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The River War

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The outward journey was unbroken by incident; but as the patrol was
returning it was attacked by an equal force of Dervishes, and a sharp
little skirmish ensued in which one British officer--Captain Peyton--
was severely wounded, nine Egyptian troopers were killed, and three
others wounded. This proof that the Dervishes were on the move
enforced the greatest vigilance in all the Dongola garrisons.

At the end of May, Mahmud with his army arrived at Omdurman.
The Khalifa received him with delight, and several imposing reviews were
held outside the city. Mahmud himself was eager to march against
the 'Turks.' He had no experience of modern rifles, and felt confident that
he could easily destroy or at least roll back the invading forces. Partly
persuaded by the zeal of his lieutenant, and partly by the wavering and
doubtful attitude of the Jaalin, the Khalifa determined early in June to
send the Kordofan army to occupy Metemma, and thereby either to awe the
tribe into loyalty, or force them to revolt while the Egyptian troops
were still too distant to assist them. He summoned the chief of the Jaalin,
Abdalla-Wad-Saad, to Omdurman, and informed him that the Jaalin territories
were threatened by the Turks. In the goodness of his heart, therefore, and
because he knew that they loved the Mahdi and practised the true religion,
he was resolved to protect them from their enemies. The chief bowed his
head. The Khalifa continued that the trusty Mahmud with his army would be
sent for that purpose; Abdalla might show his loyalty in furnishing them
with all supplies and accommodation. He intimated that the interview was
over. But the Jaalin chief had the temerity to protest. He assured the
Khalifa of his loyalty, and of the ability of his tribe to repel the enemy.
He implored him not to impose the burden of an army upon them.
He exaggerated the poverty of Metemma; he lamented the misfortunes
of the times. Finally he begged forgiveness for making his protest.

The Khalifa was infuriated. Forgetting his usual self-control and the
forms of public utterance, he broke out into a long and abusive harangue.
He told the chief that he had long doubted his loyalty, that he despised
his protestations, that he was worthy of a shameful death, that his tribe
were a blot upon the face of the earth, and that he hoped Mahmud would
improve their manners and those of their wives.

Abdalla-Wad-Saad crept from the presence, and returned in fury and disgust
to Metemma. Having collected the head men of his tribe, he informed them of
his reception and the Khalifa's intent. They did not need to be told that
the quartering upon them of Mahmud's army meant the plunder of their goods,
the ruin of their homes, and the rape of their women. It was resolved to
revolt and join the Egyptian forces. As a result of the council the Jaalin
chief wrote two letters. The first was addressed to the Sirdar, and reached
General Rundle at Merawi by messenger on the 24th of June. It declared the
Jaalin submission to the Government, and begged for help, if possible in
men, or, failing that, in arms; but ended by saying that, help or no help,
the tribe were resolved to fight the Dervishes and hold Metemma to the
death. The second letter--a mad and fatal letter--carried defiance
to the Khalifa.

Rundle, who was at Merawi when the Jaalin messenger found him,
lost no time. A large amount of ammunition and 1,100 Remington rifles
were speedily collected and hurried on camels across the desert by the
Korti-Metemma route, escorted by a strong detachment of the Camel Corps.
The Khalifa did not receive his letter until the 27th of June. But he
acted with even greater promptitude. Part of Mahmud's army had already
started for the north. Mahmud and the rest followed on the 28th. On the
30th the advanced guard arrived before Metemma. The Jaalin prepared to
resist desperately. Nearly the whole tribe had responded to the summons
of their chief, and more than 2,500 men were collected behind the walls
of the town. But in all this force there were only eighty serviceable
rifles, and only fifteen rounds of ammunition each. Abdalla expected that
the Dervishes would make their heaviest attack on the south side of
Metemma, and he therefore disposed his few riflemen along that front.
The defence of the rest of the town had perforce to be entrusted to the
valour of the spearmen.

On the morning of the 1st of July, Mahmud, with a force variously
estimated at 10,000 or 12,000 men, began his assault. The first attack
fell, as the chief had anticipated, on the southern face. It was repulsed
with severe loss by the Jaalin riflemen. A second attack followed
immediately. The enemy had meanwhile surrounded the whole town, and just as
the Jaalin ammunition was exhausted a strong force of the Dervishes
penetrated the northern face of their defences, which was held only by
spearmen. The whole of Mahmud's army poured in through the gap, and the
garrison, after a stubborn resistance, were methodically exterminated.
An inhuman butchery of the children and some of the women followed.
Abdalla-Wad-Saad was among the killed.

A few of the Jaalin who had escaped from the general destruction
fled towards Gakdul. Here they found the Camel Corps with their caravan of
rifles and ammunition. Like another force that had advanced by this very
road to carry succour to men in desperate distress, the relief had arrived
too late. The remnants of the Jaalin were left in occupation of Gakdul
Wells. The convoy and its escort returned to Korti.

But while the attention of the Khalifa was directed to these matters,
a far more serious menace offered from another quarter. Unnoticed by the
Dervishes, or, if noticed, unappreciated, the railway was stretching
farther and farther into the desert. By the middle of July it had reached
the 130th mile, and, as is related in the last chapter, work had to be
suspended until Abu Hamed was in the hands of the Egyptian forces.
The Nile was rising fast. Very soon steamers would be able to pass the
Fourth Cataract. It should have been evident that the next movement in the
advance of the 'Turks' impended. The Khalifa seems, indeed, to have
understood that the rise of the river increased his peril, for throughout
July he continued to send orders to the Emir in Berber--Yunes--that he
should advance into the Monassir district, harry such villages as existed,
and obstruct the frequent reconnaissances from Merawi. Yunes, however,
preferred to do otherwise, and remained on the left bank opposite Berber
until, at length, his master recalled him to Omdurman to explain his
conduct. Meanwhile, determined with mathematical exactness by the rise of
the Nile and progress of the railway, the moment of the Egyptian advance
arrived.

At the end of July preparations were made, as secretly as possible,
to despatch a flying column against Abu Hamed. The Dervish garrison,
under Mohammed-ez-Zein, was not believed to exceed 600 men, but in order
that there should be no doubt as to the result it was determined to employ
a strong force.

A brigade of all arms was formed as follows:-

Commanding: MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER

Cavalry . . . . . . . One troop
Artillery . . . . . . No. 2 Field Battery
[This battery consisted of six Krupp guns, two Maxims, one Gardner gun,
and one Nordenfeldt--an effective medley.]

Infantry . . . . . . . MACDONALD'S BRIGADE
- 3rd Egyptian
- IXth Soudanese
- Xth "
- XIth "

Major-General Sir Archibald Hunter, the officer to whom the operation
was entrusted, was from many points of view the most imposing figure in
the Egyptian army. He had served through the Nile Expedition of 1884-85,
with some distinction, in the Khedive's service. Thenceforward his rise
was rapid, even for an Egyptian officer, and in ten years he passed through
all the grades from Captain to Major-General. His promotion was not,
however, undeserved. Foremost in every action, twice wounded--once at the
head of his brigade--always distinguished for valour and conduct, Hunter
won the admiration of his comrades and superiors. During the River War
he became, in spite of his hard severity, the darling of the Egyptian Army.
All the personal popularity which great success might have brought to the
Sirdar focussed itself on his daring, good-humoured subordinate, and it
was to Hunter that the soldiers looked whenever there was fighting to be
done. The force now placed under his command for the attack upon Abu Hamed
amounted to about 3,600 men. Until that place was taken all other
operations were delayed. The Sirdar awaited the issue at Merawi.
The railway paused in mid-desert.

The troops composing the 'flying column' concentrated at Kassingar,
a small village a few miles above Merawi, on the right (or Abu Hamed) bank
of the Nile. General Hunter began his march on the 29th of July. The total
distance from Kassingar to Abu Hamed is 146 miles. The greatest secrecy
had been observed in the preparation of the force, but it was known that
as soon as the column actually started the news would be carried to the
enemy. Speed was therefore essential; for if the Dervish garrison in
Abu Hamed were reinforced from Berber, the flying column might not be
strong enough to take the village. On the other hand, the great heat and
the certainty that the troops would have to fight an action at the end of
the march imposed opposite considerations on the commander. To avoid the
sun, the greater part of the distance was covered at night. Yet the
advantage thus gained was to some extent neutralised by the difficulty of
marching over such broken ground in the darkness.

Throughout the whole length of the course of the Nile there is no more
miserable wilderness than the Monassir Desert. The stream of the river is
broken and its channel obstructed by a great confusion of boulders, between
and among which the water rushes in dangerous cataracts. The sandy waste
approaches the very brim, and only a few palm-trees, or here and there a
squalid mud hamlet, reveal the existence of life. The line of advance lay
along the river; but no road relieved the labour of the march. Sometimes
trailing across a broad stretch of white sand, in which the soldiers sank
to their ankles, and which filled their boots with a rasping grit;
sometimes winding over a pass or through a gorge of sharp-cut rocks, which,
even in the moonlight, felt hot with the heat of the previous day--always
in a long, jerky, and interrupted procession of men and camels, often in
single file--the column toiled painfully like the serpent to whom it
was said, 'On thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat.'

The column started at 5.30 in the evening, and by a march of sixteen and
a half miles reached Mushra-el-Obiad at about midnight. Here a convenient
watering-place, not commanded by the opposite bank, and the shade of eight
or ten thorny bushes afforded the first suitable bivouac. At 3.30 P.M. on
the 30th the march was continued eight and a half miles to a spot some
little distance beyond Shebabit. The pace was slow, and the route stony
and difficult. It was after dark when the halting-place was reached.
Several of the men strayed from the column, wandered in the gloom, and
reached the bivouac exhausted. General Hunter had proposed to push on the
next day to Hosh-el-Geref, but the fatigues of his troops in the two night
marches had already been severe, and as, after Abu Haraz, the track twisted
away from the river so that there was no water for five miles, he resolved
to halt for the day and rest. Hosh-el-Geref was therefore not reached until
the 1st of August--a day later than had been expected; but the rest had
proved of such benefit to the troops that the subsequent acceleration of
progress fully compensated for the delay. The column moved on again at
midnight and halted at daybreak at Salmi. In the small hours of the next
morning the march was resumed. The road by the Nile was found too difficult
for the Maxim guns, which were on wheels, and these had to make a detour
of twenty-eight miles into the desert while the infantry moved ten miles
along the river. In order that the Maxims should not arrive alone at
Dakfilli, General Hunter had marched thither with the IXth Soudanese
at 11 P.M. on the previous day. The rest of the column followed a few hours
later. On the 4th, by an eighteen-mile march through deep sand, El Kab was
reached. A single shot was fired from the opposite bank of the river as the
cavalry patrol entered the village; and there was no longer any doubt that
the Dervishes knew of the advance of the column. Both the troops and the
transport were now moving admirably; nevertheless, their sufferings
were severe.

The nights were consumed in movement. Without shade the soldiers could not
sleep by day. All ranks wearied, and the men would frequently, during the
night marches, sink down upon the ground in profound slumber, only to be
sternly aroused and hurried on. But the pace of the advance continued to be
swift. On the 5th, the force, by a fourteen-mile march, reached Khula.
Here they were joined by Sheikh Abdel-Azim with 150 Ababda camel-men from
Murat Wells. Up to this point three Egyptians had died and fifty-eight men
had been left behind exhausted in depots. A double ration of meat was
issued to the whole force. The column moved on during the night,
and arrived at Ginnifab at 8 A.M. on the morning of the 6th. Here startling
news of the enemy was received. It was known that Mohammed-ez-Zein was
determined to fight, and a trustworthy report was now received that a large
force was coming down from Berber to support the Abu Hamed garrison.
In spite of the long marches and the fatigues of the troops, General Hunter
resolved to hurry on. He had already made up the day spent at Abu Haraz.
He now decided to improve on the prescribed itinerary, accelerate his own
arrival and anticipate that of the Dervish reinforcements. Accordingly the
troops marched all through the night of the 6-7th with only a short halt of
an hour and a half, so as to attack Abu Hamed at dawn. After covering
sixteen miles of bad ground, the 'flying column' reached Ginnifab,
144 miles from Kassingar and only two from the Dervish post, at 3.30 on
the morning of the 7th of August. A halt of two hours was allowed for the
troops to prepare themselves. Half the 3rd Egyptian Battalion remained as
escort to the transport and reserve ammunition, and then the force
moved off in the darkness towards the enemy's position.

The village of Abu Hamed straggles along the bank of the Nile,
and consists of a central mass of mud houses, intersected by a network of
winding lanes and alleys, about 500 yards long by perhaps 100 yards wide.
To the north and south are detached clusters of ruined huts, and to the
south there rises a large, ragged pile of rocks. The ground slopes
gradually up from the river, so that at a distance of 300 yards the village
is surrounded on three sides by a low plateau. Upon this plateau stand
three stone watch-towers, which were erected by General Gordon. The Dervish
garrison were strongly posted in shelter trenches and loop-holed houses
along the eastern face of the village. The towers were held
by their outposts.

Making a wide circuit to their left, and then swinging round to the right,
so as to front facing the river, the brigade silently moved towards the
enemy's position, and at a quarter past six occupied the plateau in a
crescent-shaped formation; the XIth Soudanese on the right, opposite the
north-east corner of the village; the battery, escorted by the remaining
half-battalion of the 3rd Egyptians, next; then the IXth in the centre,
and the Xth Soudanese on the left flank. As the troops approached the
watch-towers the Dervish outposts fell back and the force continued to
advance until the edge of the plateau was reached. From here the whole
scene was visible.

The day was just breaking, and the mist hung low and white over the
steel-grey surface of the river. The outlines of the mud houses were
sharply defined on this pale background. The Dervish riflemen crouched in
the shelter trench that ran round the village. Their cavalry, perhaps a
hundred strong, were falling in hurriedly on the sandy ground to the south
near the ragged rocks. The curve of the hills, crowned with the dark line
of the troops, completed and framed the picture. Within this small
amphitheatre one of the minor dramas of war was now to be enacted.

At half past six the battery came into action, and after a few shells had
been fired at the loopholed houses in the left centre of the position,
a general advance was ordered. In excellent order the three Soudanese
battalions, with General Hunter, Lieut.-Colonel MacDonald, and the other
British officers on horseback in front of their line, advanced slowly
down the hill, opening a destructive fire on the entrenchment. The distance
was scarcely three hundred yards; but the crescent formation of the attack
made the lines of advance converge, and before half the distance was
covered the Xth were compelled to halt, lest the XIth Soudanese on the
right flank should fire into them. The Dervishes remained silent until the
troops were within a hundred yards, when they discharged two tremendous
volleys, which were chiefly effective upon the halted battalion. Major
Sidney, Lieutenant Fitzclarence, and a dozen men were shot dead. More than
fifty men were wounded. All the Soudanese thereupon with a loud shout
rushed upon the entrenchment, stormed it, and hunted the Dervishes into the
houses. In the street-fighting which followed, the numbers of the troops
prevailed. The advance scarcely paused until the river bank was reached,
and by 7.30 Abu Hamed was in the possession of the Egyptian forces.

The Dervish horsemen, who had remained spectators near the southern crag
during the attack, fled towards Berber as soon as they saw the attack
successful. Scarcely any of the infantry escaped.

In this action, besides the two British officers, Major H. M. Sidney
and Lieutenant E. Fitzclarence, 21 native soldiers were killed; 61 native
soldiers were wounded.

The news of the capture of Abu Hamed was carried swiftly by camel
and wire to all whom it might concern. The Sirdar, anticipating the result,
had already ordered the gunboats to commence the passage of the Fourth
Cataract. The camp at Railhead sprang to life after an unaccustomed rest,
and the line began again to grow rapidly. The Dervishes who were hurrying
from Berber were only twenty miles from Abu Hamed when they met the
fugitives. They immediately turned back, and retired to the foot of the
Fifth Cataract, whence after a few days' halt they continued their retreat.
Their proximity to the captured village shows how little time the column
had to spare, and that General Hunter was wise to press his marches.
The Emir who commanded at Berber heard of the loss of the outpost on
the 9th. He sent the messenger on to Metemma. Mahmud replied on the 11th
that he was starting at once with his whole army to reinforce Berber.
Apparently, however, he did not dare to move without the Khalifa's
permission; for his letters, as late as the 20th, show that he had not
broken his camp, and was still asking the Emir for information as to the
doings of the 'Turks.' Of a truth there was plenty to tell.

On the 4th of August the gunboats El Teb and Tamai approached the Fourth
Cataract to ascend to the Abu Hamed-Berber reach of the river. Major David
was in charge of the operation. Lieutenants Hood and Beatty (Royal Navy)
commanded the vessels. Two hundred men of the 7th Egyptians were towed in
barges to assist in hauling the steamers in the difficult places.
The current was, however, too strong, and it was found necessary to leave
three barges, containing 160 soldiers, at the foot of the rapids.
Nevertheless, as the cataract was not considered a very formidable barrier,
Major David determined to make the attempt. Early on the 5th, therefore,
the Tamai tried the ascent. About 300 local Shaiggia tribesmen had been
collected, and their efforts were directed--or, as the result proved,
mis-directed--by those few of the Egyptian soldiers who had not been left
behind. The steamer, with her engines working at full speed, succeeded in
mounting half the distance. But the rush of water was then so great that
her bows were swept round, and, after a narrow escape of capsizing, she
was carried swiftly down the stream.

The officers thought that this failure was due to the accidental fouling
of a rope at a critical moment, and to the fact that there were not enough
local tribesmen pulling at the hawsers. Four hundred more Shaiggia were
therefore collected from the neighbouring villages, and in the afternoon
the Teb attempted the passage. Her fortunes were far worse than those of
the Tamai. Owing to the lack of co-operation and discipline among the local
tribesmen, their utter ignorance of what was required of them, and the want
of proper supervision, the hauling power was again too weak. Again the bows
of the steamer were swept round, and, as the hawsers held, a great rush of
water poured over the bulwarks. In ten seconds the Teb heeled over and
turned bottom upwards. The hawsers parted under this new strain, and she
was swept down stream with only her keel showing. Lieutenant Beatty and
most of the crew were thrown, or glad to jump, into the foaming water of
the cataract, and, being carried down the river, were picked up below the
rapids by the Tamai, which was luckily under steam. Their escape was
extraordinary, for of the score who were flung into the water only one
Egyptian was drowned. Two other men were, however, missing, and their fate
seemed certain. The capsized steamer, swirled along by the current,
was jammed about a mile below the cataract between two rocks, where she
became a total wreck. Anxious to see if there was any chance of raising
her, the officers proceeded in the Tamai to the scene. The bottom of the
vessel was just visible above the surface. It was evident to all that her
salvage would be a work of months. The officers were about to leave the
wreck, when suddenly a knocking was heard within the hull. Tools were
brought, a plate was removed, and there emerged, safe and sound from the
hold in which they had been thus terribly imprisoned, the second engineer
and a stoker. When the rapidity with which the steamer turned upside down,
with the engines working, the fires burning, and the boilers full--
the darkness, with all the floors become ceilings--the violent inrush
of water--the wild career down the stream--are remembered, it will be
conceded that the experience of these men was sufficiently remarkable.

Search was now made for another passage. This was found on the 6th,
nearer the right bank of the river. On the 8th the Metemma arrived with 300
more men of the 7th Egyptians. Three days were spent in preparations and to
allow the Nile to rise a little more. On the 13th, elaborate precautions
being observed, the Metemma passed the cataract safely, and was tied up to
the bank on the higher reach. The Tamai followed the next day. On the 19th
and 20th the new gunboats Fateh, Naser, and Zafir, the most powerful
vessels on the river, accomplished the passage. Meanwhile the Metemma and
Tamai had already proceeded up stream. On the 23rd the unarmed steamer Dal
made the ascent, and by the 29th the whole flotilla reached
Abu Hamed safely.

After the arrival of the gunboats events began to move at the double.
The sudden dart upon Abu Hamed had caused the utmost consternation among
the Dervishes. Finding that Mahmud was not going to reinforce him, and
fearing the treachery of the local tribes, Zeki Osman, the Emir in Berber,
decided to fall back, and on the 24th he evacuated Berber and marched
south. On the 27th General Hunter at Abu Hamed heard that the Dervish
garrison had left the town. The next day he despatched Abdel-Azim,
the chief of Irregulars, and Ahmed Bey Khalifa, his brother, with forty
Ababda tribesmen, to reconnoitre. These bold fellows pushed on recklessly,
and found the inhabitants everywhere terrified or acquiescent. Spreading
extraordinary tales of the strength of the army who were following them,
they created a panic all along the river, and, in spite of a sharp fight
with a Dervish patrol, reached Berber on the 31st. As there was no armed
force in the town, the enterprising allies rode into the streets and
occupied the grain store--the only public building--in the name of the
Government. They then sent word back to Abu Hamed of what they had done,
and sat down in the town, thus audaciously captured, to await developments.

The astonishing news of the fall of Berber reached General Hunter
on the 2nd of September. He immediately telegraphed to Merawi. Sir Herbert
Kitchener was confronted with a momentous question: should Berber be
occupied or not? It may at first seem that there could be little doubt
about the matter. The objective of the expedition was Omdurman.
The occupation of Berber by an Egyptian garrison would settle at once the
difficulties near Suakin. The town was believed to be on the clear waterway
to the Dervish capital. The moral effect of its capture upon the riverain
tribes and throughout the Soudan would be enormous. Berber was, in fact,
the most important strategic point on the whole line of advance. This great
prize and advantage was now to be had for the asking.

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