The River War
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Winston S. Churchill >> The River War
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The opposite considerations were, however, tremendous. Abu Hamed marked
a definite stage in the advance. As long as Merawi and the other posts in
Dongola were strongly held, the line from Abu Hamed to Debba was capable of
easy defence. Abu Hamed could soon be made impregnable to Dervish attack.
The forces in Dongola could be quickly concentrated on any threatened
point. At this moment in the campaign it was possible to stop and wait with
perfect safety. In the meantime the Khalifa would steadily weaken and the
railway might steadily grow. When the line reached the angle of the river,
it would be time to continue the systematic and cautious advance.
Until then prudence and reason counselled delay. To occupy Berber was to
risk much. Mahmud, with a large and victorious army, lay at Metemma.
Osman Digna, with 2,000 men, held Adarama almost within striking distance.
The railway still lagged in the desert. The Dongola garrisons must be
weakened to provide a force for Berber. The Dervishes had the advantage of
occupying the interior of the angle which the Nile forms at Abu Hamed.
The troops in Berber would have to draw their supplies by a long and
slender line of camel communication, winding along all the way from Merawi,
and exposed, as a glance at the map will show, throughout its whole length
to attack. More than all this: to advance to Berber must inevitably force
the development of the whole war. The force in the town would certainly
have its communications threatened, would probably have to fight for its
very existence. The occupation of Berber would involve sooner or later a
general action; not a fight like Firket, Hafir, or Abu Hamed, with the
advantage of numbers on the side of the Egyptian troops, but an even
battle. For such a struggle British troops were necessary. At this time
it seemed most unlikely that they would be granted. But if Berber was
occupied, the war, until the arrival of British troops, would cease to be
so largely a matter of calculation, and must pass almost entirely into the
sphere of chance. The whole situation was premature and unforeseen.
The Sirdar had already won success. To halt was to halt in safety; to go on
was to go on at hazard. Most of the officers who had served long in the
Egyptian army understood the question. They waited the decision
in suspense.
The Sirdar and the Consul-General unhesitatingly faced the responsibility
together. On the 3rd of September General Hunter received orders to occupy
Berber. He started at once with 350 men of the IXth Soudanese on board
the gunboats Tamai, Zafir, Naser, and Fateh. Shortly after daybreak on the
5th the Egyptian flag was hoisted over the town. Having disembarked the
infantry detachment, the flotilla steamed south to try to harass the
retreating Emir. They succeeded; for on the next day they caught him,
moving along the bank in considerable disorder, and, opening a heavy fire,
soon drove the mixed crowd of fugitives, horse and foot, away from the
river into the desert. The gunboats then returned to Berber, towing a dozen
captured grain-boats. Meanwhile the Sirdar had started for the front
himself. Riding swiftly with a small escort across the desert from Merawi,
he crossed the Nile at the Baggara Cataract and reached Berber on the 10th
of September. Having inspected the immediate arrangements for defence,
he withdrew to Abu Hamed, and there busily prepared to meet the
developments which he well knew might follow at once, and must follow
in the course of a few months.
CHAPTER X: BERBER
The town of Berber stands at a little distance from the Nile,
on the right bank of a channel which is full only when the river is in
flood. Between this occasional stream and the regular waterway there runs
a long strip of rich alluvial soil, covered during the greater part of the
year with the abundant crops which result from its annual submersion and
the thick coating of Nile mud which it then receives. The situation of
Berber is fixed by this fertile tract, and the houses stretch for more
than seven miles along it and the channel by which it is caused. The town,
as is usual on the Nile, is comparatively narrow, and in all its length
it is only at one point broader than three-quarters of a mile. Two wide
streets run longitudinally north and south from end to end, and from these
many narrow twisting alleys lead to the desert or the river. The Berber of
Egyptian days lies in ruins at the southern end of the main roads. The new
town built by the Dervishes stands at the north. Both are foul and
unhealthy; and if Old Berber is the more dilapidated, New Berber seemed to
the British officers who visited it to be in a more active state of decay.
The architectural style of both was similar. The houses were constructed
by a simple method. A hole was dug in the ground. The excavated mud formed
the walls of the building. The roof consisted of palm-leaves and thorn
bushes. The hole became a convenient cesspool. Such was Berber, and this
'emporium of Soudan trade,' as it has been called by enthusiasts, contained
at the time of its recapture by the Egyptian forces a miserable population
of 5,000 males and 7,000 females, as destitute of property as their
dwellings were of elegance.
The Egyptian garrison of Berber at first consisted only of the 350 men
of the IXth Soudanese, and two companies of the Camel Corps, who arrived on
the 16th of September, having marched across the desert from Merawi.
But the proximity of Osman Digna at Adarama made it necessary speedily to
strengthen the force.
During the latter part of September MacDonald's brigade, with the exception
of half the 3rd Egyptians, was moved south from Abu Hamed, and by the end
of the month the infantry in Berber were swollen to three and a half
battalions. This was further increased on the 11th of October by the
arrival of the XIIIth Soudanese and the remaining half of the 3rd
Egyptians, and thereafter the place was held by five battalions (3rd, IXth,
Xth, XIth, XIIIth), No. 2 Field Battery, and two companies of the Camel
Corps. As all the Dervishes on the right bank of the Nile had fled to the
south of the Atbara, it was found possible to establish a small advanced
post of Camel Corps and friendly Arabs in the village of Dakhila, at the
confluence of the rivers. From this humble beginning the Atbara fort with
its great entrenchment was soon to develop.
The effect of the occupation of Berber upon the tribes around Suakin
was decisive, and the whole country between these towns became at once
tranquil and loyal. Osman Digna's influence was destroyed. The friendly
villages were no longer raided. The Governor of the town became in reality,
as well as in name, the Governor of the Red Sea Littoral. The route from
Suakin to Berber was opened; and a Camel Corps patrol, several small
caravans of traders, and a party of war correspondents--who might boast
that they were the first Europeans to make the journey for thirteen
years--passed safely along it.
It is now necessary to look to the enemy. Had the Khalifa allowed the Emir
Mahmud to march north immediately after the destruction of the Dervish
outpost in Abu Hamed, the course of the operations would have been very
different. Mahmud would certainly have defended Berber with his whole army.
The advance of the Expeditionary Force must have been delayed until the
Desert Railway reached the river, and probably for another year.
But, as the last chapter has described, the sudden seizure of Abu Hamed,
the defection of the riverain tribes, and the appearance of the gunboats
above the Fourth Cataract persuaded Abdullah that the climax of the war
approached, and that he was about to be attacked in his capital.
He accordingly devoted himself to his preparations for defence, and forbade
his lieutenant to advance north of Metemma or attempt any offensive
operations. In consequence Berber fell, and its fall convinced the Khalifa
that his belief was well founded. He worked with redoubled energy.
An elaborate system of forts armed with artillery was constructed outside
the great wall of Omdurman along the river-bank. The concentration of Arab
and black soldiery from Gedaref, Kordofan, and Darfur continued. Large
quantities of grain, of camels and other supplies, were requisitioned from
the people of the Ghezira (the country lying between the Blue and White
Niles) and stored or stabled in the city. The discontent to which this
arbitrary taxation gave rise was cured by a more arbitrary remedy. As many
of the doubtful and embittered tribesmen as could be caught were collected
in Omdurman, where they were compelled to drill regularly, and found it
prudent to protest their loyalty. The strength and tenacity of the ruler
were surprisingly displayed. The Khalifa Sherif, who had been suspected of
sympathising with the Jaalin, was made a prisoner at large. The direst
penalties attended the appearance of sedition. A close cordon around the
city, and especially towards the north, prevented much information from
reaching the Egyptian troops; and though small revolts broke out in
Kordofan in consequence of the withdrawal of Mahmud's army, the Dervish
Empire as a whole remained submissive, and the Khalifa was able to muster
all its remaining force to meet the expected onslaught of his enemies.
During the first week in October the Sirdar decided to send the
gunboats--which now plied, though with some difficulty, up and down the
Fifth Cataract--to reconnoitre Metemma and discover the actual strength
and position of Mahmud's army. On the 14th the Zafir, Fateh, and Naser
steamed south from Berber, under Commander Keppel, each carrying, besides
its ordinary native crew, fifty men of the IXth Soudanese and two British
sergeants of Marine Artillery. Shortly after daybreak on the 16th the
flotilla approached the enemy's position. So silently had they moved that
a small Dervish outpost a few miles to the north of Shendi was surprised
still sleeping, and the negligent guards, aroused by a splutter of firing
from the Maxim guns, awoke to find three terrible machines close upon them.
The gunboats pursued their way, and, disdaining a few shots which were
fired from the ruins of Shendi, arrived, at about seven o'clock, within
range of Metemma. The town itself stood more than a thousand yards from the
Nile, but six substantial mud forts, armed with artillery, lined and
defended the riverside. Creeping leisurely forward along the east bank,
remote from the Dervish works, the flotilla came into action at a range of
4,000 yards. The fire was at first concentrated on the two northern forts,
and the shells, striking the mud walls in rapid succession or bursting in
the interior, soon enveloped them in dust and smoke. The Dervishes
immediately replied, but the inferiority of their skill and weapons was
marked, and, although their projectiles reached the flotilla, very few
took effect. One shell, however, crashed through the deck of the Zafir,
mortally wounding a Soudanese soldier, and two struck the Fateh. After the
long-range bombardment had continued for about an hour the gunboats moved
forward opposite to the enemy's position, and poured a heavy and continuous
fire of shrapnel and double shell into all the forts, gradually subduing
their resistance. The fugitives from the batteries, and small parties of
Baggara horse who galloped about on the open plain between the works and
the town, afforded good targets to the Maxims, and many were licked up
even at extreme ranges.
No sooner had the gunboats passed the forts than the Dervish fire
ceased entirely, and it was discovered that their embrasures only commanded
the northern approach. As the guns could not be pointed to the southward,
the flotilla need fear nothing from any fort that had been left behind. The
officers were congratulating themselves on the folly of their foes, when
danger threatened from another quarter. The boats had hugged the eastern
bank as closely as possible during their duel with the forts. They were
scarcely a hundred yards from the shore, when suddenly a sharp fire of
musketry was opened from twenty or thirty Dervish rifle-men concealed in
the mimosa scrub. The bullets pattered all over the decks, but while many
recorded narrow escapes no one was actually hit, and the Maxim guns,
revolving quickly on their pivots, took a bloody vengeance for the
surprise. The flotilla then steamed slowly past the town, and, having
thoroughly reconnoitred it, turned about and ran down stream, again
exchanging shells with the Dervish artillery. All firing ceased at
half-past two; but six sailing-boats containing grain were captured on
the return voyage, and with these the gunboats retired in triumph to a
small island six miles north of Metemma, where they remained for the night.
It being now known that bombarding the Dervishes was no less enjoyable
than exciting, it was determined to spend another day with them; and at
four o'clock the next morning the flotilla again steamed southward, so as
to be in position opposite Metemma before daylight. Fire was opened on
both sides with the dawn, and it was at once evident that the Dervishes
had not been idle during the night. It appeared that on the previous day
Mahmud had expected a land attack from the direction of Gakdul, and had
placed part of his artillery and nearly all his army in position to
resist it. But as soon as he was convinced that the gunboats were
unsupported he moved several of the landward guns into the river forts,
and even built two new works, so that on the 17th the Dervishes brought
into action eleven guns, firing from eight small round forts. The gunboats,
however, contented themselves with keeping at a range at which their
superior weapons enabled them to strike without being struck, and so,
while inflicting heavy loss on their enemies, sustained no injury
themselves. After four hours' methodical and remorseless bombardment
Commander Keppel considered the reconnaissance complete, and gave the
order to retire down stream. The Dervish gunners, elated in spite of their
losses by the spectacle of the retreating vessels, redoubled their fire,
and continued hurling shell after shell in defiance down the river until
their adversaries were far beyond their range. As the gunboats floated
northward their officers, looking back towards Metemma, saw an even
stranger scene than the impotent but exulting forts. During the morning
a few flags and figures had been distinguished moving about the low range
of sandhills near the town; and as soon as the retirement of the flotilla
began, the whole of the Dervish army, at least 10,000 men, both horse and
foot, and formed in an array more than a mile in length, marched
triumphantly into view, singing, shouting, and waving their banners amid
a great cloud of dust. It was their only victory.
The loss on the gunboats was limited to the single Soudanese soldier,
who died of his wounds, and a few trifling damages. The Arab slaughter
is variously estimated, one account rating it at 1,000 men; but half that
number would probably be no exaggeration. The gunboats fired in the two
days' bombardment 650 shells and several thousand rounds of Maxim-gun
ammunition. They then returned to Berber, reporting fully on the enemy's
position and army.
As soon as Berber had been strongly occupied by the Egyptian troops,
Osman Digna realised that his position at Adarama was not only useless but
very dangerous. Mahmud had long been imperiously summoning him to join the
forces at Metemma; and although he hated the Kordofan general, and resented
his superior authority, the wary and cunning Osman decided that in this
case it would be convenient to obey and make a virtue of necessity.
Accordingly about the same time that the gunboats were making their first
reconnaissance and bombardment of Metemma, he withdrew with his two
thousand Hadendoa from Adarama, moved along the left bank of the Atbara
until the tongue of desert between the rivers became sufficiently narrow
for it to be crossed in a day, and so made his way by easy stages
to Shendi.
When the Sirdar heard of the evacuation of Adarama he immediately
determined to assure himself of the fact, to reconnoitre the unmapped
country in that region, and to destroy any property that Osman might have
left behind him. On the 23rd of October, therefore, a flying column started
from Berber under the command of General Hunter, and formed as follows:
XIth Soudanese (Major Jackson), two guns, one company of the Camel Corps,
and Abdel-Azim and 150 irregulars. Lightly equipped, and carrying the
supplies on a train of 500 camels, the small force moved rapidly along
the Nile and reached the post at the confluence on the 24th, and arrived at
Adarama on the 29th, after a journey of eighty-four miles. The report that
Osman Digna had returned to the Nile proved to be correct. His former
headquarters were deserted, and although a patrol of sixty of the Camel
Corps and the Arab irregulars scouted for forty miles further up the river,
not a single Dervish was to be seen. Having thus collected a great deal of
negative information, and delaying only to burn Adarama to the ground,
the column returned to Berber.
It was now November. The Nile was falling fast, and an impassable rapid
began to appear at Um Tiur, four miles north of the confluence. The Sirdar
had a few days in which to make up his mind whether he would keep his
gunboats on the upper or lower reach. As in the latter case their
patrolling limits would have been restricted, and they would no longer have
been able to watch the army at Metemma, he determined to leave them on the
enemy's side of the obstruction. This involved the formation of a depot at
Dakhila ['Atbara Fort'], where simple repairs could be executed and wood
and other necessities stored. To guard this little dockyard half the 3rd
Egyptian battalion was moved from Berber and posted in a small
entrenchment. The other half-battalion followed in a few weeks.
The post at the confluence was gradually growing into
the great camp of a few months later.
A regular system of gunboat patrolling was established on the upper reach,
and on the 1st of November the Zafir, Naser, and Metemma, under Commander
Keppel, again steamed south to reconnoitre Mahmud's position. The next day
they were joined by the Fateh, and on the 3rd the three larger boats ran
the gauntlet of the forts. A brisk artillery duel ensued, but the Dervish
aim was, as usual, erratic, and the vessels received no injury. It was
observed that the position of the Dervish force was unchanged, but that
three new forts had been constructed to the south of the town. The gunboats
continued on their way and proceeded as far as Wad Habeshi. The Arab
cavalry kept pace with them along the bank, ready to prevent any landing.
Having seen all there was to be seen, the flotilla returned and again
passed the batteries at Metemma. But this time they were not unscathed,
and a shell struck the Fateh, slightly wounding three men.
No other incident enlivened the monotony of November. The Khalifa
continued his defensive preparations. Mahmud remained motionless at Metemma;
and although he repeatedly begged to be allowed to advance against the
force near Berber he was steadily refused, and had to content himself with
sending raiding parties along the left bank of the Nile, and collecting
large stores of grain from all the villages within his reach. Meanwhile the
railway was stretching further and further to the south, and the great
strain which the sudden occupation of Berber had thrown upon the transport
was to some extent relieved. The tranquillity which had followed the
advance to Berber was as opportune as it was unexpected. The Sirdar,
delighted that no evil consequences had followed his daring move,
and finding that he was neither attacked nor harassed in any way,
journeyed to Kassala to arrange the details of its retrocession.
The convenient situation of Kassala--almost equally distant from Omdurman,
Berber, Suakin, Massowa, and Rosaires--and the fertility of the surrounding
region raise it to the dignity of the most important place in the Eastern
Soudan. The soil is rich; the climate, except in the rainy season,
not unhealthy. A cool night breeze relieves the heat of the day, and the
presence of abundant water at the depth of a few feet below the surface
supplies the deficiency of a river. In the year 1883 the population is said
to have numbered more than 60,000. The Egyptians considered the town of
sufficient value to require a garrison of 3,900 soldiers. A cotton mill
adequately fitted with machinery and a factory chimney gave promise of
the future development of manufacture. A regular revenue attested the
existence of trade. But disasters fell in heavy succession on the Eastern
Soudan and blighted the prosperity of its mud metropolis. In 1885, after a
long siege and a stubborn resistance, Kassala was taken by the Dervishes.
The garrison were massacred, enslaved, or incorporated in the Mahdi's army.
The town was plundered and the trade destroyed. For nearly ten years an
Arab force occupied the ruins and a camp outside them. Kassala became a
frontier post of the Dervish Empire. Its population perished or fled to the
Italian territory. This situation might have remained unaltered until after
the battle of Omdurman if the Dervishes had been content with the
possession of Kassala. But in 1893 the Emir in command of the garrison,
being anxious to distinguish himself, disobeyed the Khalifa's instructions
to remain on the defensive and attacked the Europeans at Agordat. The Arab
force of about 8,000 men were confronted by 2,300 Italian troops, protected
by strong entrenchments, under Colonel Arimondi. After a fierce but
hopeless attack the Dervishes were repulsed with a loss of 3,000 men,
among whom was their rash leader. The engagement was, however,
as disastrous to Italy as to the Khalifa. The fatal African policy of
Signor Crispi received a decided impetus, and in the next year, agreeably
to their aspirations in Abyssinia, the Italians under General Baratieri
advanced from Agordat and captured Kassala. The occupation was
provisionally recognised by Egypt without prejudice to her sovereign
rights, and 900 Italian regulars and irregulars established themselves in a
well-built fort. The severe defeat at Adowa in 1896, the disgrace of
Baratieri, the destruction of his army, and the fall of the Crispi Cabinet
rudely dispelled the African ambitions of Italy. Kassala became an
encumbrance. Nor was that all. The Dervishes, encouraged by the victory of
the Abyssinians, invested the fort, and the garrison were compelled to
fight hard to hold what their countrymen were anxious to abandon. In these
circumstances the Italian Government offered, at a convenient opportunity,
to retrocede Kassala to Egypt. The offer was accepted, and an arrangement
made. The advance of the Khedivial forces into the Dongola province
relieved, as has been described, the pressure of the Dervish attacks.
The Arabs occupied various small posts along the Atbara and in the
neighbourhood of the town, and contented themselves with raiding.
The Italians remained entirely on the defensive, waiting patiently for
the moment when the fort could be handed over to the Egyptian troops.
The Sirdar had no difficulty in coming to a satisfactory arrangement
with General Caneva, the Italian commander. The fort was to be occupied by
an Egyptian force, the stores and armament to be purchased at a valuation,
and a force of Italian Arab irregulars to be transferred to the Egyptian
service. Sir H. Kitchener then returned to the Nile, where the situation
had suddenly become acute. During November Colonel Parsons, the 16th
Egyptian Battalion, and a few native gunners marched from Suakin, and on
the 20th of December arrived at Kassala. The Italian irregulars--
henceforth to be known as the Arab battalion--were at once despatched to
the attack of the small Dervish posts at El Fasher and Asubri, and on the
next day these places were surprised and taken with scarcely any loss.
The Italian officers, although a little disgusted at the turn of events,
treated the Egyptian representatives with the most perfect courtesy,
and the formal transference of Kassala fort was arranged to take place
on Christmas Day.
An imposing ceremonial was observed, and the scene itself was strange.
The fort was oblong in plan, with mud ramparts and parapets pierced for
musketry. Tents and stores filled the enclosure. In the middle stood the
cotton factory. Its machinery had long since been destroyed, but the
substantial building formed the central keep of the fort. The tall chimney
had become a convenient look-out post. The lightning-conductor acted as a
flagstaff. The ruins of the old town of Kassala lay brown and confused on
the plain to the southward, and behind all rose the dark rugged spurs of
the Abyssinian mountains. The flags of Egypt and of Italy were hoisted.
The troops of both countries, drawn up in line, exchanged military
compliments. Then the Egyptian guard marched across the drawbridge into
the fort and relieved the Italian soldiers. The brass band of the 16th
Battalion played appropriate airs. The Italian flag was lowered, and with
a salute of twenty-one guns the retrocession of Kassala was complete.
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