A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P R S T U V W X Z

The Naval War of 1812

T >> Theodore Roosevelt >> The Naval War of 1812




MACDONOUGH'S FORCE.

Metal, from long
Name. Tons. Crew. Broadside. or short guns.

_Saratoga_, 734 240 414 lbs. -+- long, 96
'- short, 318
_Eagle_, 500 150 264 " -+- long, 72
'- short, 192
_Ticonderoga_, 350 112 180 " -+- long, 84
'- short, 96
_Preble_, 80 30 36 " long, 36

Six gun-boats, 420 246 252 " -+- long, 144
'- short, 108
Four gun-boats, 160 104 48 " long, 48

In all, 14 vessels of 2,244 tons and 882 men, with 86 guns throwing
at a broadside 1,194 lbs. of shot, 480 from long, and 714 from short guns.

[Illustration: Commodore Thomas Macdonough: a contemporary
portrait by Gilbert Stuart. (Courtesy National Gallery of
Art, Mellon Collection)]

The force of the British squadron in guns and ships is known accurately,
as most of it was captured. The _Confiance_ rated for years in our
lists as a frigate of the class of the _Constellation_, _Congress_,
and _Macedonian_; she was thus of over 1,200 tons. (Cooper says more,
"nearly double the tonnage of the _Saratoga._") She carried on her
main-deck thirty long 24's, fifteen in each broadside. She did not
have a complete spar-deck; on her poop, which came forward to the
mizzen-mast, were two 32-pound (or possibly 42-pound) carronades
and on her spacious top-gallant forecastle were four 32--(or 42-)
pound carronades, and a long 24 on a pivot. [Footnote: This is her
armament as given by Cooper, on the authority of Lieutenant E. A.
F. Lavallette. who was in charge of her for three months, and went
aboard her ten minutes after the _Linnet_ struck.] She had aboard her
a furnace for heating shot; eight or ten of which heated shot were
found with the furnace. [Footnote: James stigmatizes the statement
of Commodore Macdonough about the furnace as "as gross a falsehood
as ever was uttered"; but he gives no authority for the denial, and
it appears to have been merely an ebullition of spleen on his part.
Every American officer who went aboard the _Confiance_ saw the furnace
and the hot shot.] This was, of course, a perfectly legitimate advantage.
The _Linnet_, Captain Daniel Pring, was a brig of the same size as
the _Ticonderoga_, mounting 16 long 12's. The _Chubb_ and _Finch_,
Lieutenants James McGhie and William Hicks, were formerly the
American sloops _Growler_ and _Eagle_, of 112 and 110 tons respectively.
The former mounted ten 18-pound carronades and one long 6; the latter,
six 18-pound carronades, four long 6's, and one short 18. There were
twelve gun-boats. [Footnote: Letter of General George Prevost, Sept.
11, 1814. All the American accounts say 13; the British official
account had best be taken. James says only ten, but gives no authority;
he appears to have been entirely ignorant of all things connected with
this action.] Five of these were large, of about 70 tons each; three
mounted a long 24 and a 32-pound carronade each; one mounted a long
18 and a 32-pound carronade; one a long 18 and a short 18. Seven
were smaller, of about 40 tons each; three of these carried each a
long 18, and four carried each a 32-pound carronade. There is greater
difficulty in finding out the number of men in the British fleet.
American historians are unanimous in stating it at from 1,000 to
1,100; British historians never do any thing but copy James blindly.
Midshipman Lea of the _Confiance_, in a letter (already quoted)
published in the "London Naval Chronicle," vol. xxxii, p. 292, gives
her crew as 300; but more than this amount of dead and prisoners
were taken out of her. The number given her by Commander Ward in
his "Naval Tactics," is probably nearest right--325. [Footnote: James
gives her but 270 men,--without stating his authority.] The _Linnet_
had about 125 men, and the _Chubb_ and _Finch_ about 50 men each.
According to Admiral Paulding (given by Lossing, in his "Field Book
of the War of 1812," p. 868) their gun-boats averaged 50 men each.
This is probably true, as they were manned largely by soldiers, any
number of whom could be spared from Sir George Prevost's great army;
but it may be best to consider the large ones as having 41, and the
small 26 men, which were the complements of the American gun-boats
of the same sizes. The following, then, is the force of

DOWNIE'S SQUADRON.

From what guns,
Name. Tonnage. Crew. Broadside. long or short.

_Confiance_, 1200 325 480 lbs. -+- long, 384
'- short, 96
_Linnet_, 350 125 96 " long, 96

_Chubb_, 112 50 96 " -+- long, 6
'- short, 90
_Finch_, 110 50 84 " -+- long, 12
'- short, 72
Five gun-boats, 350 205 254 " -+- long, 12
'- short, 72
Seven gun-boats, 280 182 182 " -+- long, 54
'- short, 128

In all, 16 vessels, of about 2,402 tons, with 937 men, [Footnote:
About; there were probably more rather than less.] and a total of
92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,192 lbs., 660 from long and
532 from short pieces.

These are widely different from the figures that appear in the pages
of most British historians, from Sir Archibald Alison down and up.
Thus, in the "History of the British Navy," by C. D. Yonge (already
quoted), it is said that on Lake Champlain "our (the British) force
was manifestly and vastly inferior, * * * their (the American) broadside
outweighing ours in more than the proportion of three to two, while
the difference in their tonnage and in the number of their crews was
still more in their favor." None of these historians, or quasi-historians,
have made the faintest effort to find out the facts for themselves,
following James' figures with blind reliance, and accordingly it is
only necessary to discuss the latter. This reputable gentleman ends
his account ("Naval Occurrences," p. 424) by remarking that Macdonough
wrote as he did because "he knew that nothing would stamp a falsehood
with currency equal to a pious expression, * * * his falsehoods
equalling in number the lines of his letter." These remarks are
interesting as showing the unbiassed and truthful character of the
author, rather than for any particular weight they will have in
influencing any one's judgment on Commodore Macdonough. James gives
the engaged force of the British as "8 vessels, of 1,426 tons, with
537 men, and throwing 765 lbs. of shot." To reduce the force down
to this, he first excludes the _Finch_, because she "grounded opposite
an American battery _before the engagement commenced_," which reads
especially well in connection with Capt. Pring's official letter:
"Lieut. Hicks, of the _Finch_, had the mortification to strike on
a reef of rocks to the eastward of Crab Island _about the middle of
the engagement_." [Footnote: The italics are mine. The letter is
given in full in the "Naval Chronicle."] What James means cannot
be imagined; no stretch of language will convert "about the middle
of" into "before." The _Finch_ struck on the reef in consequence of
having been disabled and rendered helpless by the fire from the
_Ticonderoga_. Adding her force to James' statement (counting her
crew only as he gives it), we get 9 vessels, 1,536 tons, 577 men,
849 lbs. of shot. James also excludes five gun-boats, because they
ran away almost as soon as the action commenced (vol. vi, p. 501).
This assertion is by no means equivalent to the statement in Captain
Pring's letter "that the flotilla of gun-boats had abandoned the
object assigned to them," and, if it was, it would not warrant his
excluding the five gun-boats. Their flight may have been disgraceful,
but they formed part of the attacking force nevertheless; almost
any general could say that he had won against superior numbers if
he refused to count in any of his own men whom he suspected of behaving
badly. James gives his 10 gun-boats 294 men and 13 guns (two long
24's, five long 18's, six 32-pound carronades), and makes them average
45 tons; adding on the five he leaves out, we get 14 vessels, of
1,761 tons, with 714 men, throwing at a broadside 1,025 lbs. of
shot (591 from long guns, 434 from carronades). But Sir George Prevost,
in the letter already quoted, says there were 12 gun-boats, and the
American accounts say more. Supposing the two gun-boats James did
not include at all to be equal respectively to one of the largest
and one of the smallest of the gun-boats as he gives them ("Naval
Occurrences," p. 417); that is, one to have had 35 men, a long 24,
and a 32-pound carronade, the other, 25 men and a 32-pound carronade,
we get for Downie's force 16 vessels, of 1,851 tons, with 774 men,
throwing at a broadside 1,113 lbs. of shot (615 from long guns,
498 from carronades). It must be remembered that so far I have merely
corrected James by means of the authorities from which he draws his
account--the official letters of the British commanders. I have not
brought up a single American authority against him, but have only
made such alterations as a writer could with nothing whatever but
the accounts of Sir George Prevost and Captain Pring before him to
compare with James. Thus it is seen that according to James himself
Downie really had 774 men to Macdonough's 882, and threw at a broadside
1,113 lbs. of shot to Macdonough's 1,194 lbs. James says ("Naval
Occurrences," pp. 410, 413): "Let it be recollected, no musketry
was employed on either side," and "The marines were of no use, as
the action was fought out of the range of musketry"; the 106 additional
men on the part of the Americans were thus not of much consequence,
the action being fought at anchor, and there being men enough to
manage the guns and perform every other duty. So we need only attend
to the broadside force. Here, then, Downie could present at a broadside
615 lbs. of shot from long guns to Macdonough's 480, and 498 lbs.
from carronades to Macdonough's 714; or, he threw 135 lbs. of shot
more from his long guns, and 216 less from his carronades. This is
equivalent to Downie's having seven long 18's and one long 9, and
Macdonough's having one 24-pound and six 32-pound carronades. A
32-pound carronade is not equal to a long 18; so that _even by
James' own showing Downie's force was slightly the superior_.

Thus far, I may repeat, I have corrected James solely by the evidence
of his own side; now I shall bring in some American authorities.
These do not contradict the British official letters, for they virtually
agree with them; but they do go against James' unsupported assertions,
and, being made by naval officers of irreproachable reputation, will
certainly outweigh them. In the first place, James asserts that on
the main-deck of the _Confiance_ but 13 guns were presented in broadside,
two 32-pound carronades being thrust through the bridle- and two
others through the stern-ports; so he excludes two of her guns from
the broadside. Such guns would have been of great use to her at certain
stages of the combat, and ought to be included in the force. But
besides this the American officers positively say that she had a
_broadside_ of 15 guns. Adding these two guns, and making a trifling
change in the arrangement of the guns in the row-galleys, we get
a broadside of 1,192 lbs., exactly as I have given it above. There
is no difficulty in accounting for the difference of tonnage as given
by James and by the Americans, for we have considered the same subject
in reference to the battle of Lake Erie. James calculates the American
tonnage as if for sea-vessels of deep holds, while, as regards the
British vessels, he allows for the shallow holds that all the lake
craft had; that is, he gives in one the nominal, in the other the
real, tonnage. This fully accounts for the discrepancy. It only remains
to account for the difference in the number of men. From James we
can get 772. In the first place, we can reason by analogy. I have
already shown that, as regards the battle of Lake Erie, he is convicted
(by English, not by American, evidence) of having underestimated
Barclay's force by about 25 per cent. If he did the same thing here,
the British force was over 1,000 strong, and I have no doubt that
it was. But we have other proofs. On p. 417 of the "Naval Occurrences"
he says the complement of the four captured British vessels amounted
to 420 men, of whom 54 were killed in action, leaving 366 prisoners,
including the wounded. But the report of prisoners, as given by the
American authorities, gives 369 officers and seamen unhurt or but
slightly wounded, 57 wounded men paroled, and other wounded whose
number was unspecified. Supposing this number to have been 82, and
adding 54 dead, we would get in all 550 men for the four ships, the
number I have adopted in my list. This would make the British wounded
129 instead of 116, as James says: but neither the Americans nor
the British seem to have enumerated all their wounded in this fight.
Taking into account all these considerations, it will be seen that
the figures I have given are probably approximately correct, and,
at any rate, indicate pretty closely the _relative_ strength of the
two squadrons. The slight differences in tonnage and crews (158 tons
and 55 men, in favor of the British) are so trivial that they need
not be taken into account, and we will merely consider the broadside
force. In absolute weight of metal the two combatants were evenly
matched--almost exactly;--but whereas from Downie's broadside of
1,192 lbs. 660 were from long and 532 from short guns, of Macdonough's
broadside of 1,194 lbs., but 480 were from long and 714 from short
pieces. The forces were thus equal, except that Downie opposed 180
lbs. from long guns to 182 from carronades; as if 10 long 18's were
opposed to ten 18-pound carronades. This would make the odds on their
face about 10 to 9 against the Americans; in reality they were greater,
for the possession of the _Confiance_ was a very great advantage.
The action is, as regards metal, the exact reverse of those between
Chauncy and Yeo. Take, for example, the fight off Burlington on
Sept. 28, 1813. Yeo's broadside was 1,374 lbs. to Chauncy's 1,288;
but whereas only 180 of Yeo's was from long guns, of Chauncy's but
536 was from carronades. Chauncy's fleet was thus much the superior.
At least we must say this: if Macdonough beat merely an equal force,
then Yeo made a most disgraceful and cowardly flight before an
inferior foe; but if we contend that Macdonough's force was inferior
to that of his antagonist, then we must admit that Yeo's was in
like manner inferior to Chauncy's. These rules work both ways. The
_Confiance_ was a heavier vessel than the _Pike_, presenting in
broadside one long 24- and three 32-pound carronades more than the
latter. James (vol. vi, p. 355) says: "The _Pike_ alone was nearly
a match for Sir James Yeo's squadron," and Brenton says (vol. ii,
503): "The _General Pike_ was more than a match for the whole British
squadron." Neither of these writers means quite as much as he says,
for the logical result would be that the _Confiance_ alone was a
match for all of Macdonough's force. Still it is safe to say that
the _Pike_ gave Chauncy a great advantage, and that the _Confiance_
made Downie's fleet much superior to Macdonough's.

Macdonough saw that the British would be forced to make the attack
in order to get the control of the waters. On this long, narrow lake
the winds usually blow pretty nearly north or south, and the set of
the current is of course northward; all the vessels, being flat and
shallow, could not beat to windward well, so there was little chance
of the British making the attack when there was a southerly wind
blowing. So late in the season there was danger of sudden and furious
gales, which would make it risky for Downie to wait outside the bay
till the wind suited him; and inside the bay the wind was pretty
sure to be light and baffling. Young Macdonough (then but 28 years
of age) calculated all these chances very coolly and decided to await
the attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with the head of his line
so far to the north that it could hardly be turned; and then proceeded
to make all the other preparations with the same foresight. Not
only were his vessels provided with springs, but also with anchors
to be used astern in any emergency. The _Saratoga _was further
prepared for a change of wind, or for the necessity of winding ship,
by having a kedge planted broad off on each of her bows, with a hawser
and preventer hawser (hanging in bights under water) leading from
each quarter to the kedge on that side. There had not been time to
train the men thoroughly at the guns; and to make these produce their
full effect the constant supervision of the officers had to be exerted.
The British were laboring under this same disadvantage, but neither
side felt the want very much, as the smooth water, stationary position
of the ships, and fair range, made the fire of both sides very destructive.

Plattsburg Bay is deep and opens to the southward; so that a wind
which would enable the British to sail up the lake would force them
to beat when entering the bay. The east side of the mouth of the
bay is formed by Cumberland Head; the entrance is about a mile and
a half across, and the other boundary, southwest from the Head, is
an extensive shoal, and a small, low island. This is called Crab
Island, and on it was a hospital and one six-pounder gun, which was
to be manned in case of necessity by the strongest patients. Macdonough
had anchored in a north-and-south line a little to the south of the
outlet of the Saranac, and out of range of the shore batteries, being
two miles from the western shore. The head of his line was so near
Cumberland Head that an attempt to turn it would place the opponent
under a very heavy fire, while to the south the shoal prevented a
flank attack. The _Eagle_ lay to the north, flanked on each side
by a couple of gun-boats; then came the _Saratoga_, with three
gun-boats between her and the _Ticonderoga_, the next in line; then
came three gun-boats and the _Preble_. The four large vessels were
at anchor; the galleys being under their sweeps and forming a second
line about 40 yards back, some of them keeping their places and some
not doing so. By this arrangement his line could not be doubled upon,
there was not room to anchor on his broadside out of reach of his
carronades, and the enemy was forced to attack him by standing in bows on.

The morning of September 11th opened with a light breeze from the
northeast. Downie's fleet weighed anchor at daylight, and came down
the lake with the wind nearly aft, the booms of the two sloops
swinging out to starboard. At half-past seven, [Footnote: The letters
of the two commanders conflict a little as to time, both absolutely
and relatively. Pring says the action lasted two hours and three
quarters, the American accounts, two hours and twenty minutes. Pring
says it began at 8.00; Macdonough says a few minutes before nine, etc.
I take the mean time.] the people in the ships could see their
adversaries' upper sails across the narrow strip of land ending in
Cumberland Head, before the British doubled the latter. Captain Downie
hove to with his four large vessels when he had fairly opened the
Bay, and waited for his galleys to overtake him. Then his four vessels
filled on the starboard tack and headed for the American line, going
abreast, the _Chubb_ to the north, heading well to windward of the
_Eagle_, for whose bows the _Linnet_ was headed, while the _Confiance_
was to be laid athwart the hawse of the _Saratoga_; the _Finch_ was
to leeward with the twelve gun-boats, and was to engage the rear of
the American line.

As the English squadron stood bravely in, young Macdonough, who feared
his foes not at all, but his God a great deal, knelt for a moment,
with his officers, on the quarter-deck; and then ensued a few minutes
of perfect quiet, the men waiting with grim expectancy for the opening
of the fight. The Eagle spoke first with her long 18's, but to no
effect, for the shot fell short. Then, as the _Linnet_ passed the
_Saratoga_, she fired her broadside of long 12's, but her shot also
fell short, except one that struck a hen-coop which happened to be
aboard the _Saratoga_. There was a game cock inside, and, instead
of being frightened at his sudden release, he jumped up on a gun-slide,
clapped his wings, and crowed lustily. The men laughed and cheered;
and immediately afterward Macdonough himself fired the first shot
from one of the long guns. The 24-pound ball struck the _Confiance_
near the hawse-hole and ranged the length of her deck, killing and
wounding several men. All the American long guns now opened and were
replied to by the British galleys.

The _Confiance_ stood steadily on without replying. But she was
baffled by shifting winds, and was soon so cut up, having both her
port bow-anchors shot away, and suffering much loss, that she was
obliged to port her helm and come to while still nearly a quarter
of a mile distant from the _Saratoga_. Captain Downie came to anchor
in grand style,--securing every thing carefully before he fired a
gun, and then opening with a terribly destructive broadside. The
_Chubb_ and _Linnet_ stood farther in, and anchored forward the
_Eagle's_ beam. Meanwhile the _Finch_ got abreast of the _Ticonderoga_,
under her sweeps, supported by the gun-boats. The main fighting was
thus to take place between the vans, where the _Eagle_, _Saratoga_,
and six or seven gun-boats were engaged with the _Chubb_, _Linnet_,
_Confiance_, and two or three gun-boats; while in the rear, the
_Ticonderoga_, the _Preble_, and the other American galleys engaged
the _Finch_ and the remaining nine or ten English galleys. The battle
at the foot of the line was fought on the part of the Americans to
prevent their flank being turned, and on the part of the British
to effect that object. At first, the fighting was at long range,
but gradually the British galleys closed up, firing very well. The
American galleys at this end of the line were chiefly the small ones,
armed with one 12-pounder apiece, and they by degrees drew back before
the heavy fire of their opponents. About an hour after the discharge
of the first gun had been fired the _Finch_ closed up toward the
_Ticonderoga_, and was completely crippled by a couple of broadsides
from the latter. She drifted helplessly down the line and grounded
near Crab Island; some of the convalescent patients manned the
six-pounder and fired a shot or two at her, when she struck, nearly
half of her crew being killed or wounded. About the same time the
British gun-boats forced the _Preble_ out of line, whereupon she
cut her cable and drifted inshore out of the fight. Two or three
of the British gun-boats had already been sufficiently damaged by
some of the shot from the _Ticonderoga's_ long guns to make them
wary; and the contest at this part of the line narrowed down to one
between the American schooner and the remaining British gun-boats,
who combined to make a most determined attack upon her. So hastily
had the squadron been fitted out that many of the matches for her
guns were at the last moment found to be defective. The captain of
one of the divisions was a midshipman, but sixteen years old, Hiram
Paulding. When he found the matches to be bad he fired the guns of
his section by having pistols flashed at them, and continued this
through the whole fight. The _Ticonderoga's_ commander, Lieut. Cassin,
fought his schooner most nobly. He kept walking the taffrail amidst
showers of musketry and grape, coolly watching the movements of the
galleys and directing the guns to be loaded with canister and bags
of bullets, when the enemy tried to board. The British galleys were
handled with determined gallantry, under the command of Lieutenant
Bell. Had they driven off the _Ticonderoga_ they would have won
the day for their side, and they pushed up till they were not a
boat-hook's length distant, to try to carry her by boarding; but
every attempt was repulsed and they were forced to draw off, some
of them so crippled by the slaughter they had suffered that they
could hardly man the oars.

Meanwhile the fighting at the head of the line had been even fiercer.
The first broadside of the _Confiance_, fired from 16 long 24's,
double shotted, coolly sighted, in smooth water, at point-blank range,
produced the most terrible effect on the _Saratoga_. Her hull shivered
all over with the shock, and when the crash subsided nearly half of
her people were seen stretched on deck, for many had been knocked
down who were not seriously hurt. Among the slain was her first
lieutenant, Peter Gamble; he was kneeling down to sight the bow-gun,
when a shot entered the port, split the quoin, and drove a portion
of it against his side, killing him without breaking the skin. The
survivors carried on the fight with undiminished energy. Macdonough
himself worked like a common sailor, in pointing and handling a
favorite gun. While bending over to sight it a round shot cut in
two the spanker boom, which fell on his head and struck him senseless
for two or three minutes; he then leaped to his feet and continued
as before, when a shot took off the head of the captain of the gun
and drove it in his face with such a force as to knock him to the
other side of the deck. But after the first broadside not so much
injury was done; the guns of the _Confiance_ had been levelled to
point-blank range, and as the quoins were loosened by the successive
discharges they were not properly replaced, so that her broadsides
kept going higher and higher and doing less and less damage. Very
shortly after the beginning of the action her gallant captain was
slain. He was standing behind one of the long guns when a shot from
the _Saratoga_ struck it and threw it completely off the carriage
against his right groin, killing him almost instantly. His skin was
not broken; a black mark, about the size of a small plate, was the
only visible injury. His watch was found flattened, with its hands
pointing to the very second at which he received the fatal blow. As
the contest went on the fire gradually decreased in weight, the guns
being disabled. The inexperience of both crews partly caused this.
The American sailors overloaded their carronades so as to very much
destroy the effect of their fire; when the officers became disabled,
the men would cram the guns with shot till the last projected from
the muzzle. Of course, this lessened the execution, and also gradually
crippled the guns. On board the _Confiance_ the confusion was even
worse: after the battle the charges of the guns were drawn, and on
the side she had fought one was found with a canvas bag containing
two round of shot rammed home and wadded without any powder; another
with two cartridges and no shot; and a third with a wad below the
cartridge.

Copyright (c) 2007. famouswriterz.com. All rights reserved.