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The River War

W >> Winston S. Churchill >> The River War




Here, then, for a year we leave Colonel Parsons and his small force
to swelter in the mud fort, to carry on a partisan warfare with the Dervish
raiders, to look longingly towards Gedaref, and to nurse the hope that when
Omdurman has fallen their opportunity will come. The reader, like the
Sirdar, must return in a hurry to the Upper Nile.

Towards the end of November the Khalifa had begun to realise
that the Turks did not mean to advance any further till the next flood
of the river. He perceived that the troops remained near Berber, and that
the railway was only a little way south of Abu Hamed. The blow still
impended, but it was delayed. As soon as he had come to this conclusion,
he no longer turned a deaf ear to Mahmud's solicitations. He knew that the
falling Nile would restrict the movements of the gunboats. He knew that
there were only 2,000 men in Berber--a mere handful. He did not realise
the tremendous power of rapid concentration which the railway had given
his enemies; and he began to think of offensive operations. But Mahmud
should not go alone. The whole strength of the Dervish army should be
exerted to drive back the invaders. All the troops in Omdurman were ordered
north. A great camp was again formed near Kerreri. Thousands of camels were
collected, and once more every preparation was made for a general advance.
At the beginning of December he sent his own secretary to Mahmud to explain
the plan, and to assure him of early reinforcements and supplies. Lastly,
Abdullah preached a new Jehad, and it is remarkable that, while all former
exhortations had been directed against 'the infidel'--i.e., those who did
not believe in the Mahdi--his letters and sermons on this occasion summoned
the tribes to destroy not the Egyptians but the Christians. The Khalifa had
no doubts as to who inspired the movement which threatened him. There were
at this time scarcely 150 Europeans in the Soudan; but they had made
their presence felt.

The Sirdar was returning from Kassala when the rumours of an intended
Dervish advance began to grow. Every scrap of information was assiduously
collected by the Intelligence Department, but it was not until the 18th of
December, just as he reached Wady Halfa, that the General received
apparently certain news that the Khalifa, Mahmud, all the Emirs, and the
whole army were about to march north. There can be no doubt that even this
tardy movement of the enemy seriously threatened the success of the
operations. If the Dervishes moved swiftly, it looked as if a very critical
engagement would have to be fought to avoid a damaging retreat. Sir H.
Kitchener's reply to the Khalifa's open intent was to order a general
concentration of the available Egyptian army towards Berber, to telegraph
to Lord Cromer asking for a British brigade, and to close
the Suakin-Berber route.

The gunboat depot at the confluence, with only a half-battalion escort,
was now in an extremely exposed position. The gunboats could not steam
north, for the cataract four miles below the confluence was already
impassable. Since they must remain on the enemy's side, so must their
depot; and the depot must be held by a much stronger force. Although the
Sirdar felt too weak to maintain himself even on the defensive without
reinforcements, he was now compelled to push still further south. On the
22nd of December Lewis's brigade of four battalions and a battery were
hurried along the Nile to its junction with the Atbara, and began busily
entrenching themselves in a angle formed by the rivers. The Atbara fort
sprang into existence.

Meanwhile the concentration was proceeding. All the troops in Dongola,
with the exception of scanty garrisons in Merawi, Korti, and Debba, were
massed at Berber. The infantry and guns, dropping down the river in boats,
entrained at Kerma, were carried back to Halfa, then hustled across the
invaluable Desert Railway, past Abu Hamed, and finally deposited at
Railhead, which then (January 1) stood at Dakhesh. The whole journey by
rail from Merawi to Dakhesh occupied four days, whereas General Hunter
with his flying column had taken eight--a fact which proves that,
in certain circumstances which Euclid could not have foreseen, two sides
of a triangle are together shorter than the third side. The Egyptian
cavalry at Merawi received their orders on the 25th of December, and the
British officers hurried from their Christmas dinners to prepare for their
long march across the bend of the Nile to Berber. Of the eight squadrons,
three were pushed on to join Lewis's force at the position which will
hereinafter be called 'the Atbara encampment,' or more familiarly 'the
Atbara'; three swelled the gathering forces at Berber; and two remained
for the present in the Dongola province, looking anxiously out
towards Gakdul Wells and Metemma.

The War Office, who had been nervous about the situation
in the Soudan since the hasty occupation of Berber, and who had a very
lively recollection of the events of 1884 and 1885, lost no time in the
despatch of British troops; and the speed with which a force, so suddenly
called for, was concentrated shows the capacity for energy which may on
occasion be developed even by our disjointed military organisation.
The 1st Battalions of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, of the Lincoln
Regiment, and of the Cameron Highlanders were formed into a brigade
and moved from Cairo into the Soudan. The 1st Battalion of the Seaforth
Highlanders was brought from Malta to Egypt, and held in immediate
readiness to reinforce the troops at the front. Other battalions were sent
to take the places of those moved south, so that the Army of Occupation
was not diminished.

The officer selected for the command of the British brigade was a man
of high character and ability. General Gatacre had already led a brigade
in the Chitral expedition, and, serving under Sir Robert Low and Sir Bindon
Blood had gained so good a reputation that after the storming of the
Malakand Pass and the subsequent action in the plain of Khar it was thought
desirable to transpose his brigade with that of General Kinloch, and send
Gatacre forward to Chitral. From the mountains of the North-West Frontier
the general was ordered to Bombay, and in a stubborn struggle with the
bubonic plague, which was then at its height, he turned his attention from
camps of war to camps of segregation. He left India, leaving behind him
golden opinions, just before the outbreak of the great Frontier rising,
and was appointed to a brigade at Aldershot. Thence we now find him hurried
to the Soudan--a spare, middle-sized man, of great physical strength and
energy, of marked capacity and unquestioned courage, but disturbed by a
restless irritation, to which even the most inordinate activity afforded
little relief, and which often left him the exhausted victim
of his own vitality.

By the end of January a powerful force lay encamped along the river
from Abu Hamed to the Atbara. Meanwhile the Dervishes made no forward
movement. Their army was collected at Kerreri; supplies were plentiful;
all preparations had been made. Yet they tarried. The burning question of
the command had arisen. A dispute that was never settled ensued. When the
whole army was regularly assembled, the Khalifa announced publicly that he
would lead the faithful in person; but at the same time he arranged
privately that many Emirs and notables should beg him not to expose his
sacred person. After proper solicitation, therefore, he yielded to their
appeals. Then he looked round for a subordinate. The Khalifa Ali-Wad-Helu
presented himself. In the Soudan every advantage and honour accrues to the
possessor of an army, and the rival chief saw a chance of regaining his
lost power. This consideration was not, however, lost upon Abdullah.
He accepted the offer with apparent delight, but he professed himself
unable to spare any rifles for the army which Ali-Wad-Helu aspired to lead.
'Alas!' he cried, 'there are none. But that will make no difference to so
famous a warrior.' Ali-Wad-Helu, however, considered that it would make
a great deal of difference, and declined the command. Osman Sheikh-ed-Din
offered to lead the army, if he might arm the riverain tribes and use them
as auxiliaries to swell his force. This roused the disapproval of Yakub.
Such a policy, he declared, was fatal. The riverain tribes were traitors--
dogs--worthy only of being destroyed; and he enlarged upon the more refined
methods by which his policy might be carried out. The squabble continued,
until at last the Khalifa, despairing of any agreement, decided merely to
reinforce Mahmud, and accordingly ordered the Emir Yunes to march to
Metemma with about 5,000 men. But it was then discovered that Mahmud hated
Yunes, and would have none of him. At this the Khalifa broke up his camp,
and the Dervish army marched back for a second time, in vexation
and disgust, to the city.

It seemed to those who were acquainted with the Dervish movements
that all offensive operations on their part had been definitely abandoned.
Even in the Intelligence Department it was believed that the break-up of
the Kerreri camp was the end of the Khalifa's determination to move north.
There would be a hot and uneventful summer, and with the flood Nile the
expedition would begin its final advance. The news which was received on
the 15th of February came as a great and pleasant surprise. Mahmud was
crossing the Nile and proposed to advance on Berber without reinforcements
of any kind. The Sirdar, highly satisfied at this astounding piece of good
fortune, immediately began to mass his force nearer the confluence. On the
21st the British at Abu Dis were instructed to hold themselves in
readiness. The Seaforths began their journey from Cairo, and the various
battalions of the Egyptian army pressed forward towards Berber and
Atbara fort. On the 25th, Mahmud being reported as having crossed
to the right bank, the general concentration was ordered.




CHAPTER XI: RECONNAISSANCE



Although the story of a campaign is made up of many details which
cannot be omitted, since they are essential to the truth as well as the
interest of the account, it is of paramount importance that the reader
should preserve throughout a general idea. For otherwise the marches,
forays, and reconnaissance will seem disconnected and purposeless affairs,
and the battle simply a greater operation undertaken in the same haphazard
fashion. To appreciate the tale it is less necessary to contemplate the
wild scenes and stirring incidents, than thoroughly to understand the
logical sequence of incidents which all tend to and ultimately culminate
in a decisive trial of strength.

The hazards which were courted by the daring occupation of Berber
have been discussed in the last chapter. From October to December the
situation was threatening. In December it suddenly became critical.
Had the Emir Mahmud advanced with the Dervishes at Metemma even as late
as the middle of January, he might possibly have re-captured Berber.
If the great Omdurman army had taken the field, the possibility would have
become a certainty. The young Kordofan general saw his opportunity, and
begged to be allowed to seize it. But it was not until the Khalifa had sent
his own army back into the city that, being very badly informed of the
numbers and disposition of the Egyptian force, he allowed the Metemma
Dervishes to move.

Mahmud received permission to advance at the end of January.
He eagerly obeyed the longed-for order. But the whole situation
was now changed. The Egyptian army was concentrated; the British brigade
had arrived; the railway had reached Geneinetti; the miserable hamlet of
Dakhila, at the confluence, had grown from a small depot to a fort,
and from a fort to an entrenched camp, against which neither Dervish
science nor strength could by any possibility prevail. Perhaps Mahmud
did not realise the amazing power of movement that the railway had given
his foes; perhaps he still believed, with the Khalifa, that Berber was held
only by 2,000 Egyptians; or else--and this is the most probable--he was
reckless of danger and strong in his own conceit. At any rate, during the
second week in February he began to transport himself across the Nile,
with the plain design of an advance north. With all the procrastination of
an Arab he crawled leisurely forward towards the confluence of the rivers.
At El Aliab some idea of the strength of the Atbara entrenchment seems to
have dawned upon him. He paused undecided. A council was held. Mahmud was
for a continued advance and for making a direct attack on the enemy's
position. Osman Digna urged a more prudent course. Many years of hard
fighting against disciplined troops had taught the wily Hadendoa slaver
the power of modern rifles, and much sound tactics besides. He pressed his
case with jealous enthusiasm upon the commander he detested and despised.
An insurmountable obstacle confronted them. Yet what could not be overcome
might be avoided. The hardy Dervishes could endure privations which would
destroy the soldiers of civilisation. Barren and inhospitable as was
the desert, they might move round the army at the Atbara fort and so
capture Berber after all. Once they were behind the Egyptians,
these accursed ones were lost. The railway--that mysterious source of
strength--could be cut. The host that drew its life along it must fight
at a fearful disadvantage or perish miserably. Besides, he reminded Mahmud
--not without reason--that they could count on help in Berber itself.

The agreement of the Emirs, called to the council,
decided the Dervish leader. His confidence in himself was weakened,
his hatred of Osman Digna increased. Nevertheless, following the older
man's advice, he left Aliab on the 18th of March, and struck north-east
into the desert towards the village and ford of Hudi on the Atbara river.
Thence by a long desert march he might reach the Nile and Berber. But while
his information of the Sirdar's force and movements was uncertain,
the British General was better served. What Mahmud failed to derive from
spies and 'friendlies,' his adversary obtained by gunboats and cavalry.
As soon, therefore, as Sir H. Kitchener learned that the Dervishes had left
the Nile and were making a detour around his left flank, he marched up the
Atbara river to Hudi. This offered Mahmud the alternative of attacking him
in a strong position or of making a still longer detour. Having determined
upon caution he chose the latter, and, deflecting his march still more to
the east, reached the Atbara at Nakheila. But from this point the distance
to Berber was far too great for him to cover. He could not carry enough
water in his skins. The wells were few, and held against him. Further
advance was impossible. So he waited and entrenched himself, sorely
troubled, but uncertain what to do. Supplies were running short.
His magazines at Shendi had been destroyed as soon as he had left the Nile.
The Dervishes might exist, but they did not thrive, on the nuts of the
dom palms. Soldiers began to desert. Osman Digna, although his advice
had been followed, was at open enmity. His army dwindled.

And all this time his terrible antagonist watched him as a tiger gloats on
a helpless and certain prey--silent, merciless, inexorable. Then the end
came suddenly. As soon as the process of attrition was sufficiently far
advanced to demoralise the Dervish host, without completely dissolving
them, the Sirdar and his army moved. The victim, as if petrified,
was powerless to fly. The tiger crept forward two measured strides--
from Ras-el-Hudi to Abadar, from Abadar to Umdabia--crouched for a moment,
and then bounded with irresistible fury upon its prey
and tore it to pieces.

Such is a brief strategic account of the Atbara campaign;
but the tale must be told in full.

On the 23rd of January the Khalifa, having learned of the arrival of
British troops near Abu Hamed, and baffled by the disputes about the
command of his army, ordered Kerreri camp to be broken up, and permitted
his forces to return within the city, which he continued to fortify.
A few days later he authorised Mahmud to advance against Berber. What he
had not dared with 60,000 men he now attempted with 20,000. The course of
action which had for three months offered a good hope of success he
resolved to pursue only when it led to ruin. He forbade the advance while
it was advisable. When it was already become mad and fatal he commanded it.
And this was a man whose reputation for intelligence and military skill
had been bloodily demonstrated!

The gunboats ceaselessly patrolled the river, and exchanged shots with
the Dervish forts. Throughout January nothing of note had happened.
The reports of spies showed the Khalifa to be at Kerreri or in Omdurman.
Ahmed Fedil held the Shabluka Gorge, Osman Digna was at Shendi, and his
presence was proved by the construction of two new forts on that side of
the river. But beyond this the Dervishes had remained passive. On the 12th
of February, however, it was noticed that their small outpost at Khulli
had been withdrawn. This event seemed to point to a renewal of activity.
It was felt that some important movement impended. But it was not until
the 15th that its nature was apparent, and the gunboats were able to report
definitely that Mahmud was crossing to the east bank of the Nile.
The flotilla exerted itself to harass the Dervishes and impede the
transportation; but although several sailing-boats and other river craft
were captured, Mahmud succeeded in moving his whole army to Shendi by the
28th of February. His own headquarters were established at Hosh-ben-Naga,
a little village about five miles further south. A delay of more than a
fortnight followed, during which the gunboats exercised the utmost
vigilance. The Suakin-Berber road was again closed for caravans, and the
Sirdar himself proceeded to Berber. On the 11th of March the remnants of
the Jaalin tribe, having collected at Gakdul, re-occupied the now abandoned
Metemma, to find its streets and houses choked with the decaying bodies
of their relations. On the 13th the Egyptian look-out station, which had
been established on Shebaliya island, was attacked by the Dervishes,
and in the skirmish that ensued Major Sitwell was wounded. On the same day
the enemy were reported moving northwards to Aliab, and it became evident
that Mahmud had begun his advance.

He started from Shendi with a force which has been estimated
at 19,000 souls, but which included many women and children, and may have
actually numbered 12,000 fighting men, each and all supplied with a month's
rations and about ninety rounds of ammunition. The Sirdar immediately
ordered the Anglo-Egyptian army, with the exception of the cavalry and
Lewis's Egyptian brigade--which, with three squadrons, held the fort at the
confluence--to concentrate at Kunur. Broadwood, with the remaining five
squadrons, marched thither on the 16th; and the whole cavalry force,
with the Camel Corps in support, on the three subsequent days reconnoitred
twenty miles up the Nile and the Atbara.

Meanwhile the concentration was proceeding apace. The two Soudanese
brigades, formed into a division under command of Major-General Hunter,
with the artillery, reached Kunur on the night of the 15th. The British
brigade--the Lincolns, the Warwicks, and the Camerons--marched thither
from Dabeika. The Seaforth Highlanders, who on the 13th were still at Wady
Halfa, were swiftly railed across the desert to Geneinetti. Thence the
first half-battalion were brought to Kunur in steamers. The second wing--
since the need was urgent and the steamers few--were jolted across the
desert from Railhead on camels, an experience for which neither their
training nor their clothes had prepared them. By the 16th the whole force
was concentrated at Kunur, and on the following day they were reviewed by
the Sirdar. The first three days at Kunur were days of eager expectation.
Rumour was king. The Dervish army had crossed the Atbara at Hudi, and was
within ten miles of the camp. Mahmud was already making a flank march
through the desert to Berber. A battle was imminent. A collision must take
place in a few hours. Officers with field-glasses scanned the sandy horizon
for the first signs of the enemy. But the skyline remained unbroken, except
by the wheeling dust devils, and gradually the excitement abated, and the
British brigade began to regret all the useful articles they had
scrupulously left behind them at Dabeika, when they marched in a hurry
and the lightest possible order to Kunur.

On the 19th of March the gunboats reported that the Dervishes were leaving
the Nile, and Mahmud's flanking movement became apparent. The next day the
whole force at Kunur marched across the desert angle between the rivers to
Hudi. The appearance of the army would have been formidable. The cavalry,
the Camel Corps, and the Horse Artillery covered the front and right flank;
the infantry, with the British on the right, moved in line of brigade
masses; the transport followed. All was, however, shrouded in a fearful
dust-storm. The distance, ten miles, was accomplished in five hours,
and the army reached Hudi in time to construct a strong zeriba before
the night. Here they were joined from Atbara fort by Lewis's brigade of
Egyptians--with the exception of the 15th Battalion, which was left as
garrison--and the troops at the Sirdar's disposal were thus raised to
14,000 men of all arms. This force was organised as follows:

Commander-in-Chief: THE SIRDAR

British Brigade: MAJOR-GENERAL GATACRE

1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment (6 companies)
" " Lincolnshire Regiment
" " Seaforth Highlanders
" " Cameron Highlanders

Egyptian Infantry Division: MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER

1st Brigade 2nd Brigade 3rd Brigade
LIEUT.-COL. MAXWELL LIEUT.-COL. MACDONALD LIEUT.-COL. LEWIS
8th Egyptians 2nd Egyptians 3rd Egyptians
XIIth Soudanese IXth Soudanese 4th "
XIIIth " Xth " 7th "
XIVth " XIth "

Cavalry: LIEUT.-COL. BROADWOOD

8 squadrons
2 Maxim guns

Camel Corps: MAJOR TUDWAY

6 companies

Artillery: LIEUT.-COL. LONG

Detachment, No. 16 Company, E Division R.A.,
with 6 five-inch B.L. howitzers
Egyptian Horse Battery (6 guns)
Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Field Batteries Egyptian Army (18 guns)
British Maxim Battery (4 guns)
Rocket Detachment (2 sections)


Mahmud had early intelligence of the movement of the Anglo-Egyptian army.
His original intention had been to march to Hudi. But he now learned that
at Hudi he would have to fight the Sirdar's main force. Not feeling strong
enough to attack them, he determined to march to Nakheila. The mobility of
the Arabs was now as conspicuous as their dilatory nature had formerly
been. The whole Dervish army--horse, foot, and artillery, men, women,
children, and animals--actually traversed in a single day the forty miles
of waterless desert which lie between Aliab and Nakheila, at which latter
place they arrived on the night of the 20th. The Sirdar's next object was
to keep the enemy so far up the Atbara that they could not possibly strike
at Berber or Railhead. Accordingly, at dawn on the 21st, the whole force
was ordered to march to Ras-el-Hudi, five miles nearer the Dervishes'
supposed halting-place. The detour which the Arabs would have to make to
march round the troops was nearly doubled by this movement. The utter
impossibility of their flank march with a stronger enemy on the radius
of the circle was now apparent.

The movement of the Anglo-Egyptian force was screened by seven squadrons
of cavalry and the Horse Artillery, and Colonel Broadwood was further
instructed to reconnoitre along the river and endeavour to locate the
enemy. The country on either bank of the Atbara is covered with dense
scrub, impassable for civilised troops. From these belts, which average a
quarter of a mile in depth, the dom palms rise in great numbers. All the
bush is leafy, and looks very pretty and green by contrast with the sombre
vegetation of the Nile. Between the trees fly gay parrots and many other
bright birds. The river itself above Ras-el-Hudi is, during March and
April, only a dry bed of white sand about 400 yards broad, but dotted with
deep and beautifully clear pools, in which peculiarly brilliant fish and
crocodiles, deprived of their stream, are crowded together. The atmosphere
is more damp than by the Nile, and produces, in the terrible heat of the
summer, profuse and exhausting perspiration. The natives dislike the water
of the Atbara, and declare that it does not quench the thirst like that of
the great river. It has, indeed, a slightly bitter taste, which is a
strong contrast with the sweet waters of the Nile. Nevertheless the British
soldiers, with characteristic contrariness, declared their preference
for it. Outside the bush the ground undulated gently, but the surface was
either stony and uneven or else cracked and fissured by the annual
overflow. Both these conditions made it hard for cavalry, and still more
for artillery, to move freely; and the difficulties were complicated by
frequent holes and small khors full of long grass.

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