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The River War

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The line of communications from Cairo, the permanent base, to the advanced
post at Akasha was 825 miles in length. But of this distance only the
section lying south of Assuan could be considered as within the theatre
of war. The ordinary broad-gauge railway ran from Cairo to Balliana, where
a river base was established. From Balliana to Assuan reinforcements and
supplies were forwarded by Messrs. Cook's fleet of steamers, by barges
towed by small tugs, and by a number of native sailing craft. A stretch of
seven miles of railway avoids the First Cataract, and joins Assuan and
Shellal. Above Shellal a second flotilla of gunboats, steamers, barges,
and Nile boats was collected to ply between Shellal and Halfa. The military
railway ran from Halfa to Sarras. South of Sarras supplies were forwarded
by camels. To meet the increased demands of transport, 4,500 camels were
purchased in Egypt and forwarded in boats to Assuan, whence they marched
via Korosko to the front. The British Government had authorised the
construction of the military railway to Akasha, and a special railway
battalion was collected at Assuan, through which place sleepers and other
material at once began to pass to Sarras. The strategic railway
construction will, however, form the subject of a later chapter,
which I shall not anticipate.

By the 1st of April, less than three weeks from the commencement
of the advance, the whole line of communications had been organised
and was working efficiently, although still crowded with the
concentrating troops.

As soon as the 16th Battalion of reservists arrived at Suakin,
the IXth Soudanese were conveyed by transports to Kossier, and marched
thence across the desert to Kena. The distance was 120 miles, and the fact
that in spite of two heavy thunderstorms--rare phenomena in Egypt--it was
covered in four days is a notable example of the marching powers of the
black soldiers. It had been determined that the Xth Soudanese should follow
at once, but circumstances occurred which detained them on the Red Sea
littoral and must draw the attention of the reader thither.

The aspect and history of the town and port of Suakin might afford
a useful instance to a cynical politician. Most of the houses stand on a
small barren island which is connected with the mainland by a narrow
causeway. At a distance the tall buildings of white coral, often five
storeys high, present an imposing appearance, and the prominent
chimneys of the condensing machinery--for there is scarcely any fresh
water--seem to suggest manufacturing activity. But a nearer view reveals
the melancholy squalor of the scene. A large part of the town is deserted.
The narrow streets wind among tumbled-down and neglected houses.
The quaintly carved projecting windows of the facades are boarded up.
The soil exhales an odour of stagnation and decay. The atmosphere is rank
with memories of waste and failure. The scenes that meet the eye intensify
these impressions. The traveller who lands on Quarantine Island is first
confronted with the debris of the projected Suakin-Berber Railway. Two or
three locomotives that have neither felt the pressure of steam nor tasted
oil for a decade lie rusting in the ruined workshops. Huge piles of
railway material rot, unguarded and neglected, on the shore. Rolling stock
of all kinds--carriages, trucks, vans, and ballast waggons--are strewn or
heaped near the sheds. The Christian cemetery alone shows a decided
progress, and the long lines of white crosses which mark the graves of
British soldiers and sailors who lost their lives in action or by disease
during the various campaigns, no less than the large and newly enclosed
areas to meet future demands, increase the depression of the visitor.
The numerous graves of Greek traders--a study of whose epitaphs may
conveniently refresh a classical education--protest that the climate of
the island is pestilential. The high loopholed walls declare that the
desolate scrub of the mainland is inhabited only by fierce and valiant
savages who love their liberty.

For eleven years all trade had been practically stopped, and the only
merchants remaining were those who carried on an illicit traffic with the
Arabs or, with Eastern apathy, were content to wait for better days.
Being utterly unproductive, Suakin had been wisely starved by the Egyptian
Government, and the gloom of the situation was matched by the poverty
of its inhabitants.

The island on which the town stands is joined to the mainland by
a causeway, at the further end of which is an arched gateway of curious
design called 'the Gate of the Soudan.' Upon the mainland stands the
crescent-shaped suburb of El Kaff. It comprises a few mean coral-built
houses, a large area covered with mud huts inhabited by Arabs and
fishermen, and all the barracks and military buildings. The whole is
surrounded by a strong wall a mile and a half long, fifteen feet high,
six feet thick, with a parapet pierced for musketry and strengthened at
intervals by bastions armed with Krupp guns.

Three strong detached posts complete the defences of Suakin.
Ten miles to the northward, on the scene of Sir H. Kitchener's
unfortunate enterprise, is the fort of Handub. Tambuk is twenty-five
miles inland and among the hills. Situate upon a high rock, and
consisting only of a store, a formidable blockhouse, and a lookout tower,
this place is safe from any enemy unprovided with artillery. Both Handub
and Tambuk were at the outset of the campaign provisioned for four months.
The third post, Tokar Fort, lies fifty miles along the coast to the south.
Its function is to deprive the Arabs of a base in the fertile delta of the
Tokar river. The fort is strong, defended by artillery, and requires for
its garrison an entire battalion of infantry.

No description of Suakin would be complete without some allusion
to the man to whom it owes its fame. Osman Digna had been for many years
a most successful and enterprising Arab slave dealer. The attempted
suppression of his trade by the Egyptian Government drove him naturally
into opposition. He joined in the revolt of the Mahdi, and by his influence
roused the whole of the Hadendoa and other powerful tribes of the Red Sea
shore. The rest is upon record. Year after year, at a horrid sacrifice
of men and money, the Imperial Government and the old slaver fought like
wolves over the dry bone of Suakin. Baker's Teb, El Teb, Tamai, Tofrek,
Hashin, Handub, Gemaiza, Afafit--such were the fights of Osman Digna,
and through all he passed unscathed. Often defeated, but never crushed,
the wily Arab might justly boast to have run further and fought more
than any Emir in the Dervish armies.

It had scarcely seemed possible that the advance on Dongola could
influence the situation around Kassala, yet the course of events encouraged
the belief that the British diversion in favour of Italy had been
effective; for at the end of March--as soon, that is to say, as the news
of the occupation of Akasha reached him--Osman Digna separated himself
from the army threatening Kassala, and marched with 300 cavalry,
70 camelry, and 2,500 foot towards his old base in the Tokar Delta.
On the first rumour of his advance the orders of the Xth Soudanese to move
via Kossier and Kena to the Nile were cancelled, and they remained in
garrison at Tokar. At home the War Office, touched in a tender spot,
quivered apprehensively, and began forthwith to make plans to strengthen
the Suakin garrison with powerful forces.

The state of affairs in the Eastern Soudan has always been turbulent.
The authority of the Governor of the Red Sea Littoral was not at this time
respected beyond the extreme range of the guns of Suakin. The Hadendoa and
other tribes who lived under the walls of the town professed loyalty
to the Egyptian Government, not from any conviction that their rule was
preferable to that of Osman Digna, but simply for the sake of a quiet life.
As their distance from Suakin increased, the loyalty of the tribesmen
became even less pronounced, and at a radius of twenty miles all the
Sheikhs oscillated alternately between Osman Digna and the Egyptian
Government, and tried to avoid open hostilities with either. Omar Tita,
Sheikh of the district round about Erkowit, found himself situated on this
fringe of intriguing neutrality. Although he was known to have dealings
with Osman, it was believed that if he had the power to choose he would
side with the Egyptian Government. Early in April Omar Tita reported that
Osman Digna was in the neighbourhood of Erkowit with a small force,
and that he, the faithful ally of the Government, had on the 3rd of the
month defeated him with a loss of four camels. He also said that if the
Egyptian Government would send up a force to fight Osman, he,
the aforesaid ally, would keep him in play until it arrived.

After a few days of hesitation and telegraphic communication with
the Sirdar, Colonel Lloyd, the Governor of Suakin, who was then in very
bad health, decided that he had not enough troops to justify him in taking
the risk of going up to Erkowit to fight Osman. Around Suakin, as along
the Indian frontier, a battle was always procurable on the shortest notice.
When a raid has taken place, the Government may choose the scale of their
reprisals. If they are poor, they will arrange a counter-raid by means of
'friendlies,' and nothing more will be heard of the affair. If they are
rich, they will mobilise two or three brigades, and make an expedition or
fight a pitched battle, so that another glory may be added to the annals
of the British army. In the present instance the Egyptian Government were
poor, and as the British Government did not desire to profit by the
opportunity it was determined to have only a small-scale operation.
The Governor therefore arranged a plan for a demonstration at the foot of
the hills near Khor Wintri by means of combined movements from Suakin
and Tokar. The garrison of Suakin consisted of the 1st and half the 5th
Egyptian Battalions; the 16th Egyptian reservists, who had just replaced
the IXth Soudanese, and were as yet hardly formed into a military body;
one squadron of cavalry, one company of Camel Corps, and some detachments
of artillery. The garrison of Tokar consisted of the Xth Soudanese and a
few gunners. From these troops there was organised in the second week
in April, with all due ceremony, a 'Suakin Field Force.'

The plan of campaign was simple. Colonel Lloyd was to march out
from Suakin and effect a junction with the 'Tokar Column' at Khor Wintri,
where the Erkowit road enters the hills. It was then hoped that Osman Digna
would descend and fight a battle of the required dimensions in the open;
after which, if victorious, the force would return to Suakin and Tokar.

In order to make the Suakin Column as mobile as possible, the whole force
was mounted on camels, of which more than 1,000 were requisitioned, as well
as 60 mules and 120 donkeys. Two hundred Arabs accompanied the column to
hold these beasts when necessary. Six days' forage and rations, one day's
reserve of water, 200 rounds per man, and 100 shell per gun were carried.
At five o'clock on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 14th of April, the troops
paraded outside the walls of Suakin, and bivouacked in the open ready
to march at daylight.

The next morning the column, which numbered about 1,200 men of all arms,
started. After marching for four or five hours in the direction of Khor
Wintri the cavalry, who covered the advance, came in contact with the
Dervish scouts. The force thereupon assumed an oblong formation: the mixed
Soudanese company and the two guns in front, three Egyptian companies on
each flank, the Camel Corps company in the rear, and the transport in the
centre. The pace was slow, and, since few of the camels had ever been
saddled or ridden, progress was often interrupted by their behaviour and
by the broken and difficult nature of the country. Nevertheless at about
four o'clock in the afternoon, Teroi Wells, eight miles from Khor Wintri,
were reached; and here, having marched nineteen miles, Colonel Lloyd
determined to halt. While the infantry were making the zeriba, the cavalry
were sent on under Captain Fenwick (an infantry officer employed on
the Staff) to gain touch with the Tokar force, who were expected to have
already reached the rendezvous. Apparently under the belief that Omar Tita
and his Arabs would give timely notice of an attack, the cavalry seem to
have neglected many of the usual precautions, and in consequence at about
five o'clock, when approaching Khor Wintri, they found themselves suddenly
confronted with a force of about 200 Dervish horsemen supported by a large
body of infantry. The squadron wheeled about with promptitude, and began
to retire at a trot. The Dervish horsemen immediately pursued. The result
was that the Egyptians began a disorderly flight at a gallop through the
thick and treacherous scrub and over broken, dangerous ground. Sixteen
horses fell; their riders were instantly speared by the pursuers. Rallying
thirty-eight troopers, Captain Fenwick seized a rocky hillock, and
dismounting with the natural instinct of an infantry soldier, prepared to
defend himself to the last. The remainder of the squadron continued their
flight, and thirty-two troopers, under an Egyptian officer (whose horse
is said to have bolted), arrived at the Teroi zeriba with the news that
their comrades had been destroyed, or had perhaps 'returned to Suakin,'
and that they themselves had been closely followed by the enemy. The news
caused the gravest anxiety, which was not diminished when it was found
that the bush around the zeriba was being strongly occupied by Dervish
spearmen. Two mounted men, who volunteered for the perilous duty, were sent
to make their way through this savage cordon, and try to find either the
remainder of the cavalry or the Tokar Column. Both were hunted down and
killed. The rest of the force continued in hourly expectation of an attack.

Their suspense was aggravated towards midnight, when the Dervishes began
to approach the zeriba. In the darkness what was thought to be a body of
horsemen was seen moving along a shallow khor opposite the right face of
the defence. At the same moment a loud yell was raised by the enemy on the
other side. An uncontrolled musketry fire immediately broke out. The guns
fired blindly up the valley; the infantry wildly on all sides.
The fusillade continued furiously for some time, and when by the efforts
of the British officers the troops were restrained, it was found that the
Dervishes had retired, leaving behind them a single wounded man.
Occasional shots were fired from the scrub until the morning, but no fresh
attack was attempted by the Dervishes.

Meanwhile Captain Fenwick maintained his solitary and perilous position
on the hillock. He was soon surrounded by considerable bodies of the enemy,
and as soon as it became dark he was sharply attacked. But the Dervishes
fortunately possessed few rifles, and the officers and troopers, by firing
steady volleys, succeeded in holding their ground and repulsing them.
The sound of the guns at Teroi encouraged the Egyptians and revealed the
direction of their friends. With the daylight the Dervishes, who seem
throughout the affair to have been poor-spirited fellows, drew off, and the
detachment, remounting, made haste to rejoin the main body.

The force, again united, pursued their way to Khor Wintri, where they
found the column from Tokar already arrived. Marching early on the 15th,
Major Sidney with 250 men of the Xth Soudanese, the only really trustworthy
troops in the force, had reached Khor Wintri the same afternoon. He drove
out the small Dervish post occupying the khor, and was about to bivouac,
when he was sharply attacked by a force of Arabs said to have numbered
80 horsemen and 500 foot. The Soudanese fought with their usual courage,
and the Dervishes were repulsed, leaving thirty dead upon the ground.
The regulars had three men wounded.

Up to this point Colonel Lloyd's plan had been successfully carried out.
The columns from Suakin and Tokar had effected a junction at Khor Wintri
on the Erkowit road. It now remained to await the attack of Osman Digna,
and inflict a heavy blow upon him. It was decided, however, in view of
what had occurred, to omit this part of the scheme, and both forces
returned together without delay to Suakin, which they reached on the 18th,
having lost in the operations eighteen Egyptian soldiers killed
and three wounded.

Their arrival terminated a period of anxious doubt as to their fate.
The town, which had been almost entirely denuded of troops, was left
in charge of Captain Ford-Hutchinson. At about two o'clock in the
afternoon of the 16th a few stragglers from the Egyptian cavalry with
half-a-dozen riderless horses knocked at the gates, and vague but sinister
rumours spread on all sides. The belief that a disaster had overtaken the
Egyptian force greatly excited the Arabs living within the walls, and it
appeared that they were about to rise, plunder the town, and massacre the
Christians. Her Majesty's ship Scout was, however, by good fortune in the
harbour. Strong parties of bluejackets were landed to patrol the streets.
The guns of the warship were laid on the Arab quarter. These measures had
a tranquillising effect, and order reigned in Suakin until the return of
the Field Force, when their victory was celebrated with appropriate
festivities.

It was announced that as a result of the successful operations the
Dervish enterprise against the Tokai Delta had collapsed, and that Osman
Digna's power was for ever broken. In order, however, that no unfortunate
incident should mar the triumph, the Xth Soudanese were sent back to Tokar
by sea via Trinkitat, instead of marching direct and the garrison of Suakin
confined themselves henceforward strictly to their defences. Osman Digna
remained in the neighbourhood and raided the friendly villages. On the
arrival of the Indian contingent he was supposed to be within twelve miles
of the town, but thereafter he retired to Adarama on the Atbara river,
where he remained during the Dongola campaign. The fact that no further
offensive operations were undertaken in the Eastern Soudan prevented all
fighting, for the Dervishes were, of course, unable to assail the strong
permanent fortifications behind which the Egyptians took shelter. They
nevertheless remained in actual possession of the surrounding country,
until the whole situation was altered by the successful advance of powerful
forces behind them along the Nile and by the occupation of Berber.

After the affair of Khor Wintri it was evident that it would not
be possible to leave Suakin to the defence only of the 16th Battalion of
reservists. On the other hand, Sir H. Kitchener required every soldier the
Egyptian army could muster to carry out the operations on the Nile. It was
therefore determined to send Indian troops to Suakin to garrison the town
and forts, and thus release the Xth Soudanese and the Egyptian battalions
for the Dongola Expedition. Accordingly early in the month of May the
Indian Army authorities were ordered to prepare a brigade of all arms
for service in Egypt.

The troops selected were as follow: 26th Bengal Infantry, 35th Sikhs,
1st Bombay Lancers, 5th Bombay Mountain Battery, two Maxim guns, one
section Queen's Own (Madras) Sappers and Miners--in all about 4,000 men.
The command was entrusted to Colonel Egerton, of the Corps of Guides.

On the 30th of May the dreary town of Suakin was enlivened by the arrival
of the first detachments, and during the following week the whole force
disembarked at the rotten piers and assumed the duties of the defence.
It is mournful to tell how this gallant brigade, which landed so full of
high hope and warlike enthusiasm, and which was certainly during the
summer the most efficient force in the Soudan, was reduced in seven months
to the sullen band who returned to India wasted by disease, embittered by
disappointment, and inflamed by feelings of resentment and envy.

The Indian contingent landed in the full expectation of being immediately
employed against the enemy. After a week, when all the stores had been
landed, officers and men spent their time speculating when the order to
march would come. It was true that there was no transport in Suakin, but
that difficulty was easily overcome by rumours that 5,000 camels were on
their way from the Somali coast to enable the force to move on Kassala
or Berber. As these did not arrive, General Egerton sent in a proposed
scheme to the Sirdar, in which he undertook to hold all the advanced posts
up to the Kokreb range, if he were supplied with 1,000 camels for
transport. A characteristic answer was returned, to the effect that it was
not intended to use the Indian contingent as a mobile force. They had come
as a garrison for Suakin, and a garrison for Suakin they should remain.
This information was not, however, communicated to the troops, who
continued to hope for orders to advance until the fall of Dongola.

The heat when the contingent arrived was not great, but as the months
wore on the temperature rose steadily, until in August and September the
thermometer rarely fell below 103° during the night, and often rose to 115°
by day. Dust storms were frequent. A veritable plague of flies tormented
the unhappy soldiers. The unhealthy climate, the depressing inactivity,
and the scantiness of fresh meat or the use of condensed water, provoked
an outbreak of scurvy. At one time nearly all the followers and 50 per cent
of the troops were affected. Several large drafts were invalided to India.
The symptoms were painful and disgusting--open wounds, loosening of the
teeth, curious fungoid growths on the gums and legs. The cavalry horses
and transport animals suffered from bursati, and even a pinprick expanded
into a large open sore. It is doubtful whether the brigade could have been
considered fit for active service after September. All the Europeans
suffered acutely from prickly heat. Malarial fever was common. There were
numerous cases of abscess on the liver. Twenty-five per cent of the British
officers were invalided to England or India, and only six escaped a stay in
hospital. The experiences of the battalion holding Tokar Fort were even
worse than those of the troops in Suakin. At length the longed-for time of
departure arrived. With feelings of relief and delight the Indian
contingent shook the dust of Suakin off their feet and returned to India.
It is a satisfaction to pass from the dismal narrative of events in the
Eastern Soudan to the successful campaign on the Nile.

By the middle of April the concentration on the frontier was completed.
The communications were cleared of their human freight, and occupied only
by supplies and railway material, which continued to pour south at the
utmost capacity of the transport. Eleven thousand troops had been massed
at and beyond Wady Halfa. But no serious operations could take place until
a strong reserve of stores had been accumulated at the front. Meanwhile the
army waited, and the railway grew steadily. The battalions were distributed
in three principal fortified camps--Halfa, Sarras, and Akasha--and
detachments held the chain of small posts which linked them together.

Including the North Staffordshire Regiment, the garrison of Wady Halfa
numbered about 3,000 men. The town and cantonment, nowhere more than 400
yards in width, straggle along the river-bank, squeezed in between
the water and the desert, for nearly three miles. The houses, offices,
and barracks are all built of mud, and the aspect of the place is brown
and squalid. A few buildings, however, attain to the dignity of two
storeys. At the northern end of the town a group of fairly well-built
houses occupy the river-front, and a distant view of the clusters of
palm-trees, of the white walls, and the minaret of the mosque refreshes
the weary traveller from Korosko or Shellal with the hopes of civilised
entertainment. The whole town is protected towards the deserts by a ditch
and mud wall; and heavy Krupp field-pieces are mounted on little bastions
where the ends of the rampart rest upon the river. Five small detached
forts strengthen the land front, and the futility of an Arab attack at
this time was evident. Halfa had now become the terminus of a railway,
which was rapidly extending; and the continual arrival and despatch of
tons of material, the building of sheds, workshops, and storehouses lent
the African slum the bustle and activity of a civilised city.

Sarras Fort is an extensive building, perched on a crag of black rock
rising on the banks of the Nile about thirty miles south of Halfa. During
the long years of preparation it had been Egypt's most advanced outpost
and the southern terminus of the military railway. The beginning of the
expedition swelled it into an entrenched camp, holding nearly 6,000 men.
From each end of the black rock on which the fort stood a strong stone wall
and wire entanglement ran back to the river. The space thus enclosed was
crowded with rows of tents and lines of animals and horses; and in the fort
Colonel Hunter, commanding the district known as 'Sarras and the South,'
had his headquarters.

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