions from the American government, which, if the returns were
false, would certainly have been a most elaborate piece of deception.
It is far more likely that Hilyar was mistaken; or he may have
counted in the _Essex Junior's_ crew, which would entirely account
for the discrepancies. In any event it must be remembered that he
makes the American killed and wounded 111 (Porter, 124), and _not_
69, as James says. The latter's statement is wilfully false, as he
had seen Hilyar's letter.] He also bears very candid testimony to
the defence of the _Essex_ having been effective enough to at one
time render the result doubtful, saying: "Our first attack * * *
produced no visible effect. Our second * * * was not more successful;
and having lost the use of our main-sail, jib, and main-stay,
appearances looked a little inauspicious." Throughout the war no
ship was so desperately defended as the _Essex_, taking into account
the frightful odds against which she fought, which always enhances
the merit of a defence. The _Lawrence_, which suffered even more,
was backed by a fleet; the _Frolic_ was overcome by an equal foe;
and the _Reindeer_ fought at far less of a disadvantage, and suffered
less. None of the frigates, British or American, were defended with
any thing like the resolution she displayed.

But it is perhaps permissible to inquire whether Porter's course,
after the accident to his top-mast occurred, was altogether the best
that could have been taken. On such a question no opinion could have
been better than Farragut's, although of course his judgment was
_ex post facto_, as he was very young at the time of the fight.

"In the first place, I consider our original and greatest error was
in attempting to regain the anchorage; being greatly superior in
sailing powers we should have borne up and run before the wind.
If we had come in contact with the _Phoebe_ we should have carried
her by boarding; if she avoided us, as she might have done by her
greater ability to manoeuvre, then we should have taken her fire
and passed on, leaving both vessels behind until we had replaced
our top-mast, by which time they would have been separated, as unless
they did so it would have been no chase, the _Cherub_ being a dull
sailer.

"Secondly, when it was apparent to everybody that we had no chance
of success under the circumstances, the ship should have been run
ashore, throwing her broadside to the beach to prevent raking, and
fought as long as was consistent with humanity, and then set on fire.
But having determined upon anchoring we should have bent a spring
on to the ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable, where it was
exposed, and could be shot away as fast as put on."

But it must be remembered that when Porter decided to anchor near
shore, in neutral water, he could not anticipate Hilyar's deliberate
and treacherous breach of faith. I do not allude to the mere disregard
of neutrality. Whatever international moralists may say, such
disregard is a mere question of expediency. If the benefits to be
gained by attacking a hostile ship in neutral waters are such as to
counterbalance the risk of incurring the enmity of the neutral
power, why then the attack ought to be made. Had Hilyar, when he
first made his appearance off Valparaiso, sailed in with his two
ships, the men at quarters and guns out, and at once attacked
Porter, considering the destruction of the _Essex_ as outweighing
the insult to Chili, why his behavior would have been perfectly
justifiable. In fact this is unquestionably what he intended to do,
but he suddenly found himself in such a position, that in the even
of hostilities, _his_ ship would be the captured one, and he owed
his escape purely to Porter's over-forbearance, under great provocation
Then he gave his word to Potter that he would not infringe on the
neutrality; and he never dared to break it, until he saw Porter was
disabled and almost helpless! This may seem strong language to use
about a British officer, but it is justly strong. Exactly as any
outsider must consider Warrington's attack on the British brig
_Nautilus_ in 1815, as a piece of needless cruelty; so any outsider
must consider Hilyar as having most treacherously broken faith with
Porter.

After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly and courteously to the
prisoners; and, as already said, he fought his ship most ably, for
it would have been quixotic to a degree to forego his advantages.
But previous to the battle his conduct had been over-cautious. It
was to be expected that the _Essex_ would make her escape as soon
as practicable, and so he should have used every effort to bring
her to action. Instead of this he always declined the fight when
alone; and he owed his ultimate success to the fact that the _Essex_
instead of escaping, as she could several times have done, stayed,
hoping to bring the _Phoebe_ to action single-handed. It must be
remembered that the _Essex_ was almost as weak compared to the
_Phoebe_, as the _Cherub_ was compared to the _Essex_. The latter
was just about midway between the British ships, as may be seen by
the following comparison. In the action the _Essex_ fought all six
of her long 12's, and the _Cherub_ both her long 9's, instead of
the corresponding broadside carronades which the ships regularly
used. This gives the _Essex_ a better armament than she would have
had fighting her guns as they were regularly used; but it can be
seen how great the inequality still was. It must also be kept in
mind, that while in the battles between the American 44's and
British 38's, the short weight 24-pounders of the former had in
reality no greater range or accuracy than the full weight 18's of
their opponents, in this case the _Phoebe's_ full weight 18's had
a very much greater range and accuracy than the short weight 12's
of the _Essex_.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Men. Broadside Guns. Weight. Total.

_Phoebe_, 320 13 long 18's 234 lbs.
1 " 12 12 "
1 " 9 9 " (255)
7 short 32's 224 "
1 " 18 18 " (242)
__________ _____
23 guns. 497 lbs.

_Cherub_, 180 2 long 9's 18 lbs. (18)
2 short 18's 36 "
9 " 32's 288 " (342)
___________ ______
13 guns. 342 lbs.
______________________________ ______ _____
500 men. 36 guns. 839 lbs. metal.
-+- 273 long. -+-
'- 566 short. -'

_Essex_, 255 6 long 12's 66 lbs. -+- Taking 7 per
17 short 32's 504 " | cent off
| for short
'- weight.
____________ _____________ ________ _______________
255 men, 32 guns, 570 lbs.

All accounts agree as to the armament of the _Essex_. I have taken
that of the _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ from James; but Captain Porter's
official letter, and all the other American accounts make the
_Phoebe's_ broadside 15 long 18's and 8 short 32's, and give the
_Cherub_, in all, 18 short 32's, 8 short 24's, and two long nines.
This would make their broadside 904 lbs., 288 long, 616 short. I
would have no doubt that the American accounts were right if the
question rested solely on James' veracity; but he probably took his
figures from official sources. At any rate, remembering the difference
between long guns and carronades, it appears that the _Essex_ was
really nearly intermediate in force between the _Phoebe_ and the
_Cherub_. The battle being fought, with a very trifling exception,
at long range, it was in reality a conflict between a crippled ship
throwing a broadside of 66 lbs. of metal, and two ships throwing
273 lbs., who by their ability to manoeuvre could choose positions
where they could act with full effect, while their antagonist could
not return a shot. Contemporary history does not afford a single
instance of so determined a defence against such frightful odds.

The official letters of Captains Hilyar and Porter agree substantially
in all respects; the details of the fight, as seen in the _Essex_,
are found in the "Life of Farragut." But although the British captain
does full justice to his foe, British historians have universally
tried to belittle Porter's conduct. It is much to be regretted that
we have no British account worth paying attention to of the proceedings
before the fight, when the _Phoebe_ declined single combat with the
_Essex_. James, of course, states that the _Phoebe_ did not decline
it, but he gives no authority, and his unsupported assertion would
be valueless even if uncontradicted. His account of the action is
grossly inaccurate as he has inexcusably garbled Hilyar's report.
One instance of this I have already mentioned, as regards Hilyar's
account of Porter's loss. Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the
_Essex_ was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly denies this,
thereby impliedly accusing the British captain of falsehood. There
is really no need of the corroboration of Porter's letter, but he
has it most fully in the "Life of Farragut," p. 37: "The men came
rushing up from below, many with their clothes burning, which were
torn from them as quickly as possible, and those for whom this could
not be done were told to jump overboard and quench the flames. * * *
One man swam to shore with scarcely a square inch of his body which
had not been burned, and, although he was deranged for some days,
he ultimately recovered, and afterward served with me in the West
Indies." The third unfounded statement in James' account is that
buckets of spirits were found in all parts of the main deck of the
_Essex_, and that most of the prisoners were drunk. No authority
is cited for this, and there is not a shadow of truth in it. He ends
by stating that "few even in his own country will venture to speak
well of Captain David Porter." After these various paragraphs we
are certainly justified in rejecting James' account _in toto_. An
occasional mistake is perfectly excusable, and gross ignorance of
a good many facts does not invalidate a man's testimony with regard
to some others with which he is acquainted; but a wilful and systematic
perversion of the truth in a number of cases throws a very strong
doubt on a historian's remaining statements, unless they are supported
by unquestionable authority.

But if British historians have generally given Porter much less than
his due, by omitting all reference to the inferiority of his guns,
his lost top-mast, etc., it is no worse than Americans have done in
similar cases. The latter, for example, will make great allowances
in the case of the _Essex_ for her having carronades only, but utterly
fail to allude to the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ as having suffered under
the same disadvantage. They should remember that the rules cut both ways.

The _Essex_ having suffered chiefly above the waterline, she was
repaired sufficiently in Valparaiso to enable her to make the voyage
to England, where she was added to the British navy. The _Essex Junior_
was disarmed and the American prisoners embarked in her for New York,
on parole. But Lieutenant McKnight, Chaplain Adams, Midshipman Lyman,
and 11 seamen were exchanged on the spot for some of the British
prisoners on board the _Essex Junior_. McKnight and Lyman accompanied
the _Phoebe_ to Rio Janeiro, where they embarked on a Swedish vessel,
were taken out of her by the _Wasp_, Captain Blakely, and were lost
with the rest of the crew of that vessel. The others reached New
York in safety. Of the prizes made by the _Essex_, some were burnt
or sunk by the Americans, and some retaken by the British. And so,
after nearly two years' uninterrupted success, the career of the
_Essex_ terminated amid disasters of all kinds. But at least her
officers and crew could reflect that they had afforded an example
of courage in adversity that it would be difficult to match elsewhere.

The first of the new heavy sloops of war that got to sea was the
_Frolic_, Master Commandant Joseph Bainbridge, which put out early
in February. Shortly afterward she encountered a large Carthagenian
privateer, which refused to surrender and was sunk by a broadside,
nearly a hundred of her crew being drowned. Before daylight on the
20th of April, lat. 24° 12' N., long. 81° 25' W., she fell in with
the British 36-gun frigate _Orpheus_, Capt. Pigot, and the 12-gun
schooner _Shelburne_, Lieut. Hope, both to leeward. The schooner
soon weathered the _Frolic_, but of course was afraid to close, and
the American sloop continued beating to windward, in the effort to
escape, for nearly 13 hours; the water was started, the anchors cut
away, and finally the guns thrown overboard--a measure by means of
which both the _Hornet_, the _Rattlesnake_, and the _Adams_ succeeded
in escaping under similar circumstances,--but all was of no avail,
and she was finally captured. The court of inquiry honorably acquitted
both officers and crew. As was to be expected James considers the
surrender a disgraceful one, because the guns were thrown overboard.
As I have said, this was a measure which had proved successful in
several cases of a like nature; the criticism is a piece of petty
meanness. Fortunately we have Admiral Codrington's dictum on the
surrender ("Memoirs," vol. 1, p. 310), which he evidently considered
as perfectly honorable.

[Illustration: Master Commandant Lewis Warrington: a contemporary
portrait by Rembrandt Peale. (Courtesy Naval Historical Foundation)]

A sister ship to the _Frolic_, the _Peacock_, Capt. Lewis Warrington,
sailed from New York on March 12th, and cruised southward; on the
28th of April, at seven in the morning, lat. 17° 47' N., long. 80°
7' W., several sail were made to windward. [Footnote: Official letter
of Capt. Warrington, April 29. 1814.] These were a small convoy of
merchant-men, bound for the Bermudas, under the protection of the
18-gun brig-sloop _Epervier_, Capt. Wales, 5 days out of Havana,
and with $118,000 in specie on board. [Footnote: James, vi, 424.]
The _Epervier_ when discovered was steering north by east, the wind
being from the eastward; soon afterward the wind veered gradually
round to the southward, and the _Epervier_ hauled up close on the
port tack, while the convoy made all sail away, and the _Peacock_
came down with the wind on her starboard quarter. At 10 A.M. the
vessels were within gun-shot, and the _Peacock_ edged away to get
in a raking broadside, but the _Epervier_ frustrated this by putting
her helm up until close on her adversary's bow, when she rounded to
and fired her starboard guns, receiving in return the starboard
broadside of the _Peacock_ at 10.20 A.M. These first broadsides took
effect aloft, the brig being partially dismantled, while the
_Peacock's_ fore-yard was totally disabled by two round shot in the
starboard quarter, which deprived the ship of the use of her fore-sail
and fore-top-sail, and compelled her to run large. However, the
_Epervier_ eased away [Footnote: According to some accounts she at
this time tacked.] when abaft her foe's beam, and ran off alongside
of her (using her port guns, while the American still had the
starboard battery engaged) at 10.35. The _Peacock's_ fire was now
very hot, and directed chiefly at her adversary's hull, on which
it told heavily, while she did not suffer at all in return. The
_Epervier_ coming up into the wind, owing somewhat to the loss of
head-sail, Capt. Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, but they
refused, saying "she's too heavy for us," [Footnote: James, "Naval
Occurrences," p. 243.] and then, at 11.05 the colors were hauled down.

[Illustration of the action between _PEACOCK_ and _EPERVIER_ between
10.10 and 11.05.]

Except the injury to her fore-yard, the _Peacock's_ damages were
confined to the loss of a few top-mast and top-gallant backstays,
and some shot-holes through her sails. Of her crew, consisting, all
told, of 166 men and boys, [Footnote: "Niles' Register," vi. 196,
says only 160; the above is taken from Warrington's letter of June
1st, preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives.
The crew contained about 10 boys, was not composed of picked men,
and did not number 185--_vide_ James.] only two were wounded, both
slightly. The _Epervier_, on the other hand, had 45 shot-holes in
her hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, main-top-mast over the side,
main-mast nearly in two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit wounded
severely, and most of the fore-rigging and stays shot away; and of
her crew of 128 men (according to the list of prisoners given by
Captain Warrington; James says 118, but he is not backed up by any
official report) 9 were killed and mortally wounded, and 14 severely
and slightly wounded. Instead of two long sixes for bow-chasers,
and a shifting carronade, she had two 18-pound carronades (according
to the American prize-lists; [Footnote: American State Papers, vol.
xiv, p. 427.] Capt. Warrington says 32's). Otherwise she was armed
as usual. She was, like the rest of her kind, very "tubby," being
as broad as the _Peacock_, though 10 feet shorter on deck. Allowing,
as usual, 7 per cent, for short weight of the American shot, we get the

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