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The Naval War of 1812

T >> Theodore Roosevelt >> The Naval War of 1812




This attack was quite as wanton and unprovoked as Warrington's, and
Bartholomew's foe was relatively to himself even less powerful;
moreover, while the _Peacock's_ crew showed great skill in handling
their guns, the crew of the _Erebus_ most emphatically did not. The
intent in both cases was equally bad, only the British captain lacked
the ability to carry his out.

Summary.

The concluding operations of the war call for much the same comments
as those of the preceding years. The balance of praise certainly
inclines toward the Americans. Captain John Hayes' squadron showed
great hardihood, perseverance and judgment, which were rewarded by
the capture of the _President_; and Decatur's surrender seems decidedly
tame. But as regards the action between the _President_ and _Endymion_
(taking into account the fact that the former fought almost under
the guns of an overwhelming force, and was therefore obliged to expose
herself far more than she otherwise would have), it showed nearly
as great superiority on the side of the Americans as the frigate
actions of 1812 did--in fact, probably quite as much as in the case
of the _Java_. Similarly, while the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ did well,
the _Constitution_ did better; and Sir George Collier's ships certainly
did not distinguish themselves when in chase of _Old Ironsides_. So
with the _Hornet_ in her two encounters; no one can question the
pluck with which the _Penguin_ was fought, but her gunnery was as
bad as that of the _Cornwallis_ subsequently proved. And though the
skirmish between the _Peacock_ and _Nautilus_ is not one to which
an American cares to look back, yet, regarding it purely from a
fighting stand-point, there is no question which crew was the best
trained and most skilful.

LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815.

Name. Rate. Where Built. Cost.
_Washington_ 74 Portsmouth $235,861.00
_Independence_ 74 Boston 421,810.41
_Franklin_ 74 Philadelphia 438,149.40
_Guerrière_ 44 " 306,158.56
_Java_ 44 Baltimore 232,767.38
_Fulton_ 30 New York 320,000.00
_Torpedo_ "

These ships first put to sea in this year. For the first time in
her history the United States possessed line-of-battle ships; and
for the first time in all history, the steam frigate appeared on
the navy list of a nation. The _Fulton_, with her clumsy central
wheel, concealed from shot by the double hull, with such thick scantling
that none but heavy guns could harm her, and relying for offensive
weapons not on a broadside of thirty guns of small calibre, but on
two pivotal 100-pounder columbiads, or, perhaps, if necessary, on
blows from her hog snout,--the _Fulton_ was the true prototype of
the modern steam ironclad, with its few heavy guns and ram. Almost
as significant is the presence of the _Torpedo_. I have not chronicled
the several efforts made by the Americans to destroy British vessels
with torpedoes; some very nearly succeeded, and although they failed
it must not be supposed that they did no good. On the contrary, they
made the British in many cases very cautious about venturing into
good anchorage (especially in Long Island Sound and the Chesapeake),
and by the mere terror of their name prevented more than one harrying
expedition. The _Fulton_ was not got into condition to be fought
until just as the war ended; had it continued a few months, it is
more than probable that the deeds of the _Merrimac_ and the havoc
wrought by the Confederate torpedoes would have been forestalled by
nearly half a century. As it was, neither of these engines of war
attracted much attention. For ten or fifteen years the _Fulton_ was
the only war-vessel of her kind in existence, and then her name
disappears from our lists. The torpedoes had been tried in the
Revolutionary War, but their failure prevented much notice from being
taken of them, and, besides, at that time there was a strong feeling
that it was dishonorable to blow a ship up with a powder-can concealed
_under_ the water, though highly laudable to burn her by means of
a fire-raft floating _on_ the water--a nice distinction in naval
ethics that has since disappeared. [Footnote: James fairly foams at
the mouth at the mere mention of torpedoes.]

AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.

By Ocean Cruisers.
Name. Guns. Tonnage. Remarks.
_President_ 52 1,576 captured by squadron.
--- -----
52 guns 1,576 tons.


BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC.

a.--By Privateers.
Name. Guns. Tonnage. Remarks.
_Chasseur_ 12 240 by privateer _St. Lawrence_.

b.--By Ocean Cruisers
_Cyane_ 34 659 by _Constitution_.
_Levant_ 20 500 retaken.
_Penguin_ 19 477 by _Hornet_.
--- -----
85 guns 1,876 tons.
20 500 (subtracting _Levant_).
65 guns, 1,376 tons.

In summing up the results of the struggle on the ocean it is to be
noticed that very little was attempted, and nothing done, by the
American Navy that could _materially_ affect the result of the war.
Commodore Rodgers' expedition after the Jamaica Plate fleet failed;
both the efforts to get a small squadron into the East Indian waters
also miscarried; and otherwise the whole history of the struggle on
the ocean is, as regards the Americans, only the record of individual
cruises and fights. The material results were not very great, at
least in their effect on Great Britain, whose enormous navy did not
feel in the slightest degree the loss of a few frigates and sloops.
But morally the result was of inestimable benefit to the United States.
The victories kept up the spirits of the people, cast down by the
defeats on land; practically decided in favor of the Americans the
chief question in dispute--Great Britain's right of search and
impressment--and gave the navy, and thereby the country, a world-wide
reputation. I doubt if ever before a nation gained so much honor
by a few single-ship duels. For there can be no question which side
came out of the war with the greatest credit. The damage inflicted
by each on the other was not very unequal in amount, but the balance
was certainly in favor of the United States, as can be seen by the
following tables, for the details of which reference can be made to
the various years:

AMERICAN LOSS. BRITISH LOSS.

Caused: Tonnage. Guns. Tonnage.[1] Guns.
By Ocean Cruisers 5,984 278 8,451 351
On the Lakes 727 37 4,159 212
By the Army 3,007 116 500 22
By Privateers -- -- 402 20
------ ---- ------ ----
Total, 9,718 431 13,512 605

[Footnote 1: The tonnage can only be given approximately, as that
of the vessels on Lake Champlain is not exactly known, although we
know about what the two fleets tonned relatively to one another.]

In addition we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting 24 guns, and, in
the aggregate, of 387 tons, and also, 25 gun-boats, with 71 guns,
and, in the aggregate, of nearly 2,000 tons. This would swell our
loss to 12,105 tons, and 526 guns; [Footnote: This differs greatly
from the figures given by James in his "Naval Occurrences" (App. ccxv).
He makes the American loss 14,844 tons, and 660 guns. His list includes,
for example, the "_Growler_ and _Hamilton_, upset in carrying sail
to avoid Sir James' fleet"; it would be quite reasonable to put down
the loss of the _Royal George_ to the credit of the French. Then he
mentions the _Julia_ and _Growler_, which were recaptured; the _Asp_,
which was also recaptured; the "_New York_, 46, destroyed at Washington,"
which was _not_ destroyed or harmed in any way, and which, moreover,
was a condemned hulk; the "_Boston_, 42 (in reality 32), destroyed
at Washington," which had been a condemned hulk for ten years, and
had no guns or anything else in her, and was as much a loss to our
navy as the fishing up and burning of an old wreck would have been;
and 8 gun-boats whose destruction was either mythical, or else which
were not national vessels. By deducting all these we reduce James'
total by 120 guns, and 2,600 tons; and a few more alterations (such
as excluding the swivels in the _President's_ tops, which he counts,
etc.), brings his number down to that given above--and also affords
a good idea of the value to be attached to his figures and tables.
The British loss he gives at but 530 guns and 10,273 tons. He omits
the 24-gun ship burnt by Chauncy at York, although including the
frigate and corvette burnt by Ross at Washington; if the former is
excluded the two latter should be, which would make the balance still
more in favor of the Americans. He omits the guns of the _Gloucester_,
because they had been taken out of her and placed in battery on the
shore, bur he includes those of the _Adams_, which had been served
in precisely the same way. He omits all reference to the British
14-gun schooner burnt on Ontario, and to all 3 and 4-gun sloops and
schooners captured there, although including the corresponding American
vessels. The reason that he so much underestimates the tonnage,
especially on the lakes, I have elsewhere discussed. His tables of
the relative loss in men are even more erroneous, exaggerating that
of the Americans, and greatly underestimating that of the British;
but I have not tabulated this on account of the impossibility of
getting fair estimates of the killed and wounded in the cutting-out
expeditions, and the difficulty of enumerating the prisoners taken
in descents, etc. Roughly, about 2,700 Americans and 3,800 British
were captured; the comparative loss in killed and wounded stood much
more in our favor.

I have excluded from the British loss the brigs _Detroit_ and
_Caledonia_, and schooner _Nancy_ (aggregating 10 guns and about
500 tons), destroyed on the upper lakes, because I hardly know whether
they could be considered national vessels; the schooner _Highflyer_,
of 8 guns, 40 men, and 209 tons, taken by Rodgers, because she seems
to have been merely a tender; and the _Dominica_, 15, of 77 men, and
270 tons, because her captor, the privateer _Decatur_, though nominally
an American, was really a French vessel. Of course both tables are
only approximately exact; but at any rate the balance of damage and
loss was over 4 to 3 in our favor.] but the loss of the revenue-cutters
and gun-boats can fairly be considered to be counterbalanced by the
capture or destruction of the various British Royal Packets (all
armed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges, etc., which would
be in the aggregate of at least as great tonnage and gun force, and
with more numerous crews.

But the comparative material loss gives no idea of the comparative
honor gained. The British navy, numbering at the onset a thousand
cruisers, had accomplished less than the American, which numbered
but a dozen. Moreover, most of the loss suffered by the former was
in single fight, while this had been but twice the case with the
Americans, who had generally been overwhelmed by numbers. The
_President_ and _Essex_ were both captured by more than double their
force simply because they were disabled before the fight began,
otherwise they would certainly have escaped. With the exceptions
of the _Chesapeake_ and _Argus_ (both of which were taken fairly,
because their antagonists, though of only equal force, were better
fighters), the remaining loss of the Americans was due to the small
cruisers stumbling from time to time across the path of some one
of the innumerable British heavy vessels. Had Congressional forethought
been sufficiently great to have allowed a few line-of-battle ships
to have been in readiness some time previous to the war, results
of weight might have been accomplished. But the only activity ever
exhibited by Congress in materially increasing the navy previous to
the war, had been in partially carrying out President Jefferson's
ideas of having an enormous force of very worthless gun-boats--a
scheme whose wisdom was about on a par with some of that statesman's
political and military theories.

Of the twelve [Footnote: Not counting the last action of the
_Constitution_, the _President's_ action, or the capture of the _Essex_,
on account of the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount of credit
due to each side. In both the first actions, however, the American
ships seem to have been rather more ably fought than their antagonists,
and, taking into account the overwhelming disadvantages under which
the _Essex_ labored, her defence displayed more desperate bravery
than did that of any other ship during the war.] single-ship actions,
two (those of the _Argus_ and _Chesapeake_) undoubtedly redounded
most to the credit of the British, in two (that of the _Wasp_ with
the _Reindeer_, and that of the _Enterprise_ with the _Boxer_), the
honors were nearly even, and in the other eight the superiority of
the Americans was very manifest. In three actions (those with the
_Penguin_, _Frolic_, and _Shannon_) the combatants were about equal
in strength, the Americans having slightly the advantage; in all
the others but two, the victors combined superiority of force with
superiority of skill. In but two cases, those of the _Argus_ and
_Epervier_, could any lack of courage be imputed to the vanquished.
The second year alone showed to the advantage of the British; the
various encounters otherwise were as creditable to the Americans
at the end as at the beginning of the war. This is worth attending
to, because many authors speak as if the successes of the Americans
were confined to the first year. It is true that no frigate was taken
after the first year, but this was partly because the strictness
of the blockade kept the American frigates more in port, while the
sloops put out to sea at pleasure, and partly because after that
year the British 18-pounder frigates either cruised in couples, or,
when single, invariably refused, by order of the Board of Admiralty,
an encounter with a 24-pounder; and though much of the American success
was unquestionably to be attributed to more men and heavier guns,
yet much of it was not. The war itself gives us two instances in
which defeat was owing solely, it may be said, to inferiority of
force, courage and skill being equal. The _Wasp_ was far heavier
than the _Reindeer_, and, there being nothing to choose between them
in any thing else, the damage done was about proportionate to this
difference. It follows, as a matter of course, that the very much
greater disproportion in loss in the cases of the _Avon_, _Epervier_,
etc., where the disproportion in force was much less (they mounting
32's instead of 24's, and the victors being all of the same class),
is only to be explained by the inferiority in skill on the part of
the vanquished. These remarks apply just as much to the _Argus_.
The _Reindeer_, with her 24's, would have been almost exactly on a
par with her, and yet would have taken her with even greater ease
than the _Peacock_ did with her 32's. In other words, the only effect
of our superiority in metal, men, and tonnage was to increase somewhat
the disparity in loss. Had the _Congress_ and _Constellation_, instead
of the _United States_ and _Constitution_, encountered the _Macedonian_
and _Java_, the difference in execution would have been less than
it was, but the result would have been unchanged, and would have
been precisely such as ensued when the _Wasp_ met the _Frolic_, or
the _Hornet_ the _Penguin_. On the other hand, had the _Shannon_ met
the _Constitution_ there would have been a repetition of the fight
between the _Wasp_ and _Reindeer_; for it is but fair to remember
that great as is the honor that Broke deserves, it is no more than
that due to Manners.

The Republic of the United States owed a great deal to the excellent
make and armament of its ships, but it owed still more to the men
who were in them. The massive timbers and heavy guns of _Old Ironsides_
would have availed but little had it not been for her able commanders
and crews. Of all the excellent single-ship captains, British or
American, produced by the war, the palm should be awarded to Hull.
[Footnote: See "Naval Tactics," by Commander J. H. Ward, and "Life
of Commodore Tatnall," by Charles C. Jones, Jr.] The deed of no other
man (excepting Macdonough) equalled his escape from Broke's five
ships, or surpassed his half-hour's conflict with the _Guerrière_.
After him, almost all the American captains deserve high praise--Decatur,
Jones, Blakely, Biddle, Bainbridge, Lawrence, Burrows, Allen, Warrington,
Stewart, Porter. It is no small glory to a country to have had such
men upholding the honor of its flag. On a par with the best of them
are Broke, Manners, and also Byron and Blythe. It must be but a
poor-spirited American whose veins do not tingle with pride when
he reads of the cruises and fights of the sea-captains, and their
grim prowess, which kept the old Yankee flag floating over the waters
of the Atlantic for three years, in the teeth of the mightiest naval
power the world has ever seen; but it is equally impossible not to
admire Broke's chivalric challenge and successful fight, or the
heroic death of the captain of the _Reindeer_.

Nor can the war ever be fairly understood by any one who does not
bear in mind that the combatants were men of the same stock, who
far more nearly resembled each other than either resembled any other
nation. I honestly believe that the American sailor offered rather
better material for a man-of-warsman than the British, because the
freer institutions of his country (as compared with the Britain of
the drunken Prince Regent and his dotard father--a very different
land from the present free England) and the peculiar exigencies of
his life tended to make him more intelligent and self-reliant; but
the difference, when there was any, was very small, and disappeared
entirely when his opponents had been drilled for any length of time
by men like Broke or Manners. The advantage consisted in the fact
that our _average_ commander was equal to the best, and higher than
the average, of the opposing captains; and this held good throughout
the various grades of the officers. The American officers knew they
had redoubtable foes to contend with, and made every preparation
accordingly. Owing their rank to their own exertions, trained by
practical experience and with large liberty of action, they made
every effort to have their crews in the most perfect state of skill
and discipline. In Commodore Tatnall's biography (p. 15) it is
mentioned that the blockaded _Constellation_ had her men well trained
at the guns and at target practice, though still lying in the river,
so as to be at once able to meet a foe when she put out to sea. The
British captain, often owing his command to his social standing or
to favoritism, hampered by red tape, [Footnote: For instance, James
mentions that they were forbidden to use more than so many shot in
practice, and that Capt. Broke utterly disregarded this command.]
and accustomed by 20 years' almost uninterrupted success to regard
the British arms as invincible, was apt to laugh at all manoeuvring,
[Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Naval Gunnery," states this in
various places.--"Accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring."] and scorned
to prepare too carefully for a fight, trusting to the old British
"pluck and luck" to carry him through. So, gradually he forgot how
to manoeuvre or to prepare. The _Java_ had been at sea six weeks
before she was captured, yet during that time the entire exercise
of her crew at the guns had been confined to the discharge of six
broadsides of blank cartridges (James, vi, 184); the _Constitution_,
like the _Java_, had shipped an entirely new and raw crew previous
to her first cruise, and was at sea but five weeks before she met
the _Guerrière_, and yet her men had been trained to perfection.
This is a sufficient comment on the comparative merits of Captain
Hull and Captain Lambert. The American prepared himself in every
possible way; the Briton tried to cope with courage alone against
courage united to skill. His bad gunnery had not been felt in
contending with European foes [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass; he
seems to think that in 1812 the British had fallen off absolutely,
though not relatively to their European foes.] as unskilful as
himself. Says Lord Howard Douglass (p. 3): "We entered with too
much confidence into a war with a marine much more expert than any
of our European enemies * * * there was inferiority of gunnery as
well as of force," etc. Admiral Codrington, commenting on the
_Epervier's_ loss, says, as before quoted, that, owing to his being
chosen purely for merit, the American captain was an overmatch for
the British, unless "he encountered our best officers on equal terms."

The best criticism on the war is that given by Capitaine Jurien de
la Gravière. [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes," ii, p. 269, 272, 274
(Paris, 1847).] After speaking of the heavier metal and greater number
of men of the American ships, he continues: "And yet only an enormous
superiority in the precision and rapidity of their fire can explain
the difference in the losses sustained by the combatants.* * * Nor
was the skill of their gunners the only cause to which the Americans
owed their success. Their ships were faster; the crews, composed
of chosen men, manoeuvred with uniformity and precision; their captains
had that practical knowledge which is only to be acquired by long
experience of the sea; and it is not to be wondered at that the
_Constitution_, when chased during three days by a squadron of five
English frigates, succeeded in escaping, by surpassing them in
manoeuvring, and by availing herself of every ingenious resource
and skilful expedient that maritime science could suggest. * * *
To a marine exalted by success, but rendered negligent by the very
habit of victory, the Congress only opposed the best of vessels and
most formidable of armaments. * * *" [Footnote: The praise should
be given to the individual captains and _not_ to Congress, however;
and none of the American ships had picked crews. During the war the
_Shannon_ had the only crew which could with any fairness be termed
"picked," for her men had been together seven years, and all of her
"boys" must have been well-grown young men, much older than the boys
on her antagonist.]

It is interesting to compare the results of this inter-Anglian warfare,
waged between the Insular and the Continental English, with the results
of the contest that the former were at the same time carrying on
with their Gallo-Roman neighbors across the channel. For this purpose
I shall rely on Troude's "Batailles Navales," which would certainly
not give the English more than their due. His account of the comparative
force in each case can be supplemented by the corresponding one given
in James. Under drawn battles I include all such as were indecisive,
in so far that neither combatant was captured; in almost every case
each captain claimed that the other ran away.

During the year 1812 to 1815 inclusive, there were eight actions
between French and English ships of approximately equal force. In
three of these the English were victorious.

In 1812 the _Victorious_, 74, captured the _Rivoli_, 74.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.
Broadsides, Metal, lbs.

Troude. James.
_Victorious_ 1,014 1,060
_Rivoli_ 1,010 1,085

In 1814 the _Tagus_ captured the _Ceres_ and the _Hebrus_ captured
the _Etoile_.

Broadsides, Metal, lbs.

Troude. James.
_Tagus_ 444 467
_Ceres_ 428 463

_Hebrus_ 467 467
_Etoile_ 428 463

The _Ceres_, when she surrendered, had but one man wounded, although
she had suffered a good deal aloft. The fight between the 74's was
murderous to an almost unexampled degree, 125 English and 400 French
falling. The _Hebrus_ lost 40 and the _Etoile_ 120 men.

Five actions were "drawn."

In 1812 the _Swallow_ fought the _Renard_ and _Garland_. The former
threw 262, the latter 290 lbs. of shot at a broadside.

In 1815 the _Pilot_, throwing 262 lbs., fought a draw with the
_Egerie_ throwing 260.

In 1814 two frigates of the force of the _Tagus_ fought a draw with
two frigates of the force of the _Ceres_; and the _Eurotas_, with
24-pounders failed to capture the _Chlorinde_, which had only
18-pounders. In 1815 the _Amelia_ fought a draw with the _Arethuse_,
the ships throwing respectively 549 and 463 lbs., according to the
English, or 572 and 410 lbs., according to the French accounts. In
spite of being superior in force the English ship lost 141 men, and
the French but 105. This was a bloodier fight than even that of the
_Chesapeake_ with the _Shannon_; but the gunnery was, nevertheless,
much worse than that shown by the two combatants in the famous duel
off Boston harbor, one battle lasting four hours and the other 15
minutes.

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