The History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella The Catholic, V3
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William H. Prescott >> The History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella The Catholic, V3
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[19] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 76.--Giovio, Vitae Illust. Virorum,
fol. 253-255.--Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 17.
[20] Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 75.--Garnier, Hist. de France, tom.
v. pp. 396, 397.--Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 5, apud Petitot, Collection
des Mémoires, tom. xvi.--Giovio, Vitae Illust. Virorum, ubi supra.--
Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. pp. 303, 304.--St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys
XII., pp. 171, 172.--Brantôme, Oeuvres, tom. ii. disc. 8.
[21] Giovio, Vitae Illust. Virorum, fol. 255.--Garibay, Compendio, tom.
ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.--Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 180.--Peter
Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 256.--Fleurange, Mémoires, chap. 5.
No account, that I know of, places the French loss so low as 3000; Garibay
raises it to 4500, and the French maréchal de Fleurange rates that of the
Swiss alone at 5000; a round exaggeration, not readily accounted for, as
he had undoubted access to the best means of information. The Spaniards
were too well screened to sustain much injury, and no estimate makes it
more than a hundred killed, and some considerable less. The odds are
indeed startling, but not impossible; as the Spaniards were not much
exposed by personal collision with the enemy, until the latter were thrown
into too much disorder to think of anything but escape. The more than
usual confusion and discrepancy in the various statements of the
particulars of this action may probably be attributed to the lateness of
the hour, and consequently imperfect light, in which it was fought.
[22] Quintana, Españoles Célebres, tom i. p. 277.--Giovio, Vitae Illust.
Virorum, fol. 255.--Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. pp. 248, 249.--
Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 17.--Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap.
181.
[23] It was to this same city of Venusium that the rash and unfortunate
Varro made his retreat, some seventeen centuries before, from the bloody
field of Cannae. Liv. Hist., lib. 22, cap. 49.
[24] Giovio, Vitae Illust. Virorum, fol. 255.--Peter Martyr, Opus Epist.,
epist. 256.--Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 80.
Friday, says Guicciardini, alluding no doubt to Columbus's discoveries, as
well as these two victories, was observed to be a lucky day to the
Spaniards; according to Gaillard, it was regarded from this time by the
French with more superstitious dread than ever. Istoria, tom. i. p. 301.--
Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 348.
[25] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 8, 24.--Giovio,
Vitae Illust. Virorum, fol. 250.
The reader may perhaps recollect the distinguished part played in the
Moorish war by Luis Portocarrero, lord of Palma. He was of noble Italian
origin, being descended from the ancient Genoese house of Boccanegra. The
Great Captain and he had married sisters; and this connection probably
recommended him, as much as his military talents, to the Calabrian
command, which it was highly important should be intrusted to one who
would maintain a good understanding with the commander-in-chief; a thing
not easy to secure among the haughty nobility of Castile.
[26] Giovio, Vitae Illust. Virorum, fol. 255.--Peter Martyr, Opus Epist.,
epist. 256.--Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 80.--Varillas, Histoire de
Louis XII. (Paris, 1688,) tom. i. pp. 289-292. See the account of
D'Aubigny's victories at Seminara, in Part II. Chapters 2 and 11, of this
History.
[27] Since 1494 the sceptre of Naples had passed into the hands of no less
than seven princes, Ferdinand I., Alfonso II., Ferdinand II., Charles
VIII., Frederic III., Louis XII., Ferdinand the Catholic. No private
estate in the kingdom in the same time had probably changed masters half
so often. See Cartas del Gran Capitan, MS.
[28] Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. p. 304.--Giannone, Istoria di Napoli,
lib. 29, cap. 4.--Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 250.--Summonte,
Hist. di Napoli, tom. iii. pp. 552, 553.--Muratori, Annali d'Italia, tom.
xiv. p. 40.--Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 81.--Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V.,
fol. 18.
[29] The Italians, in their admiration of Pedro Navarro, caused medals to
be struck, on which the invention of mines was ascribed to him. (Marini,
apud Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. p. 351.) Although not actually the
inventor, his glory was scarcely less, since he was the first who
discovered the extensive and formidable uses to which they might be
applied in the science of destruction. See Part I. Chapter 13, note 23, of
this History.
[30] Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 5, cap. 30, 31, 34, 35.
--Giovio, Vitae Illust. Virorum, fol. 255-257.--Garibay, Compendio, tom.
ii. lib. 19, cap. 15.--Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 183.--
Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 6, pp. 307-309.--Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol.
18, 19.--Ammirato, Istorie Florentine, tom. iii. p. 271.-Summonte, Hist.
di Napoli, tom. iii. p. 554.--Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 84, 86, 87,
93, 95.--Sismondi, Hist. des Français, tom. xv. pp. 407-409.
CHAPTER XIII.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.--UNSUCCESSFUL INVASION OF SPAIN.--TRUCE.
1503.
Ferdinand's Policy Examined.--First Symptoms of Joanna's Insanity.--
Isabella's Distress and Fortitude.--Efforts of France.--Siege of Salsas.--
Isabella's Levies.--Ferdinand's Successes.--Reflections on the Campaign.
The events noticed in the preceding chapter glided away as rapidly as the
flitting phantoms of a dream. Scarcely had Louis the Twelfth received the
unwelcome intelligence of Gonsalvo de Cordova's refusal to obey the
mandate of the archduke Philip, before he was astounded with the tidings
of the victory of Cerignola, the march on Naples, and the surrender of
that capital, as well as of the greater part of the kingdom, following one
another in breathless succession. It seemed as if the very means on which
the French king had so confidently relied for calming the tempest, had
been the signal for awakening all its fury, and bringing it on his devoted
head. Mortified and incensed at being made the dupe of what he deemed a
perfidious policy, he demanded an explanation of the archduke, who was
still in France. The latter, vehemently protesting his own innocence,
felt, or affected to feel, so sensibly the ridiculous and, as it appeared,
dishonorable part played by him in the transaction, that he was thrown
into a severe illness, which confined him to his bed for several days. [1]
Without delay, he wrote to the Spanish court in terms of bitter
expostulation, urging the immediate ratification of the treaty made
pursuant to its orders, and an indemnification to France for its
subsequent violation. Such is the account given by the French historians.
The Spanish writers, on the other hand, say, that before the news of
Gonsalvo's successes reached Spain, King Ferdinand refused to confirm the
treaty sent him by his son-in-law, until it had undergone certain material
modifications. If the Spanish monarch hesitated to approve the treaty in
the doubtful posture of his affairs, he was little likely to do so, when
he had the game entirely in his own hands. [2]
He postponed an answer to Philip's application, willing probably to gain
time for the Great Captain to strengthen himself firmly in his recent
acquisitions. At length, after a considerable interval, he despatched an
embassy to France, announcing his final determination never to ratify a
treaty made in contempt of his orders, and so clearly detrimental to his
interests. He endeavored, however, to gain further time by spinning out
the negotiation, holding up for this purpose the prospect of an ultimate
accommodation, and suggesting the re-establishment of his kinsman, the
unfortunate Frederic, on the Neapolitan throne, as the best means of
effecting it. The artifice, however, was too gross even for the credulous
Louis; who peremptorily demanded of the ambassadors the instant and
absolute ratification of the treaty, and, on their declaring it was beyond
their powers, ordered them at once to leave his court. "I had rather,"
said he, "suffer the loss of a kingdom, which may perhaps be retrieved,
than the loss of honor, which never can." A noble sentiment, but falling
with no particular grace from the lips of Louis the Twelfth. [3]
The whole of this blind transaction is stated in so irreconcilable a
manner by the historians of the different nations, that it is extremely
difficult to draw anything like a probable narrative out of them. The
Spanish writers assert that the public commission of the archduke was
controlled by strict private instructions; [4] while the French, on the
other hand, are either silent as to the latter, or represent them to have
been as broad and unlimited as his credentials. [5] If this be true, the
negotiations must be admitted to exhibit, on the part of Ferdinand, as
gross an example of political jugglery and falsehood, as ever disgraced
the annals of diplomacy. [6]
But it is altogether improbable, as I have before remarked, that a monarch
so astute and habitually cautious should have intrusted unlimited
authority, in so delicate a business, to a person whose discretion,
independent of his known partiality for the French monarch, he held so
lightly. It is much more likely that he limited, as is often done, the
full powers committed to him in public, by private instructions of the
most explicit character; and that the archduke was betrayed by his own
vanity, and perhaps ambition (for the treaty threw the immediate power
into his own hands), into arrangements unwarranted by the tenor of these
instructions. [7]
If this were the case, the propriety of Ferdinand's conduct in refusing
the ratification depends on the question how far a sovereign is bound by
the acts of a plenipotentiary who departs from his private instructions.
Formerly, the question would seem to have been unsettled. Indeed, some of
the most respectable writers on public law in the beginning of the
seventeenth century maintain, that such a departure would not justify the
prince in withholding his ratification; deciding thus, no doubt, on
principles of natural equity, which appear to require that a principal
should be held responsible for the acts of an agent, coming within the
scope of his powers, though at variance with his secret orders, with which
the other contracting party can have no acquaintance or concern. [8]
The inconvenience, however, arising from adopting a principle in political
negotiations, which must necessarily place the destinies of a whole nation
in the hands of a single individual, rash or incompetent, it may be,
without the power of interference or supervision on the part of the
government, has led to a different conclusion in practice; and it is now
generally admitted by European writers, not merely that the exchange of
ratifications is essential to the validity of a treaty, but that a
government is not bound to ratify the doings of a minister who has
transcended his private instructions. [9]
But, whatever be thought of Ferdinand's good faith in the early stages of
this business, there is no doubt that, at a later period, when his
position was changed by the success of his arms in Italy, he sought only
to amuse the French court with a show of negotiation, in order, as we have
already intimated, to paralyze its operations and gain time for securing
his conquests. The French writers inveigh loudly against this crafty and
treacherous policy; and Louis the Twelfth gave vent to his own indignation
in no very measured terms. But, however we may now regard it, it was in
perfect accordance with the trickish spirit of the age; and the French
king resigned all right of rebuking his antagonist on this score, when he
condescended to become a party with him to the infamous partition treaty,
and still more when he so grossly violated it. He had voluntarily engaged
with his Spanish rival in the game, and it afforded no good ground of
complaint, that he was the least adroit of the two.
While Ferdinand was thus triumphant in his schemes of foreign policy and
conquest, his domestic life was clouded with the deepest anxiety, in
consequence of the declining health of the queen, and the eccentric
conduct of his daughter, the infanta Joanna. We have already seen the
extravagant fondness with which that princess, notwithstanding her
occasional sallies of jealousy, doated on her young and handsome husband.
[10] From the hour of his departure she had been plunged in the deepest
dejection, sitting day and night with her eyes fixed on the ground, in
uninterrupted silence, or broken only by occasional expressions of
petulant discontent. She refused all consolation, thinking only of
rejoining her absent lord, and "equally regardless," says Martyr, who was
then at the court, "of herself, her future subjects, and her afflicted
parents." [11]
On the 10th of March, 1503, she was delivered of her second son, who
received the baptismal name of Ferdinand, in compliment to his
grandfather. [12] No change, however, took place in the mind of the
unfortunate mother, who from this time was wholly occupied with the
project of returning to Flanders. An invitation to that effect, which she
received from her husband in the month of November, determined her to
undertake the journey, at all hazards, notwithstanding the affectionate
remonstrances of the queen, who represented the impracticability of
traversing France, agitated, as it then was, with all the bustle of
war-like preparation, or of venturing by sea at this inclement and
stormy season.
One evening, while her mother was absent at Segovia, Joanna, whose
residence was at Medina del Campo, left her apartment in the castle, and
sallied out, though in dishabille, without announcing her purpose to any
of her attendants. They followed, however, and used every argument and
entreaty to prevail on her to return, at least for the night, but without
effect; until the bishop of Burgos, who had charge of her household,
finding every other means ineffectual, was compelled to close the castle
gates, in order to prevent her departure.
The princess, thus thwarted in her purpose, gave way to the most violent
indignation. She menaced the attendants with her utmost vengeance for
their disobedience, and, taking her station on the barrier, she
obstinately refused to re-enter the castle, or even to put on any
additional clothing, but remained cold and shivering on the spot till the
following morning. The good bishop, sorely embarrassed by the dilemma to
which he found himself reduced, of offending the queen by complying with
the mad humor of the princess, or the latter still more, by resisting it,
despatched an express in all haste to Isabella, acquainting her with the
affair, and begging instructions how to proceed.
The queen, who was staying, as has been said, at Segovia, about forty
miles distant, alarmed at the intelligence, sent the king's cousin, the
admiral Henriquez, together with the archbishop of Toledo, at once to
Medina, and prepared to follow as fast as the feeble state of her health
would permit. The efforts of these eminent persons, however, were not much
more successful than those of the bishop. All they could obtain from
Joanna was, that she would retire to a miserable kitchen in the
neighborhood, during the night; while she persisted in taking her station
on the barrier as soon as it was light, and continued there, immovable as
a statue, the whole day. In this deplorable state she was found by the
queen on her arrival; and it was not without great difficulty that the
latter, with all the deference habitually paid her by her daughter,
succeeded in persuading her to return to her own apartments in the castle.
These were the first unequivocal symptoms of that hereditary taint of
insanity which had clouded the latter days of Isabella's mother, and
which, with a few brief intervals, was to shed a deeper gloom over the
long-protracted existence of her unfortunate daughter. [13]
The conviction of this sad infirmity of the princess gave a shock to the
unhappy mother, scarcely less than that which she had formerly been called
to endure in the death of her children. The sorrows, over which time had
had so little power, were opened afresh by a calamity, which naturally
filled her with the most gloomy forebodings for the fate of her people,
whose welfare was to be committed to such incompetent hands. These
domestic griefs were still further swelled at this time by the death of
two of her ancient friends and counsellors, Juan Chacon, adelantado of
Murcia, [14] and Gutierre de Cardenas, grand commander of Leon. [15] They
had attached themselves to Isabella in the early part of her life, when
her fortunes were still under a cloud; and they afterwards reaped the
requital of their services in such ample honors and emoluments as royal
gratitude could bestow, and in the full enjoyment of her confidence, to
which their steady devotion to her interests well entitled them. [16]
But neither the domestic troubles which pressed so heavily on Isabella's
heart, nor the rapidly declining state of her own health, had power to
blunt the energies of her mind, or lessen the vigilance with which she
watched over the interests of her people. A remarkable proof of this was
given in the autumn of the present year, 1503, when the country was
menaced with an invasion from France.
The whole French nation had shared the indignation of Louis the Twelfth,
at the mortifying result of his enterprise against Naples; and it answered
his call for supplies so promptly and liberally, that, in a few months
after the defeat of Cerignola, he was able to resume operations, on a more
formidable scale than France had witnessed for centuries. Three large
armies were raised, one to retrieve affairs in Italy, a second to
penetrate into Spain, by the way of Fontarabia, and a third to cross into
Roussillon, and get possession of the strong post of Salsas, the key of
the mountain passes in that quarter. Two fleets were also equipped in the
ports of Genoa and Marseilles, the latter of which was to support the
invasion of Roussillon by a descent on the coast of Catalonia. These
various corps were intended to act in concert, and thus, by one grand,
simultaneous movement, Spain was to be assailed on three several points of
her territory. The results did not correspond with the magnificence of the
apparatus. [17]
The army destined to march on Fontarabia was placed under the command of
Alan d'Albret, father of the king of Navarre, along the frontiers of whose
dominions its route necessarily lay. Ferdinand had assured himself of the
favorable dispositions of this prince, the situation of whose kingdom,
more than its strength, made his friendship important; and the lord
d'Albret, whether from a direct understanding with the Spanish monarch, or
fearful of the consequences which might result to his son from the
hostility of the latter, detained the forces intrusted to him, so long
among the bleak and barren fastnesses of the mountains, that at length,
exhausted by fatigue and want of food, the army melted away without even
reaching the enemy's borders. [18]
The force directed against Roussillon was of a more formidable character.
It was commanded by the maréchal de Rieux, a brave and experienced
officer, though much broken by age and bodily infirmities. It amounted to
more than twenty thousand men. Its strength, however, lay chiefly in its
numbers. It was, with the exception of a few thousand lansquenets under
William de la Marck, [19] made up of the arrière-ban of the kingdom, and
the undisciplined militia from the great towns of Languedoc. With this
numerous array the French marshal entered Roussillon without opposition,
and sat down before Salsas on the 16th of September, 1503.
The old castle of Salsas, which had been carried without much difficulty
by the French in the preceding war, had been put in a defensible condition
at the commencement of the present, under the superintendence of Pedro
Navarro, although the repairs were not yet wholly completed. Ferdinand, on
the approach of the enemy, had thrown a thousand picked men into the
place, which was well victualled and provided for a siege; while a corps
of six thousand was placed under his cousin, Don Frederic de Toledo, duke
of Alva, with orders to take up a position in the neighborhood, where he
might watch the movements of the enemy, and annoy him as far as possible
by cutting off his supplies. [20]
Ferdinand, in the mean while, lost no time in enforcing levies throughout
the kingdom, with which he might advance to the relief of the beleaguered
fortress. While thus occupied, he received such accounts of the queen's
indisposition as induced him to quit Aragon, where he then was, and hasten
by rapid journeys to Castile. The accounts were probably exaggerated; he
found no cause for immediate alarm on his arrival, and Isabella, ever
ready to sacrifice her own inclinations to the public weal, persuaded him
to return to the scene of operations, where his presence at this juncture
was so important. Forgetting her illness, she made the most unwearied
efforts for assembling troops without delay to support her husband. The
grand constable of Castile was commissioned to raise levies through every
part of the kingdom, and the principal nobility flocked in with their
retainers from the farthest provinces, all eager to obey the call of their
beloved mistress. Thus strengthened, Ferdinand, whose head-quarters were
established at Girona, saw himself in less than a month in possession of a
force, which, including the supplies of Aragon, amounted to ten or twelve
thousand horse, and three or four times that number of foot. He no longer
delayed his march, and about the middle of October put his army in motion,
proposing to effect a junction with the duke of Alva, then lying before
Perpignan, at a few leagues' distance from Salsas. [21] Isabella, who was
at Segovia, was made acquainted by regular expresses with every movement
of the army. She no sooner learned its departure from Gerona than she was
filled with disquietude at the prospect of a speedy encounter with the
enemy, whose defeat, whatever glory it might reflect on her own arms,
could be purchased only at the expense of Christian blood. She wrote in
earnest terms to her husband, requesting him not to drive his enemies to
despair by closing up their retreat to their own land, but to leave
vengeance to Him to whom alone it belonged. She passed her days, together
with her whole household, in fasting and continual prayer, and, in the
fervor of her pious zeal, personally visited the several religious houses
of the city, distributing alms among their holy inmates, and imploring
them humbly to supplicate the Almighty to avert the impending calamity.
[22]
The prayers of the devout queen and her court found favor with Heaven.
[23] King Ferdinand reached Perpignan on the 19th of October, and on that
same night the French marshal, finding himself unequal to the rencontre
with the combined forces of Spain, broke up his camp, and, setting fire to
his tents, began his retreat towards the frontier, having consumed nearly
six weeks since first opening trenches. Ferdinand pressed close on his
flying enemy, whose rear sustained some annoyance from the Spanish
_ginetes_, in its passage through the defiles of the sierras. The retreat,
however, was conducted in too good order to allow any material loss to be
inflicted on the French, who succeeded at length in sheltering themselves
under the cannon of Narbonne, up to which place they were pursued by their
victorious foe. Several places on the frontier, as Leocate, Palme, Sigean,
Roquefort, and others, were abandoned to the Spaniards, who pillaged them
of whatever was worth carrying off; without any violence, however, to the
persons of the inhabitants, whom, as a Christian population, if we are to
believe Martyr, Ferdinand refused even to make prisoners. [24]
The Spanish monarch made no attempt to retain these acquisitions; but,
having dismantled some of the towns, which offered most resistance,
returned loaded with the spoils of victory to his own dominions. "Had he
been as good a general as he was a statesman," says a Spanish historian,
"he might have penetrated to the centre of France." [25] Ferdinand,
however, was too prudent to attempt conquests which could only be
maintained, if maintained at all, at an infinite expense of blood and
treasure. He had sufficiently vindicated his honor by meeting his foe so
promptly, and driving him triumphantly over the border; and he preferred,
like a cautious prince, not to risk all he had gained by attempting more,
but to employ his present successes as a vantage-ground for entering on
negotiation, in which at all times he placed more reliance than on the
sword.
In this, his good star still further favored him. The armada, equipped at
so much cost by the French king at Marseilles, had no sooner put to sea,
than it was assailed by furious tempests, and so far crippled, that it was
obliged to return to port without even effecting a descent on the Spanish
coast.
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