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The Naval War of 1812

T >> Theodore Roosevelt >> The Naval War of 1812




As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to get it comparatively, and
not absolutely, I have given it throughout for both sides as estimated
by the American method of that day. The tonnage of the vessels on
the lakes has been already noticed.



Appendix B


PREVIOUS HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES NAVY

Very few students of naval history will deny that in 1812 the average
American ship was superior to the average British ship of the same
strength; and that the latter was in turn superior to the average
French ship. The explanation given by the victor is in each case
the same; the American writer ascribes the success of his nation
to "the aptitude of the American character for the sea," and the
Briton similarly writes that "the English are inherently better suited
for the sea than the French." Race characteristics may have had some
little effect between the last pair of combatants (although only
a little), and it is _possible_ that they somewhat affected the
outcome of the Anglo-American struggle, but they did not form the
main cause. This can best be proved by examining the combats of
two preceding periods, in which the English, French, and Americans
were at war with one another.

During the years 1798-1800, the United States carried on a desultory
conflict with France, then at war with England. Our navy was just
built, and was rated in the most extraordinary manner; the _Chesapeake_,
carrying 18-pounders, was called a 44; and the _Constellation_ which
carried 24's, a 36, while the _Washington_, rating 24, was really
much heavier than the _Boston_, rating 28. On Feb. 9, 1799, after
an hour's conflict, the _Constellation_ captured the French frigate
_Insurgente_; the Americans lost 3, the French 70 men, killed and
wounded. The _Constitution_ carried but 38 guns; 28 long 24's, on
the main-deck, and 10 long 12's on the quarter-deck, with a crew
of 309 men. According to Troude (iii, 169), _l'lnsurgente_ carried
26 long 12's, 10 long 6's, and 4 36-pound carronades; the Americans
report her number of men as nearly four hundred. Thus in actual
[Footnote: French shot was really very much heavier than the nominally
corresponding English shot, as the following table, taken from Captain
T. L. Simmon's work on "Heavy Ordnance" (London, 1837, p. 62) will show:

Nominal French Weight Actual Weight of Same Shot in
of Shot. English Pounds.
36 lbs. 43 lbs 4 oz.
24 " 28 " 8 3/4"
18 " 21 " 4 1/2"
12 " 14 " 7 "
] (not nominal) weight of shot the _Constitution_ was superior by
about 80 pounds, and was inferior in crew by from 50 to 100 men.
This would make the vessels apparently nearly equal in force; but
of course the long 24's of the Constellation made it impossible that
_l'lnsurgente_, armed only with long 12's, should contend with her.
As already said, a superiority in number of men makes very little
difference, provided each vessel has ample to handle the guns, repair
damages, work the sails, etc. Troude goes more into details than
any other French historian; but I think his details are generally
wrong. In this case he gives the _Constellation_ 12's, instead of
the 24's she really carried; and also supplies her with 10 32-pound
carronades--of which species of ordnance there was then not one piece
in our navy. The first carronades we ever had were those carried
by the same frigate on her next voyage. She had completely changed
her armament, having 28 long 18's on the main-deck, ten 24-pound
carronades on the quarter-deck; and, I believe, 6 long 12's on the
forecastle, with a crew of 310 men. Thus armed, she encountered and
fought a drawn battle with _la Vengeance_. Troude (vol. iii, pp.
201, and 216) describes the armament of the latter as 26 long 18's,
10 long 8's, and 4 36-pound carronades. On board of her was an
American prisoner, James Howe, who swore she had 52 guns, and 400
men (see Cooper, i, 306). The French and American accounts thus
radically disagree. The point is settled definitely by the report
of the British captain Milne, who, in the _Seine_ frigate, captured
_la Vengeance_ in the same year, and then reported her armament as
being 28 long 18's, 16 long 12's, and 8 36-pound carronades, with
326 men. As the American and British accounts, written entirely
independently of one another, tally almost exactly, it is evident
that Troude was very greatly mistaken. He blunders very much over
the _Constellation's_ armament.

Thus in this action the American frigate fought a draw with an
antagonist, nearly as much superior to herself as an American 44
was to a British 38. In November, 1800, the "28-gun frigate,"
_Boston_, of 530 tons, 200 men, carrying 24 long 9's on the main-deck,
and on the spar-deck 8 long 6's (or possibly 12-pound carronades)
captured, after two hours action, the French corvette _Berceau_,
of 24 guns, long 8's; the _Boston_ was about the same size as her
foe, with the same number of men, and superior in metal about as
ten to nine. She lost 15, and the _Berceau_ 40 men. Troude (iii,
p. 219) gives the _Berceau_ 30 guns, 22 long 8's, and 8 12-pound
carronades. If this is true she was in reality of equal force with
the _Boston_. But I question if Troude really knew anything about
the combatants; he gives the _Boston_ (of the same size and build
as the _Cyane_) 48 guns--a number impossible for her to carry. He
continually makes the grossest errors; in this same (the third)
volume, for example, he arms a British 50-gun-ship with 72 cannon,
giving her a broadside fifty per cent. heavier than it should be
(p. 141); and, still worse, states the ordinary complement of a
British 32-gun frigate to be 384 men, instead of about 220 (p. 417).
He is by no means as trustworthy as James, though less rancorous.

The United States schooner _Experiment_, of 12 guns, long 6's, and
70 men, captured the French man-of-war three-masted-schooner _La
Diane_, of 14 guns (either 4- or 6-pounders), with a crew of 60 men,
and 30 passengers; and the _Enterprise_, the sister vessel of the
_Experiment_, captured numerous strong privateers. One of them, a
much heavier vessel than her captor, made a most obstinate fight.
She was the _Flambeau_ brig of fourteen 8-pounders and 100 men, of
whom half were killed or wounded. The _Enterprise_ had 3 killed and
7 wounded.

Comparing these different actions, it is evident that the Americans
were superior to the French in fighting capacity during the years
1799 and 1800. During the same two years there had been numerous
single contests between vessels of Britain and France, ending almost
invariably in favor of the former, which I mention first in each
couple. The 12-pounder frigate _Daedalus_ captured the 12-pounder
frigate _Prudente_, of equal force. The British 18-pounder frigate
_Sybille_ captured the frigate _Forte_, armed with 52 guns, 30 of
them long 24's on the main-deck; she was formidably armed and as
heavy as the _Constitution_. The _Sybille_ lost 22 and the _Forte_
145 men killed and wounded. The 18-pounder frigate _Clyde_, with
the loss of 5 men, captured the 12-pounder frigate _Vestale_, which
lost 32. The cutter _Courser_, of twelve 4-pounders and 40 men,
captured the privateer _Guerrière_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 44
men. The cutter _Viper_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 48 men, captured
the privateer _Suret_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 57 men. The 16-gun
ship-sloop, _Peterel_, with 89 men, engaged the _Cerf_, 14, _Lejoille_,
6, and _Ligurienne_, 16, with in all 240 men, and captured the
_Ligunenne_. The 30-gun corvette _Dart_ captured by surprise the
38-gun frigate _Desirée_. The _Gypsey_, of ten 4-pounders and 82
men, captured the _Quidproquo_, of 8 guns, 4- and 8-pounders, and
98 men. The schooner _Milbrook_ of sixteen 18-pounder carronades
and 47 men, fought a draw with the privateer _Bellone_, of 24 long
8's and six 36-pound carronades. Finally, six months after the
_Vengeance_ had escaped from the _Constellation_ (or beaten her off,
as the French say) she was captured by the British frigate _Seine_,
which threw a broadside about 30 pounds more than the American did
in her action, and had some 29 men less aboard. So that her commander,
Captain Milne, with the same force as Commodore Truxtun, of the
_Constellation_, accomplished what the latter failed to do.

Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty clear that, while the
Americans were then undoubtedly much superior to the French, they
were still, at least slightly, inferior to the British.

From 1777 to 1782 the state of things was very different. The single
combats were too numerous for me to mention them here; and besides
it would be impossible to get at the truth without going to a great
deal of trouble--the accounts given by Cooper, Sohomberg, and Troude
differing so widely that they can often hardly be recognized as
treating of the same events. But it is certain that the British were
very much superior to the Americans. Some of the American ships
behaved most disgracefully, deserting their consorts and fleeing
from much smaller foes. Generally the American ship was captured
when opposed by an equal force--although there were some brilliant
exceptions to this. With the French things were more equal; their
frigates were sunk or captured time and again, but nearly as often
they sunk or captured their antagonists. Some of the most gallant
fights on record are recounted of French frigates of this period;
in 1781 the _Minerve_, 32, resisted the _Courageous_, 74, till she
had lost 73 men and had actually inflicted a loss of 17 men on her
gigantic antagonist, and the previous year the _Bellepoule_, 32,
had performed a similar feat with the _Nonsuch_, 64, while the
_Capricieuse_, 32, had fought for five hours before surrendering
to the _Prudente_ and _Licorne_, each of force equal to herself.
She lost 100 men, inflicting a loss of 55 upon her two antagonists.
Such instances make us feel rather ashamed when we compare them with
the fight in which the British ship _Glasgow_, 20, beat off an
American squadron of 5 ships, including two of equal force to herself,
or with the time when the _Ariadne_, 20, and _Ceres_, 14, attacked
and captured without resistance the _Alfred_, 20, the latter ship
being deserted in the most outrageously cowardly manner by her consort
the _Raleigh_, 32. At that period the average American ship was
certainly by no means equal to the average French ship of the same
force, and the latter in turn was a little, but only a little, inferior
to the average British ship of equal strength.

Thus in 1782 the British stood first in nautical prowess, separated
but by a very narrow interval from the French, while the Americans
made a bad third. In 1789 the British still stood first, while the
Americans had made a great stride forward, coming close on their
heels, and the French had fallen far behind into the third place.
In 1812 the relative positions of the British and French were
unchanged, but the Americans had taken another very decided step
in advance, and stood nearly as far ahead of the British as the
latter were ahead of the French.

The explanation of these changes is not difficult. In 1782 the American
war vessels were in reality privateers; the crews were unpracticed,
the officers untrained, and they had none of the traditions and
discipline of a regular service. At the same time the French marine
was at its highest point; it was commanded by officers of ability
and experience, promoted largely for merit, and with crews thoroughly
trained, especially in gunnery, by a long course of service on the
sea. In courage, and in skill in the management of guns, musketry,
etc., they were the full equals of their English antagonists; their
slight _average_ inferiority in seamanship may, it is possible, be
fairly put down to the difference in race. (It seems certain that,
when serving in a neutral vessel, for example, the Englishmen aboard
are apt to make better sailors than the Frenchmen.) In 1799 the
revolution had deprived the French of all their best officers, had
let the character of the marine run down, and the discipline of the
service become utterly disorganized; this exposed them to frightful
reverses, and these in turn prevented the character of the service
from recovering its former tone. Meanwhile the Americans had established
for the first time a regular navy, and, as there was excellent material
to work with, it at once came up close to the English; constant and
arduous service, fine discipline, promotion for merit, and the most
unflagging attention to practical seamanship and gunnery had in 1812
raised it far above even the high English standard. During all these
three periods the English marine, it must be remembered, did not fall
off, but at least kept its position; the French, on the contrary,
_did_ fall off, while the American navy advanced by great strides
to the first place.



Appendix C


After my work was in press I for the first time came across Prof.
J. Russell Soley's "Naval Campaign of 1812," in the "Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute," for October 20, 1881. It is
apparently the precursor of a more extended history. Had I known
that such a writer as Professor Soley was engaged on a work of this
kind I certainly should not have attempted it myself.

In several points our accounts differ. In the action with the
_Guerrière_ his diagram differs from mine chiefly in his making the
_Constitution_ steer in a more direct line, while I have represented
her as shifting her course several times in order to avoid being
raked, bringing the wind first on her port and then on her
starboard-quarter. My account of the number of the crew of the
_Guerrière_ is taken from the _Constitution's_ muster-book (in the
Treasury Department at Washington), which contains the names of all
the British prisoners received aboard the _Constitution_ after the
fight. The various writers used "larboard" and "starboard" with
such perfect indifference, in speaking of the closing and the loss
of the _Guerrière's_ mizzen-mast, that I hardly knew which account
to adopt; it finally seemed to me that the only way to reconcile
the conflicting statements was by making the mast act as a rudder,
first to keep the ship off the wind until it was dead aft and then
to bring her up into it. If this was the case, it deadened her speed,
and prevented Dacres from keeping his ship yardarm and yardarm with
the foe, though he tried to steady his course with the helm; but,
in this view, it rather delayed Hull's raking than helped him. If
Professor Soley's account is right, I hardly know what to make of
the statement in one of the American accounts that the _Constitution_
"luffed across the enemy's bow," and of Cooper's statement (in
_Putnam's Magazine_) that the _Guerrière's_ bowsprit pressed against
the _Constitution's_ "lee or port quarter."

In the action of the _Wasp_ with the _Frolic_, I have adopted James'
statement of the latter's force; Professor Soley follows Captain
Jones' letter, which gives the brig three additional guns and 18
pounds more metal in broadside. My reason for following James was
that his account of the _Frolic's_ force agrees with the regular
armament of her class. Captain Jones gives her _two_ carronades on
the topgallant forecastle, which must certainly be a mistake; he
makes her chase-guns long 12's, but all the other British brigs
carried 6's; he also gives her another gun in broadside, which he
calls a 12-pounder, and Lieutenant Biddle (in a letter to his father)
a 32-pound carronade. His last gun should perhaps be counted in;
I excluded it because the two American officials differed in their
account of it, because I did not know through what port it could
be fought, and because James asserted that it was dismounted and
lashed to the forecastle. The _Wasp_ left port with 138 men; subtracting
the pilot and two men who were drowned, makes 135 the number on board
during the action. As the battle was fought, I doubt if the loss of
the brig's main-yard had much effect on the result; had it been her
object to keep on the wind, or had the loss of her after-sails enabled
her antagonist to cross her stern (as in the case of the _Argus_
and _Pelican_), the accident could fairly be said to have had a decided
effect upon the contest. But as a short time after the fight began
the vessels were running nearly free, and as the _Wasp_ herself was
greatly injured aloft at the time, and made no effort to cross her
foe's stern, it is difficult to see that it made much difference.
The brig's head-sails were all right, and, as she was not close-hauled,
the cause of her not being kept more under command was probably purely
due to the slaughter on her decks.

Professor Soley represents the combat of the _States_ and _Macedonian_
as a plain yardarm and yardarm action after the first forty minutes.
I have followed the English authorities and make it a running fight
throughout. If Professor Soley is right, the enormous disparity in
loss was due mainly to the infinitely greater accuracy of the American
fire; according to my diagram the chief cause was the incompetency
of the _Macedonian's_ commander. In one event the difference was
mainly in the gunnery of the crews, in the other, it was mainly in
the tactical skill of the captains. The question is merely as to
how soon Carden, in his headlong, foolishly rash approach, was enabled
to close with Decatur. I have represented the closing as taking place
later than Professor Soley has done; very possibly I am wrong. Could
my work now be rewritten I think I should adopt his diagram of the
action of the _Macedonian_.

But in the action with the _Java_ it seems to me that he is mistaken.
He has here followed the British accounts; but they are contradicted
by the American authorities, and besides have a very improbable look.
When the _Constitution_ came round for the second time, on the port
tack, James declares the _Java_ passed directly across her stern,
almost touching, but that the British crew, overcome by astonishment
or awe, did not fire a shot; and that shortly afterward the manoeuvre
was repeated. When this incident is said to have occurred the _Java's_
crew had been hard at work fighting the guns for half an hour, and
they continued for an hour and a half afterward; it is impossible
to believe that they would have foreborne to fire more than one gun
when in such a superb position for inflicting damage. Even had the
men been struck with temporary lunacy the officers alone would have
fired some of the guns. Moreover, if the courses of the vessels were
such as indicated on Professor Soley's diagram the _Java_ would herself
have been previously exposed to a terrible raking fire, which was
not the case. So the alleged manoeuvres have, _per se_, a decidedly
apocryphal look; and besides they are flatly contradicted by the
American accounts which state distinctly that the _Java_ remained
to windward in every portion of the fight. On this same tack Professor
Soley represents the _Java_ as forereaching on the _Constitution_;
I have reversed this. At this time the _Java_ had been much cut up
in her rigging and aloft generally, while the _Constitution_ had
set much additional sail, and in consequence the latter forged ahead
and wore in the smoke unperceived. When the ships came foul Professor
Soley has drawn the _Constitution_ in a position in which she would
receive a most destructive stern rake from her antagonist's whole
broadside. The positions could not have been as there represented.
The _Java's_ bowsprit came foul in the _Constitution's_ mizzen rigging
and as the latter forged ahead she pulled the former gradually round
till when they separated the ships were in a head and stern line.
Commodore Bainbridge, as he particularly says, at once "kept away
to avoid being raked," while the loss of the head-sails aboard the
_Java_ would cause the latter to come up in the wind, and the two
ships would again be running parallel, with the American to leeward.
I have already discussed fully the reasons for rejecting in this
instance the British report of their own force and loss. This was
the last defeat that the British officially reported; the admiralty
were smarting with the sting of successive disasters and anxious
at all costs to put the best possible face on affairs (as witness
Mr. Croker's response to Lord Dundonald's speech in the House). There
is every reason for believing that in this case the reports were
garbled; exactly as at a later date the official correspondence
preceding the terrible disasters at Cabul was tampered with before
being put before the public (see McCarthy's "History of our Own Times").

It is difficult to draw a diagram of the action between the _Hornet_
and _Peacock,_ although it was so short, the accounts contradicting
one another as to which ship was to windward and which on the "larboard
tack;" and I do not know if I have correctly represented the position
of the combatants at the close of the engagement. Lieutenant Conner
reported the number of men aboard the _Hornet_ fit for duty as 135;
Lawrence says she had 8 absent in a prize and 7 too sick to be at
quarters. This would make an original complement of 150, and tallies
exactly with the number of men left on the _Hornet_ after the action
was over, as mentioned by Lawrence in his account of the total number
of souls aboard. The log-book of the _Hornet_ just before starting
on her cruise, states her entire complement as 158; but 4 of these
were sick and left behind. There is still a discrepancy of 4 men,
but during the course of the cruise nothing would be more likely
than that four men should be gotten rid of, either by sickness,
desertion, or dismissal. At any rate the discrepancy is very trivial.
In her last cruise, as I have elsewhere said, I have probably
overestimated the number of the _Hornet's_ crew; this seems especially
likely when it is remembered that toward the close of the war our
vessels left port with fewer supernumeraries aboard than earlier
in the contest. If such is the case, the _Hornet_ and _Penguin_ were
of almost exactly equal force.

My own comments upon the causes of our success, upon the various
historians of the war, etc., are so similar to those of Professor
Soley, that I almost feel as if I had been guilty of plagiarism;
yet I never saw his writings till half an hour ago. But in commenting
on the actions of 1812, I think the Professor has laid too much stress
on the difference in "dash" between the combatants. The _Wasp_ bore
down with perfect confidence to engage an equal foe; and the _Hornet_
could not tell till the _Peacock_ opened fire that the latter was
inferior in force, and moreover fought in sight of another hostile
vessel. In the action with the _Guerrière_ it was Hull and not Dacres
who acted boldly, the Englishman delaying the combat and trying to
keep it at long range for some time. In this fight it must be remembered
that neither foe knew the exact force of the other until the close
work began; then, it is true, Dacres fought most bravely. So with
the _Macedonian;_ James particularly says that she did not know the
force of her foe, and was confident of victory. The _Java,_ however,
must have known that she was to engage a superior force. In neither
of the first two frigate actions did the Americans have a chance
to display any courage in the actual fighting, the victory was won
with such ease. But in each case they entered as bravely, although
by no means as rashly or foolishly, into the fight as their antagonists
did. It must always be remembered that until this time it was by
no means proved that 24-pounders were better guns than 18's to put
on frigates; exactly as at a little later date it was vigorously
contended that 42-pounders were no more effective guns for two-deckers
than 32-pounders were. Till 1812 there had been no experience to
justify the theory that the 24-pounder was the better gun. So that
in the first five actions it cannot be said that the British showed
any especial courage in _beginning_ the fight; it was more properly
to be called ignorance. After the fight was once begun they certainly
acted very bravely, and, in particular, the desperate nature of the
_Frolic's_ defence has never been surpassed.

But admitting this is a very different thing from admitting that
the British fought more bravely than their foes; the combatants were
about on a par in this respect. The Americans, it seems to me, were
always to the full as ready to engage as their antagonists were;
on each side there were few over-cautious men, such as Commodore
Rodgers and Sir George Collier, the opposing captains on Lake
Ontario, the commander of the _Bonne Citoyenne_, and perhaps
Commodore Decatur, but as a rule either side jumped at the chance
of a fight. The difference in tactics was one of skill and common
sense, not one of timidity. The _United States_ did not "avoid close
action" from over-caution, but simply to take advantage of her
opponent's rashness. Hull's approach was as bold as it was skilful;
had the opponent to leeward been the _Endymion_, instead of the
_Guerrière_, her 24-pounders would not have saved her from the fate
that overtook the latter. Throughout the war I think that the Americans
were as bold in beginning action, and as stubborn in continuing it,
as were their foes--although no more so. Neither side can claim any
superiority on the average, though each can in individual cases,
as regards courage. Foolhardiness does not imply bravery. A
prize-fighter who refused to use his guard would be looked upon as
exceptionally brainless, not as exceptionally brave; yet such a case
is almost exactly parallel to that of the captain of the _Macedonian_.

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